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Critical infrastructures in healthcare, power systems, and web services, in-
corporate cyber-physical systems (CPSes), where the software controlled comput-
ing systems interact with the physical environment through actuation and monitor-
ing. Ensuring software safety in CPSes, to avoid hazards to property and human
life as a result of un-controlled interactions, is essential and challenging. The prin-
cipal hurdle in this regard is the characterization of the context driven interactions
between software and the physical environment (cyber-physical interactions), which
introduce multi-dimensional dynamics in space and time, complex non-linearities,
and non-trivial aggregation of interaction in case of networked operations.
Traditionally, CPS software is tested for safety either through experimental
trials, which can be expensive, incomprehensive, and hazardous, or through static
analysis of code, which ignore the cyber-physical interactions. This thesis considers
model based engineering, a paradigm widely used in different disciplines of engi-
neering, for safety verification of CPS software and contributes to three fundamen-
tal phases: a) modeling, building abstractions or models that characterize cyber-
physical interactions in a mathematical framework, b) analysis, reasoning about
safety based on properties of the model, and c) synthesis, implementing models
on standard testbeds for performing preliminary experimental trials.
In this regard, CPS modeling techniques are proposed that can accurately
capture the context driven spatio-temporal aggregate cyber-physical interactions.
Different levels of abstractions are considered, which result in high level architec-
tural models, or more detailed formal behavioral models of CPSes. The outcomes
include, a well defined architectural specification framework called CPS-DAS and a
novel spatio-temporal formal model called Spatio-Temporal Hybrid Automata (STHA)
for CPSes.
i
Model analysis techniques are proposed for the CPS models, which can sim-
ulate the effects of dynamic context changes on non-linear spatio-temporal cyber-
physical interactions, and characterize aggregate effects. The outcomes include
tractable algorithms for simulation analysis and for theoretically proving safety prop-
erties of CPS software.
Lastly a software synthesis technique is proposed that can automatically
convert high level architectural models of CPSes in the healthcare domain into im-
plementations in high level programming languages. The outcome is a tool called
Health-Dev that can synthesize software implementations of CPS models in health-
care for experimental verification of safety properties.
ii
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Increasingly embedded computing systems in smart and context-aware mission-
critical infrastructures are exhibiting tight coupling with their physical environment
(Figure 1.1). Examples include: (1) physiological sensors deployed on human body
that continuously monitor health and enable fast detection of medical emergencies
and subsequent delivery of therapies [5–7], (2) smart buildings that detect absence
of occupants and shut down the cooling unit to save energy [8], (3) data-centers
or cloud computing infrastructures that use solar energy for cooling purposes [9],
and (4) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), that use an image of a terrain to perform
surveillance [10]. In such systems either, a) context information from the physical
environment is used by the software to improve performance or energy efficiency
of the computing units (as in the case of sensors scavenging energy from the hu-
man body), or b) feedback from the dynamically changing physical environment is
used for automated control of the environment itself (as in the case of artificial pan-
creas [11], where glucose meter readings from a patient is used to control blood
glucose levels). Systems in which the software controls the physical environment or
uses context information from the environment for computing operations are called
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSes) (Figure 1.1).
1.1 Safety in CPSes
The context driven tight-coupling between the cyber and the physical in CPSes,
though advantageous, is subject to new forms of risks that have not been consid-
ered adequately in the traditional computing domain. These new types of risks in-
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Figure 1.1: Cyber-physical systems, with tight coupling between computing and
physical environment through interaction parameters. Solid lines indicate effect
of computing operations on interaction parameters, dashed lines indicate effect of
physical operations on interaction parameters, and thick solid lines indicate cyber-
physical interactions.
of excessive medication) or vice versa (e.g., throttling of servers in a data center
due to overheating and lack of cooling). Indeed according to a report published by
Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) pro-
gram [12], CPSes are by definition safety critical in nature. Since risks in CPSes may
have direct hazardous consequences on the physical environment, CPSes have to
be analyzed and guaranteed for safety even before deployment.
CPSes are complex systems with many interacting components exhibiting
aggregate behavior [13,14], i.e. properties that are only observed when components
operate in coalition and not stand alone. Hence, safety violations may occur due to
faults in different components of the CPS including the computing hardware, soft-
ware, communication medium, physical environment, and the interaction between
different components, which often cause unwanted aggregate effects. A classifica-
tion of CPS safety violations with respect to sources of faults is discussed in Section
2.1 of Chapter 2. Although safety assurance research has an elaborate history dat-
ing back to 1970s when the US army declared their verification and validation pro-
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Figure 1.2: Safety assurance approaches for CPS software. The principal contribu-
tion of this thesis is facilitating cyber-physical interaction modeling and verification in
MBSV for CPSes.
gram for the safety of their Anti-Ballistic Missile [15], only recently there have been
several cases of failures in CPS operation that have been attributed to software
faults while interacting with the physical environment. The flight control software
of Airbus A320 have been reported to behave erroneously when flying strips are
altered ( http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/8.77.html#subj6 ). The GRASEBY infusion
pumps have been recalled after cases of potentially fatal over-infusions [16] due to
software failures, which were not detected on subsequent testing of the software in
isolation.
Although there has been several efforts to verify the software safety of med-
ical devices including Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) recent endeavors at
static testing [17], most of them consider software in isolation and ignore the cyber-
physical interactions. Similarly safety research in other CPS domains such as UAVs
limit to static testing of the software [18–20].
This thesis focuses on the complications introduced by cyber-physical inter-
actions in assuring safety of the physical environment from hazards caused by faulty
operation of CPS software.
3
1.2 Approaches for CPS Software Safety Assurance
Over the years several approaches for verification of software of a system [21] has
been undertaken as shown in Figure 1.2, which have been also applied to CPS soft-
ware safety but with little success. CPS software often undergoes post-manufacture
safety analysis through experimentations on selected test cases in controlled envi-
ronments. Although experimental safety evaluation is incomprehensive due to lim-
ited test cases, regulatory agencies such as FDA depend on such evidences of
safety for approving CPSes in healthcare (medical devices). The inaccuracy in ex-
perimental safety evaluation is evident from the large number of recalls faced by
several approved and marketed medical device. Reported hazards for such recalls
include serious fatalities caused by malfunctioning of surrogate devices or life sup-
port systems such as infusion pump control systems. A case in point is the sudden
unpredicted over-infusion of drug by the SMITHS MEDICAL Graseby 3300 Auto-
mated injection system recently listed in the Maude database [16]. The device was
recalled and it underwent the same set of tests and no hazards were reported. Thus,
experimental evaluation although necessary, is not sufficient to prove safety.
Static testing of software is another approach that is widely used in evaluat-
ing the correctness of code [17,22,23]. In this approach, each software component
of CPS is first tested in module testing, then the integration of different components
are tested for faults, then the CPS is tested as a whole system. Each module can
be tested in two ways: a) white box testing, where the internal code of a module is
analyzed by testing the execution of every statement (statement coverage), every
branch of execution (branch testing), every condition (condition testing), and every
possible path taken by the input during the code execution (path testing), and b)
black box testing, where the specification of the code as an algorithm is used to
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derive logic specifications, decision tables, test syntax, and cause effect graphs for
analyzing the correctness. This approach is extensively being pursued by the regu-
latory agencies such as FDA. FDA has recently suggested the use of static testing
tools such as CodeSonar to medical device manufacturers for proving safety of their
software [17]. Note that often such testing are infeasible, e.g., the number of paths
taken by an input may be infinite as in the case of while loops and hence traversing
every possible path may not be feasible. Thus, such testings are inherently limited.
While experimental and static testing work on individual test cases or config-
urations of the system, analysis operates on a set of test cases at a time and hence
are typically faster and more comprehensive than the testing process [21]. Once the
implementation of the software is available correctness proofs using loop invariants
or backward substitution techniques and symbolic execution of the code can be per-
formed. Correctness proofs are typically complex and obtaining loop invariant is not
feasible for several software implementations. Although researchers have devised
automated loop invariant deduction techniques [24], they are mostly for synthesized
code and impractical for manual implementations. Symbolic execution of the code
involve classifying inputs based on their effects on faults in the software. A subset
of inputs are then derived, which covers all the faults in the software. Representa-
tive inputs from the subset are then used to execute the code and check for faults.
Such combinatorial analysis technique is prevalent in VLSI system design [25] and
has been recently suggested for software analysis by National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) [26].
All the abovementioned techniques however, consider the software of CPSes
in isolation and ignore the cyber-physical interactions. Further, sole reliance on
these testing techniques for safety assurance is not cost effective, since they ne-
cessitate the presence of CPS software implementations, which are typically expen-
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sive. Any safety hazard detected after implementation may lead to costly redesigning
and re-manufacturing. Finally, hazards in case of faults during experimentation may
cause irrecoverable loss of property and life. Hence, CPS software safety has to
be analyzed before implementation at an early design stage. An approach that is
widely used in this regard is model based software analysis and verification (Figure
1.2).
1.3 Model Based Software Analysis and Verification
The notion of model based software analysis and verification fall under the generic
paradigm of model based engineering (MBE). MBE is a methodology for reasoning
about the properties of a system using simplifying abstractions. Such reasonings
aide in the development of a system by eliminating flaws and checking adherence
to preferences at an early design stage. MBE has been used extensively to de-
velop, manage, and verify, different components of a system. Some of the common
usages of MBE include: a) developing system as a whole, model based systems
engineering (MBSysE) [27], b) managing processes in a system, model based pro-
cess engineering (MBPE) [28], and c) developing the software of a system, model
based software engineering (MBSE) [29].
MBSE involves stages representative of the life cycle of software [29]. It in-
cludes: a) requirements analysis - when constraints such as safety, and preferences
such as development platform for the software implementation are gathered and an-
alyzed, b) development - when the software is implemented in the chosen platform,
c) verification - when the operation of the software is checked for conformity to the
constraints and preferences set forth in the requirements analysis stage, d) deploy-
ment - when the implemented and tested software is customized and installed on
real systems, and e) maintenance - when the software is modified or enhanced to
be compatible with new systems or to cope with newly occurring faults. Model based
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safety analysis and verification (MBSV) stage of MBSE, is applicable to the problem
of software safety verification of CPSes and have recently received considerable
focus [18–20,30,31].
MBSV depends on an abstract representation of a software design in a
mathematical form or as an algorithm. Any such abstract representation is called a
model. The requirements of the system such as safety, is expressed as constraints
on the system properties, which are variables in the model. Mathematical models
can then be used for theoretical analysis (verification) while algorithmic models can
be used in simulations (analysis) for checking compliance with the requirements.
Once the models are analyzed or verified against the safety requirements, they are
converted into implementations, which are again verified through experimentation.
Thus, MBSV provides early feedback that can be used to eliminate flawed design
before implementation. This quickens the process of development, reduces the cost,
and potentially guarantees safety.
This thesis considers model based software analysis and verification for
CPSes in presence of context driven cyber-physical interactions. First, the chal-
lenges to modeling CPS software are investigated by studying several examples
in two specific domains - healthcare and cloud computing. Secondly, a number of
safety analysis and verification solutions are proposed.
1.4 Related Work
MBSV has been widely used for analyzing and verifying the software of CPSes.
In the medical device domain, FDA is performing collaborative research to apply
MBSV theories for comprehensively proving safety properties of medical devices
before marketing. Several efforts [30, 31] have used MBSV in this regard. Also in
other CPS domains such as UAVs, there has been considerable work [18–20] in
guaranteeing software safety using MBSV. However, such efforts isolate the device
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software and physical dynamics with which it interacts through static assumptions
on the properties of the environment. Such isolated analysis may be valid for eval-
uating harmful side effects of CPS operation on the physical environment. But for
CPSes where the computing unit incorporates information from the environment in
its decision making (e.g., artificial pancreas), such isolated analysis fail to provide
accurate safety evaluations. To this effect, there has been a considerable push to-
wards hybrid approaches for modeling and analysis of CPSes where the discrete
time operation of the software and the continuous dynamics of the cyber-physical
interactions can be modeled in a single framework. For example, for smart infu-
sion pump control systems simplified hybrid models are used for verifying drug over-
dose [32]. Another hybrid modeling technique with timed automata has been used to
verify pulse oximeter and infusion pump feedback control systems for administering
analgesic [33]. Hybrid modeling has been of great interest in the UAV CPS domain
where the cooperation of the computing logic and the aerodynamics are modeled
and verified [34, 35]. Several work in the more generic context of CPS has been
proposed, where the authors have developed new hybrid models such as O-minimal
models [36], or applying control theory to CPS safety assessment [37] or online ver-
ification techniques [38], or incorporating real time guarantees in CPS design [39].
However, such research efforts either attempt to use the existing modeling construct
such as hybrid automata or timed automata in the new domain of CPS or consider
the CPS operations with only temporal dynamics. In doing so simplifying assump-
tions to the cyber-physical interactions are made, which introduces inaccuracies in
their safety conclusions.
These assumptions ignore at least one of the five salient properties of CPSes
identified in this thesis. These properties, discussed in the following section, neces-
sitate new modeling and analysis techniques. Solutions to a subset of these require-
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ments are provided in this thesis, while others are open problems worthy of doctoral
research. This need for new modeling and analysis techniques for CPS has been
recognized by the National Science Foundation (NSF), which has invested billions of
dollars on CPS modeling and analysis. The research efforts in this thesis has been
largely funded by three such funding sources.
1.5 Challenges of MBSV for CPSes
Following are the five salient properties of CPSes:
• Hybrid nature: To achieve safety in a CPS, the computing unit needs to ex-
tract diverse types of information, related to say thermal, mechanical, and
electrical properties of the environment. Design and analysis of CPS thus re-
quires in-depth understanding of the characteristics of these information and
their effects on the computing operation. As Willems has aptly pointed out [40],
systems researchers should incorporate detailed behavioral characterizations
of the physical environment in the theories and techniques of computer sci-
ence. Lack of such considerations result in serious violations of safety prop-
erties. For example, in case of a pulse oximeter in a Body Sensor Network
(BSN), if the control of the sampling frequency is not aware of the tempera-
ture rise on human skin, severe burn hazards can occur [41]. This stresses the
need for a unified inter-disciplinary approach towards CPS design for achiev-
ing safety, that combines theories from computer science with other disciplines
of science and engineering. Computing systems typically have discrete oper-
ations with several states or modes of operation while physical environment is
continuous in nature modeled using differential equations. Hence, an unified
approach will necessitate hybrid models that can capture both discrete and
continuous operations in a single construct.
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• Aggregate effects: Many CPSes, such as BSNs and data centers, are fur-
ther distributed in nature, i.e. they comprise of more than one computing
entities (henceforth referred as the computing nodes) distributed across the
environment. Figure 1.3 shows the deployment of the aforementioned two
representative CPSes. As shown in the figure, the heating effects, caused by
the operations in the sensors and the computing servers in BSNs and data
centers, respectively, are the unintended interactions. The distributed nodes
often perform concurrent operations; thus causing aggregation of the detri-
mental impact on the environment from multiple nodes. For example, in data
centers, the recirculation of accumulated heat (referred as heat recirculation in
Figure 1.3b) from multiple servers can cause higher increase in the operating
temperature than the heat from a single server. Similarly, in BSNs, concurrent
operations in more than one sensors can have accumulated heat effect on
certain parts of the body depending on the deployment of the sensors (Figure
1.3a). Thus, CPSes may have aggregate energy interactions, which exist only
in presence of a network. Any modeling solution of CPSes should be capable
of characterizing aggregate effects in case of networked operation.
• Spatio-temporal interaction: The interactions in a CPS, are spatio-temporal
in nature. For example, in case of infusion pumps in a BSN, that inject a
given drug (e.g., insulin) into the human body, the effect of the drug on the
physiological parameters (e.g., blood glucose concentration) vary over space
as well as time. The effect is maximum at the sight of infusion and de-
creases at locations away from the sight being affected by the blood perfusion.
Capturing spatio-temporal effects requires multiple independent variables that
determine the evolution of the model. Researchers have extensively stud-
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(b) Data Center with two rows of racks
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Figure 1.3: Typical deployment of two representative CPSes showing the distributed
nature of the computing nodes, intentional and un-intentional interactions with the
physical environment, and the aggregate effect of these interactions because of con-
current operations in the distributed nodes.
time [18–20, 30, 31, 34, 35, 42, 43]. However, there exist limited efforts to cap-
ture model evolution over both space and time.
Most of the current research in spatio-temporal modeling concentrate on dis-
cretization of space and time, which introduces error in estimation [44–47].
For CPS modeling such discretization errors can lead to wrong safety conclu-
sions. Further, fine grain discretization of space and time leads to explosion of
variables to the point of becoming intractable. Hence, analysis of CPS models
should consider a continuous evaluation of spatio-temporal dynamics.
• Non-linear interaction: Non-linearities are inherent in the physical environ-
ment, e.g., the infused drug concentration variation over time inside human
body follows an error function curve. Hence, CPS models can be non-linear
in nature. Non-linearities are embodied in many different forms in a model in-
cluding delays and multiplicative terms. Theoretical analysis techniques only
exist for specific types of non-linearities which may not apply to a large class
of CPSes.
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• Dynamic context changes: The physical system in a CPS is constantly un-
dergoing change in context, e.g., weather changes, change in temperature,
change in physiological condition. Mobility, for example, is an primary cause
of such context changes in the system. These changes affect the operation
of the computing units in the CPS, for example, movement from indoor to
an outdoor environment changes the packet delivery rate (PDR) of the wire-
less medium, which can trigger a radio power management algorithm in the
sensors of a BSN. Safety analysis of CPSes should consider such dynamic
changes in the environment as a part of the model.
Hence, MBSV for CPSes needs to consider the five above-mentioned characteris-
tics of CPSes. Current techniques and modeling abstractions lack in several aspects
to be applicable to CPSes. A Federal Networking and Information Technology Re-
search & Development (NITRD) report has indeed identified the importance of new
design abstractions for CPS [48]. The research in this doctoral study investigates the
available modeling and analysis approaches for CPSes and evaluates their capabil-
ities to capture the five salient properties of CPSes. To this effect, new modeling ab-
stractions and analysis techniques are proposed and evaluated by applying them to
two CPS domains - healthcare and cloud computing infrastructure. A brief overview
of contributions to MBSV for CPSes is discussed in the following subsection.
1.6 Thesis contributions
The thesis focuses on model based safety analysis and verification of CPS software
in presence of dynamic context driven cyber-physical interactions. Any MBSV ap-
proach toward CPSes should be able to capture the five salient properties - a) hybrid
operation, b) spatio-temporal evolution of system dynamics due to cyber-physical in-
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Figure 1.4: Stages of model based safety verification of CPS software and thesis
contributions. The MBSV consists of three stages modeling, analysis and synthesis.
The thesis has contributions in each of the three stages.
non-linear dynamics, and c) dynamic context changes due to random environment
and human mobility. This section discusses three principal stages of MBSV and the
contributions of this thesis in each of the stages. Three principal stages of MBSV,
as shown in the Figure 1.4, are - a) Modeling, b) Analysis, and c) Synthesis.
Modeling Stage
MBSV depends on models, which are abstract representation of the system compo-
nents and processes. Models can be of various kinds but can be principally classified
into two different types - a) Architectural models and b) Behavioral models.
Architectural models represent a system as a connected graph components
or subsystems. Each subsystem may have properties associated with them. A con-
nection between two component may denote flow of information or a subcomponent
relationship. Architectural models are useful for easy specification and fast simula-
tion of test cases.
Behavioral models represent the internal process of a system using different
types of abstractions. It can be transfer function representation, which views the
system as a black box and gives the variation of output for a given input as a mathe-
matical function or a formal model that represents the system behavior using states
and transitions between them.
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Contributions: To capture the five salient properties of CPSes in models the thesis
makes the following contributions -
• An architectural modeling solution BAND-AiDe [2] for BSNs or CPS-DAS for
CPSes in general is proposed that can capture linear or non-linear aggre-
gate spatio-temporal physical dynamics as well as computational aspects of
CPSes.
• The CPS-DAS is then extended with capability to model cyber-physical inter-
actions under dynamic contexts [49].
• On the behavioral modeling front, a novel hybrid model, spatio-temporal hy-
brid automata (STHA) is proposed that can model linear aggregate spatio-
temporal effects of cyber-physical interaction as well as the discrete computa-
tional operations of a CPS in a single construct.
• For non-linear CPSes having only temporal dynamics, an error bounded linear
approximation technique is proposed to convert the non-linear system into
linear one dimensional hybrid automata.
Analysis Stage
The models in MBSV are used to analyze system parameters and verify safety re-
quirements before implementation or deployment. Model analysis can be broadly
divided into two categories - a) simulation of test cases, and b) reachability analysis.
Simulation analysis is necessary for fast testing of given configurations of the
CPS. This is typically helpful to test worst case operating conditions or for estimating
the amount of resource required for a given operation.
Reachability analysis is more comprehensive in the sense that it takes a
set of configurations of the CPS model and outputs the possible values that the
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system parameters can reach at any arbitrary time. Reachability analysis is helpful
for providing guarantees on system behavior.
Contributions: The thesis explores both simulation and reachability analysis solu-
tions for analyzing safety of CPSes. Following are the contributions -
• The architectural models are used for simulation through a CPS-DAS analyzer
proposed in the thesis.
• Reachability analysis is performed on the formal models discussed in this the-
sis to provide safety guarantees on the CPS models. CPS models have non-
linear and spatio-temporal dynamics for which there are limited reachability
analysis techniques. In this thesis, two real world case studies are considered
- i) artificial pancreas, where the cyber-physical interactions are non-linear in
nature but not spatio-temporal, and ii) infusion pump drug diffusion or pulse
oximeter thermal effects, where the dynamics is linear but spatio-temporal.
The non-linear case is handled using suitable linearization techniques and
then applying existing reachability analysis techniques for linear hybrid mod-
els. For STHA models, a novel reachability analysis algorithm is proposed.
Synthesis
The output of the analysis stage is a model which meets the safety requirements.
The synthesis stage takes the architectural or behavioral model and converts it into
an implementation in a standard testbed. The synthesis can be in hardware or soft-
ware. Automated hardware synthesis necessitates a standardized prototype testbed
such as a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or field programmable analog array
(FPAA). Software synthesis on the other hand necessitates a code generator.
Contributions: This thesis discusses an automated code generator from high level
specification, Health-Dev [50], in the healthcare CPS domain for implementing wire-
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less health systems such as body sensor networks controlled by a smart phone. On-
going extension of this thesis includes emulation of cyber-physical interactions using
hardware. In this regard, field programmable analog arrays (FPAA) are used for syn-
thesizing differential equations in hardware that represent the continuous dynamics.
Such synthesis is helpful in fast estimation of the cyber-physical interactions, which
can be used to profile CPS properties to be used in simulation or reachability anal-
ysis. It can also serve as a physical system emulator using which the CPS software
can be tested for interaction safety.
In the next few chapters, the thesis gives a detailed description of its contri-
butions with examples in different CPS domains, analyzes the usefulness and draw-
backs of the proposed solutions, and also discusses open research problems worthy
of PhD level research on CPS safety verification. Let us begin with a generic defini-
tion of CPS, some example CPSes, and associated safety issues.
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Chapter 2
CPS DOMAINS AND SAFETY ISSUES
A CPS, as shown in Figure 1.1, consists of embedded computing units, which tightly
interact with their physical environment to provide critical functionalities such as early
detection of health problems, securing sensitive data, and enabling long term unin-
terrupted operation. The computing units of a CPS can be characterized by a set of
quantitative properties, C. These properties are related to the computing operation
and are functions of the type of application executed. For example, members C can
be the utilization of a server in a data center, the initial concentration input to a drug
infusion control algorithm [51], the duty cycle of a sensor, or a 128 bit key for en-
cryption during communication. The physical environment in a CPS can be similarly
characterized by a set of quantitative properties,P. Examples of physical properties
include time varying physiological and environmental signals such as, temperature,
humidity, and amount of sunlight.
In a CPS, the properties in C are closely related to those in P through phys-
ical processes that cause variation of the properties in the physical environment.
Such physical processes can be characterized by a set of interaction parameters,
I. The interaction parameters can be associated with both the computing and phys-
ical properties in a CPS. Typical examples of interaction parameters include heat
transferred from the servers in the data center to the ambient air, amount of energy
harvested from the environment, or frequency domain features of physiological sig-
nals. Both the physical and computing properties affect the interaction parameters.
The computing properties are time varying. Hence the mapping between the sets C
and I can be represented by G : C×t → I (thin solid arrows in Figure 1.1), where t is
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time. The properties of the physical environment vary over both space and time. For
example, temperature varies from place to place in a data center and the intensity of
sunlight is low under shade and also has diurnal variation. Hence the mapping from
the physical properties to the interaction parameters, H : P × t × {x, y, z} → I, is
spatio-temporal in nature (dashed arrows in Figure 1.1), where {x, y, z} represents a
point in the coordinate space.
In practice mappings in G either have to be determined by performing profil-
ing experiments, e.g., utilization to power curves for a server in the data center [52],
or can be a result of the execution of an algorithm. On the other hand, the mappings
in H can be determined either by building of models of the physical processes, e.g.,
electro-mechanical models of energy obtained from piezoelectric devices [53], or
can be obtained through signal processing, e.g., extracting security keys from phsyi-
ological signals [54]. The interaction parameters define cyber-physical interactions
as follows:
Definition 1 A cyber-physical interaction is an inverse mapping K from a subset of
I to a subset of P or C.
Example 1 Pulse-oximeter thermal effects: In case of a fingertip pulse oximeter
operation [41], the sampling frequency (C) affects the amount of heat dissipated
(I). Heat dissipated as a function of frequency (G) can be obtained through power
profiling of the pulse oximeter. The effect of the dissipated heat on the temperature
rise of the human body (P) is characterized by the Penne’s bioheat equation [4].
Such a mapping is an example of K. The specific heat and skin conductance of the
human body also affect the temperature rise through mapping H, which has to be
experimentally characterized. ..
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Example 2 Drug infusion: Infusion pumps operate in close loop with physiological
sensors such as glucose meter or SPO2 sensor to control drug infusion. The in-
fusion rate (C) affect the drug concentration in the blood (I) through the diffusion
process. The diffusion process (G) can be characterized by the pharmacokinetic
model [55]. The drug concentration then affects physical properties (P) such as
blood oxygen level, unconsciousness, or cell death rate in case of chemotherapy
through physiological processes (K) such as change in action potential. A control
algorithm in the infusion pump takes the physical properties as input and adjusts
the infusion levels so as to achieve the desired physiological effects while avoiding
hazards such as respiratory distress [55]. ..
Broadly, cyber-physical interactions can be of two types: a) intended interac-
tions, which refer to the usage of information from the physical environment for per-
forming useful computing operations (Example 2) and b) unintended interactions,
which refer to the side effects of operation of the computing units on the physical
environment (Example 1). Further, in case of networked CPSes, there are often
combined effects of the individual interactions called aggregate effects, as observed
in multi-channel drug infusion. A case in point is the increased death rates of cancer
cell when α monoclonal antibody and mathotrexate drugs are infused simultane-
ously rather than when infused sequentially [56]. According to a recent report by
NITRD [12], CPSes are safety critical infrastructures. Safety hazards can occur due
to failures in different components of CPSes. In the following section, let us consider
some of the major types of safety issues occurring in a CPS.
2.1 Safety in CPS
Safety is a property of any system by virtue of which it can be guaranteed that there
will be no harm to the infrastructure and to the physical environment during normal
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or faulty operation of the system. In the literature, researchers have concentrated on
different components of a system and have defined safety in specific contexts of the
computing hardware, network, and software. One of the unique features of a Cyber-
Physical System (CPS) is the interaction of the computing unit with the physical
environment. Hence, for CPSes the safety concerns are related to the interaction
between the computing device and the physical environment.
The most generic definition of safety for a CPS can be found in the ISO
60601 standard for safety of medical electrical equipment. ISO 60601 defines safety
as the avoidance of hazards due to the operation of a medical device under nor-
mal or single fault condition [57]. This definition can also be applied to a CPS in
general non-medical domains by broadening the scope of hazards considered, in-
cluding faulty operation of the computing unit, radiation leaks, thermal effects, bio-
compatibility issues, software failures, mechanical, and electrical hazards. Hence,
safety for CPS has to be considered in both CPS (hazard due to interaction) and
non-CPS (hazard due to failure in computing devices) sense. In the literature, sev-
eral research endeavors have considered different safety aspects of a CPS, which
are listed below.
Scenario safety: It considers the safety of the CPS and its environment from a the
high level decision making perspective. It considers how the CPS handles random
hazardous events occurring in the environment potentially causing harm to life and
infrastructure if not mitigated called criticalities. Ensuring scenario safety guarantees
that under a given number of critical scenarios the CPS will mitigate all of them
and return to a normal state, where there are no more critical events. This notion
of scenario safety can be applied to any system (CPS or non-CPS) and involves
identifying critical situations of a system, developing methodologies to handle critical
conditions, and a framework to manage multiple criticalities occurring at the same
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time. Example research in this regard includes the criticality response planning,
evaluation, and actuation [58] [59] framework developed at the IMPACT Lab, ASU.
Network safety: CPS generally involves a network of computing units communicat-
ing with each other through wireless or wired channels to achieve mission critical
and smart operations. Network channels have problems of contention when the
number of communicating devices increase. Further, the wireless channel is prone
to errors such as bit errors, burst errors, and multi-path fading errors. Under this
circumstances the network safety ensures that information transfered from one de-
vice to the other is not corrupted, reaches within a given amount of time, and is not
lost due to errors in the channel. Ensuring such network safety involve an in depth
analysis of the characteristics of the communication channel and the operation of
the computing device under loss of information due to network errors. This form of
safety is also not limited to a CPS and is applicable to non-CPSes also since it does
not require analyzing the interaction between the computing device and physical en-
vironment. Many medical responses would involve network of medical devices and
it is important to analyze the impact of network delays and packet drops on criti-
cal care operations. Such evaluation of network safety in medical device networks
has been performed by Gehlot in Villanova University [60]. However, in recent years,
there has been an increased interest in using the human body as the communication
channel in several medical applications, where in-vivo sensors are deployed [61]. In
such cases, the network safety will involve characterizing the human body as the
communication channel. However, such analysis is also not CPS specific, as it only
characterizes the properties of the human body and does not analyze the interaction.
Software safety: This is a broad area of research and is related to the operation
of the software of the CPS computing devices. It is applicable for both CPS and
non-CPS systems. For non-CPS systems several notions of software safety exists:
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1. Code safety, which considers safety from coding errors such as infinite while
loops, unreachable conditions etc [62].
2. Control system safety, which considers safety from undershoot, overshoot,
unstability and long settling times (investigated as part of the design of infusion
pumps [63]).
3. Interaction safety: For CPS specific software safety a new domain of interac-
tion safety has been defined in this thesis, which considers the cooperation
of the software of a CPS with the dynamic physical environment. Traditionally,
researchers have focused on bypassing this cooperation characterization and
transforming the safety assurance problem into a well understood problem in
computer science such as formal model reachability analysis. In this regard,
several static assumptions on the physical environment has been considered,
which abstract out the dynamic nature of the physical environment. For ex-
ample, in works such as [30, 31], infusion pump software has been modeled
using a timed automata. The diffusion process is simplified so that the drug
concentration in the blood is incremented by the infusion rate instantaneously.
The problem of safety assurance is consequently reduced to developing bug
free software or a control system analysis problem, which are essentially the
non-CPS approaches discussed before. Such simplified notion of safety, how-
ever, may not entirely capture the hazards resulting from the dynamic cyber-
physical interactions. For example, infusion pumps for chemotherapy require
characterization of the spatial extent to which the drug diffuses. In case of
pumps used for anesthesia [55], the safety analysis requires the time taken
for the drug to reach a particular concentration. Hence in order to guarantee
safety of CPS software it is necessary to accurately characterize the spatio
22
temporal dynamics of the physical environment and its tight coupling with the
computing units. In essence more focus is needed on the interaction safety.
Interaction safety hazards can occur due to different kinds of cyber-physical
interactions:
• Interaction between two computing units: Cyber-physical interactions of
two computing units in different CPSes may affect each other’s opera-
tion in hazardous ways. Recently headphones are reported to interfere
with pacemakers of heart patients ( http://www.medicaldevicesafety.org/
). The electromagnetic interaction of the headphone with the patient’s
body gets coupled with the electromagnetism induced by the pacemaker
on the patient’s heart and deactivates it.
• Interactions from computing units to the physical environment: Cyber-
physical interaction between the computing units and the physical envi-
ronment may have harmful effects on the physical environment.
• Interaction from the physical environment to the computing units: The
operation of the physical environment may impose hindrance to the op-
eration of the computing unit. For example, tissue growth around the
implanted sensors can hamper sensing and communication capabilities.
Addressing interactions safety is a challenging task. Principally, it requires exact
understanding of the physical processes of the environment and the properties of
the computing unit that affect the physical processes. The Table 2.1 summarizes the
different definitions of safety and also identifies, CPS specific ones. In this thesis,
special focus is given on interaction safety of CPSes.
This thesis considers interaction safety in CPSes and provides MBE solu-
tions to safety analysis and verification. Before going into the details of the solutions
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Table 2.1: Definition of different safety categories in a CPS is listed. The safety
categories are further classified as CPS specific, non-CPS or applicable to both






let us first discuss in detail some CPS examples that will be considered as case
studies for illustrating the proposed solutions.
2.2 Ayushman Pervasive Health Monitoring System (PHMS)
Ayushman is a smart health infrastructure developed in the IMPACT Lab for privacy
ensured continuous health monitoring of ambulatory individuals. The Ayushman
has a multi-tier architecture enabling management of sensors, secure storage and
dissemination of data, access control of user health history, query processing, ser-
vice discovery and context processing. At the core of the Ayushman PHMS is a
BSN consisting of a number of physiological as well as environmental sensors such
as photoplethysmogram and humidity sensors and a smart phone serving as the
computation and communication hub. In Ayushman we consider three different con-
texts which vary in their hardware software configurations, communication protocols,
power management techniques, and energy sources.
Home Context
In this context, the user is being monitored in a home environment.
Requirements: The principal requirements from the PHMS are: 1) thermally safe
operation of wearable device, 2) low energy consumption so as to prolong battery

















Figure 2.1: Ayushman workload with varying computation and communication re-
quirements. Computation includes sensing and signal processing for physiological
value based security. The sensor processor is duty cycled and the frequency throt-
tled while the radio is kept off during the computation phase.
Hardware Configuration: The PHMS consists of physiological sensors such as elec-
trocardiogram (ECG), photoplethysmogram (PPG), and galvanic skin resistance
(GSR) sensors, and environmental sensors such as temperature and humidity.
The Shimmer sensors ( www.shimmer-research.info ) is used for ECG and GSR,
and the TelosB sensors used for environmental signals are commercially available
programmable sensor platforms, which have a micro-controller, such as MSP430
( xbow.com ) for computation and a radio for communication, such as Chipcon
( www-inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs150/Documents/CC2420.pdf ) or Bluetooth radio.
The PPG sensor is medical grade and is not programmable. The smart phone is
assumed to have an Atom processor interfaced with a Bluetooth radio for commu-
nication purposes. The Intel Atom processor provides six sleep stages of which the
deep sleep state (C6) consumes the least amount of power. It also supports eight
throttling modes in which the processor operating frequency can be modulated. The
sleep states and the throttling modes are controlled through operating system Ad-
vanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI).
Software Configuration: In Ayushman (as shown in the Figure 2.1) the sensors in the




















Figure 2.2: Generative Model based Resource Efficient Monitoring. The sensor and
the base station uses a model to reduce communication. The sensor only transmits
model parameters to the base station which in turn uses the model to reconstruct
the data.
ts seconds they transfer the data to the base station in a single burst. Every com-
munication is secured by encryption with a secret key, which is established between
each pair of PHMS devices. Key agreement between two sensors is performed fol-
lowing the Physiological value based Key Agreement (PKA) [64] protocol. In this
protocol the two participating sensors sense the same physiological value (Photo
plethysmogram signals [64]) and perform complex signal processing including FFT
computation, peak detection, polynomial evaluation and quantization to derive fea-
tures. The features are used to hide a secret key using the fuzzy vault paradigm
and is exchanged between the two sensors (known as Vault transfer). This secret
key is used for further communications between the two sensors. To maintain key
freshness PKA execution is required every 24 hrs.
Energy Source: Since the user is at home, we assume that all the PHMS devices
are charged using batteries. While at home this should be easy and noninvasive.
Radio Communication Protocol: In the home context, the sensors can communicate
with the smart phone using either ZigBee or Bluetooth. The smart phone commu-
nicates with a laptop using the wifi. To save communication energy and enable
long term monitoring with prolonged battery life, the sensors use model based data
transmission paradigm [65]. In such a technique as shown in Figure 2.2, the sensor
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compares the sensed signal with a model. If it matches it does not send any data,
in which case the base station uses the model to regenerate the signal. If it does
not match the sensor sends the sample by sample data which is used by the base
station to learn a new model. Employing this technique an energy savings of 42:1
for ECG [65] and 300:1 for PPG [66] can be obtained. The model based communi-
cation technique can be applied here since the physiological signals have a definite
structure.
Human Body: The safety of the PHMS depends on the thermal effects of the individ-
ual nodes on the human body. The physical properties of the human body are ob-
tained from previous literature ( http://niremf.ifac.cnr.it/tissprop/ ) where the authors
had done experimental measurements in clinical trials. The physical phenomenon
governing the transfer of heat from the PHMS nodes to the human body is given by
the mathematical formulation by Penne [4].
Roaming Context
In this context the user is either in travel or is out for a jog doing exercise.
Requirements: The principal requirements are: 1) reliable data communication un-
der wireless errors and low packet delivery ratio (PDR), which is typical of outdoor
environments [67], and 2) batteryless operation since recharging is not possible
when outdoor.
Hardware Configuration: Same as the Home context.
Software Configuration: The application workload is the same as in Home context.
However, since there scarcity of energy source several power management tech-
niques are applied in software: 1) employing radio sleep scheduling techniques,
2) enabling processor duty cycling in individual PHMS nodes, and 3) enabling pro-
cessor frequency scaling in PHMS nodes. The workload for Ayushman consists of
intermittent high computation and communication phases followed by longer periods
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Table 2.2: Power available from different scavenging sources in the environment and
the human body. The scavenging hours indicated are gross estimates for the case







Body Heat 0.1 - 0.15 24
Ambulation 1.5 2
Respiration 0.42 6
Sun Light 0.1 3
of inactivity. In periods of low computation and communication, when the sensors
are sensing data (Figure 2.1 short and wide block), the processor can be put to a
low power sleep state and the radio can be shutdown. However, during data trans-
mission phases (Figure 2.1 tall and narrow block) both the processor and the radio
has to operate simultaneously. In phases where only computation is required, as in
the security phase (Figure 2.1 tall and wide block), the radio can be shutdown while
the processor frequency can be modulated to control the energy consumption.
Energy Source: We consider four sources of scavenging energy based on their ease
of use for the host: 1) body heat, 2) respiration, 3) ambulation and 4) sun light. The
authors in [1] provide energy models of scavenging sources which we use in our
case-study. Table 2.2 gives the available power from the scavenging sources and
also the time duration for which they can perform the scavenging operation.
Radio Communication Protocol: The basic radio protocols used are the same for the
Home context. However, given the low PDR, high wireless channel errors are pos-
sible. Hence, techniques such as retransmissions and dynamic power management




In this context, a medical emergency has occurred and the user has to be admitted
to a hospital.
Requirements: The principal requirements are: 1) high fidelity data sampled at rec-
ommended sampling rates, and 2) hazard free operation of medical device control
systems such as infusion pumps.
Hardware Configuration: Medical grade devices and control systems are used in-
stead of commercially available sensor platforms. An example is the infusion pump
drug control system, where an infusion pump diffuses analgesic into the user. The
pump receives feedback on the level of consciousness of the user from the blood
oxygen level through a pulse oximeter sensor. The control algorithm of the infusion
pump maintains a safe level of analgesic concentration in the blood so that it does
not cause respiratory distress in the user [55].
Software Configuration: The infusion pump has a specialized control algorithm pro-
grammed in it, which continuously sends state information and receives control in-
puts from the server.
Energy Source: Energy is obtained either from the batteries or directly from the
mains.
Radio Communication Protocol: Bluetooth, Wifi, and ZigBee are most common pro-
tocols. Often the devices are wired directly to the server.
Context changes
Context changes occur due to random events triggered by: 1) user mobility, modeled
using mobility models such as random way point and Markovian model, 2) emer-
gency events such as detection of fall, epileptic seizure, arrhythmia, and 3) user















Figure 2.3: Finite State Automata representation of contexts and context changes,
ContextFSM, for the Ayushman PHMS. The transitions are governed by random
models of contexts such as mobility or occurrence of physiological conditions such
as epilepsy.
can be represented as states in the ContextFSM and the events can cause transi-
tion from one state to the other. The events can be generated using random number
generators or using the mobility models as generative functions. The ContextFSM
for the Ayushman PHMS is shown in Figure 2.3.
2.3 Artificial Pancreas
Artificial pancreas are wireless control systems, which infuse insulin to control the
blood glucose level of a type 1 diabetes patient and in the process obtain feedback
using glucose sensors. On careful review of several device design submissions, we
derive a generic architecture of artificial pancreas as shown in Figure 2.4. Artificial
pancreas consist of an infusion pump, a glucose meter, and a remote base station
operating as a closed loop control system. The remote base station runs a discrete
control algorithm that takes the glucose meter reading as feedback and the required
blood glucose level as the set point and computes the future infusion rate. This
future infusion rate information is transfered to the insulin pump over the wireless
channel, which then administers insulin at the requested rate. The glucose meter
senses the blood glucose level at specified sampling rates and sends it back to the





Discrete Computing Operation 
Continuous Human Physiology 
Figure 2.4: Generic Architecture of Artificial Pancreas, which consist of an infusion
pump, a glucose monitor and a remote controller. The controller receives feedback
from the glucose meter and computes the future infusion rate using a model predic-
tive control algorithm. It transfers the infusion rate to the infusion pump. Communi-
cation between the pump, controller, and the glucose meter takes place through the
wireless channel.
the most commonly used control algorithms and models of glucose meter feedback
for artificial pancreas.
Discrete Control Algorithm
An artificial pancreas control algorithm is mostly inactive and relies on the patient’s
own insulin management characteristics such as basal insulin rates and activities
causing carbohydrate intake or burn. However, it continuously monitors or predicts
the blood glucose level based on insulin injection and glucose intake or burn his-
tory, and takes action only when the blood glucose level reaches dangerous levels
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such as hypo- or hyper- glycemia. The control algorithm has three active modes of
operation: i) Brake, ii) Correction bolus, ii) Meal bolus supervision modes.
Brake Mode
In the brake mode the control algorithm first estimates the risk of hypo-glycemia of
the patient, R(t + τ), at a future time t + τ from the present time t. Based on this risk
parameter, the braking module attenuates the basal insulin infusion rate. Three risk
conditions are defined in most artificial pancreas configuration: a) no risk stage,
when the predicted blood glucose level at time t + τ, BG(t + τ), is greater than
a prescribed threshold BGpresthresh, b) low risk stage with slow attenuation of basal
insulin rate, when BGlowthresh ≤ BG(t + τ) ≤ BGpresthresh, where BGlowthresh is a lower bound
on the glucose concentration and c) high risk stage with large attenuation of insulin
infusion rate, when BG(t + τ) < BGlowthresh. The risk parameter for these three ranges
is given by Equation 2.1:
= 0, no risk (2.1)
R(t + τ) = k1(k2(ln(BG(t + τ)))k3 − k4)2, low risk
= 100, high risk
where, k1, k2, k3, and k4 are parameters of the artificial pancreas system. According
to these risks the basal insulin delivery rate is attenuated using the Equation 2.2:
Jattn(t) =
Jbasal
1 + kR(t + τ)
, (2.2)
where Jattn(t) is the attenuated insulin delivery rate, Jbasal is the basal infusion rate
and k is a patient specific parameter. Note that the braking mode and the subse-




Correction bolus mode is only active when four conditions are met: a) the braking
mode is inactive, b) there has not been a meal bolus for the last 2 hours, c) it has
been one hour since the last correction bolus, and d) the predicted blood glucose
level one hour hence is greater than a high threshold value of BGhighthresh. If all the
above mentioned conditions are met, then a correction bolus as given by Equation
2.3 is administered.
Jcorr =
BG(t + 60|t) − BGhighthresh
2θ
, (2.3)
where θ is also a patient specific parameter and Jcorr is the corrected infusion rate.
Meal Bolus Supervision Mode
The meal bolus supervision mode is activated by the patient at meal times. This
bolus is to ensure that the patient’s blood glucose level does not exceed dangerous






where Jbolus is the bolus infusion rate, θTDI is the total insulin intake required by the
patient and MS is the meal size. The meal size is categorized into three levels:
heavy (MS = 2.5), medium (MS = 3), and small (MS = 5) meals.
Blood Glucose Predictor Model
In each of the supervisory modes the control algorithm requires a predictor to es-
timate future blood glucose levels. The most commonly used predictor is a state
space model [68] proposed by Chase. Several variants of this model exists in liter-
ature and are used extensively in proposed artificial pancreas model. The insulin
diffusion process is represented using a three compartmental model. In this model,
33
it is assumed that the injected insulin diffuses into the blood through three different
membranes. There are two gut compartments where glucose is stored and the in-
sulin is used up in the resulting interaction. Further, the insulin also diffuses into a
remote compartment due to the continuous flow of the blood. The insulin concen-
tration and stored glucose volumes at the different compartments are represented
as the state parameters of the model and a state vector S (t) is formed as shown in
Equation 2.5.
S (t) = [δBG(t), δX(t), δIsc1(t), δIsc2(t), δIp(t), δBGsc(t), δQ1(t), δQ2(t)]T , (2.5)
where BG(t) is the blood glucose concentration in mg/dl, X(t) is the remote com-
partment insulin action in min−1, Isc1(t) and Isc2(t) are the interstitial insulin concen-
tration in the first and second compartments, respectively in mU, Ip(t) is the plasma
insulin concentration in mU, BGsc(t) is the interstitial glucose concentration in mg/dl,
and Q1(t) and Q2(t) are the stored glucose levels in the first two compartments in
mg. δ indicates the difference from some reference values.
Given this state vector, a discrete time state predictor is employed, which
expresses the current state of the insulin glucose interaction in terms of the state at
a previous time, the injected insulin uin(t), and the meal intake of the patient β(t).
The discrete state predictor is implemented as a Kalman filter with the state space
equation given in Equation 2.6.
S (t) = AS (t − 1) + Buin(t − 1) + Eβ(t − 1), (2.6)
where, A, B, and E are the parameters for the predictor and can be determined from
insulin-glucose interaction profiles obtained using T1DM simulators [69]. In many
of the submissions for artificial pancreas the daily meal intake by the patient β(t) is
modeled using a zero mean Gaussian white noise process. The first element in the
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state vector S (t) is the predicted blood glucose level, based on which the control
algorithm decides on the future infusion rate.
The discrete control algorithm decides on an infusion rate at a chosen sam-
pling period. The effect of that insulin infusion is measured by a glucose meter and
is fed back to the control algorithm, which it uses to build the state vector history. But
in a formal model this glucose meter has to be represented using some mathemati-
cal formulation. In this thesis, we discuss a well studied mathematical model of the
infusion diffusion process that we use to represent the glucose meter in the closed
loop operation of the infusion pump.
Let us assume that the infusion pump has a safety verified software. Ac-
cording to the infusion pump safety criteria as listed in the generic infusion pump
project [62], the infusion rate should not exceed p% of a preset value. However,
this safety criteria does not correspond directly to patient safety. Further, when
the medical device operates in a control loop with the human body as a feedback
the drug concentration in the blood can become unstable and reach unacceptably
high values even if the infusion rate remains within p% of the preset value, hence
hampering patient safety. Simulations on a Simulink model of the infusion pump
confirms such patient safety violations. The parameters for the pump and the phar-
macokinetic model were obtained from a case study on anesthesia infusion [55].
Figure 2.5(a) shows the infusion rate and the drug concentration in the blood over
time for anesthesia infusion. From Figure 2.5(a) it can be seen that the infusion rate
over time has significant overshoot and undershoot before it reaches a stable point.
Further, significant amount of time, settling time, is required for the drug concentra-
tion in blood to reach the reference level set by the operator. A large settling time
may lead to delay in the therapeutic effect of the drug. In case of mission critical
operations such as drug infusion to prevent cardiac arrest [70], a short settling time
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(c) Bolus at 650 ug/min












































(b) Bolus at 600 ug/min




















































































Figure 2.5: Anesthesia pump simulation with no bolus and at different levels of bolus
showing overshoot, settling time, stable, and unstable behavior. Bolus administration
marked by red lines.
is essential to provide therapeutic effects within a window of opportunity. Figures
2.5(b) and (c) show the case when bolus is requested by a patient. From figure
2.5(b) it can be seen that after bolus administration the pump dynamics becomes
unstable. However, after some time the control actions brings the infusion rate and
the drug concentration to a stable value. Figure 2.5(c) shows the same pump but
now with a higher bolus rate (50 ul/min higher) causes the system to be unstable.
Due to this unstable behavior the infusion rate can go above the limits and the safety
criteria can be violated. Further, in case of an unstable operation the reference level
of drug concentration is never reached. This causes over infusion of drugs affecting
the accuracy of the pump to maintain the desired drug level. Thus, violation of the
overshoot, undershoot, stability, settling time and accuracy properties can lead to
patient safety hazards even though the software of the pump is certified safe.
2.4 Data Center Cooling Control
Contemporary HPC data centers use raised floors and lowered ceilings for cool-
ing air circulation, with the computing equipment organized in rows of 42U racks

















Figure 2.6: Heat transfer mechanisms in data center. The cool air from the CRAC is
non-uniformly distributed among the servers. The heated air is recirculated through-
out the data center and finally reaches the CRAC where it is again cooled.
ure 2.6). The computing equipment is usually in blade-server form, organized in 7U
chassis. Often, in data centers, server racks are provided with chiller doors, which
cool down the hot air coming out of the blade servers before it enters the data center
room [71].
The cooling of the data center room is done by the CRAC, a.k.a the heat-
ing and ventilation air conditioner (HVAC). They supply cool air into the data center
through the raised floor vents. The cool air flows through the chassis inlet and gets
heated up by convection from the computing equipments and hot air comes out of
the chassis outlet. The hot air goes to the inlet of the CRAC which cools it down.
However, depending on the design of the data center, parts of the hot air may recir-
culate within the room affecting the thermal map at various positions including the
inlet of the CRAC and the chassis.
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Equipment Safety
The CRAC has to supply cold air so that the inlet temperature of each chassis does
not exceed the redline temperature (T red), which otherwise would lead to throttling
of the operation of the computing unit—an undesirable phenomenon with respect to
HPC job performance (throughput and turnaround time). For the safe operation of
each chassis, the inlet temperature should be below the redline temperature. Thus,
chassis inlet temp 6 redline temp
=⇒
(
cold supply temp from CRAC +temp increase by recirculated heat
)
6 Tred
=⇒ FTsup(t) + DP(t) 6 Tred, (2.7)
where Tred is an n dimensional vector {T redi }n, T redi is the redline temperature for
chassis i, n is the total number of chassis in the data center, D is an n × n matrix
derived from the recirculation among the n chassis [72], and F is an n × n diagonal
matrix where each diagonal element, fii (1 6 i 6 n), is derived from the amount of
cold supply air going to the inlet of chassis i. Note that in absence of recirculation D
becomes a matrix populated with all zeroes [72] and F becomes an identity matrix;
thus the inlet at each chassis is same as the supply temperature. Table 2.3 lists the
scalar symbols used.
Job and Machine Environment
The state-of-the-art in commercially available data center management software fol-
lows a conventional job queuing and issuing paradigm that focuses on optimizing
performance policy metrics, those usually being throughput and turn-around time.
The user front-end of a data center is the submission interface, i.e. the interface of
the scheduler, which decides when and where (i.e. what servers) the jobs to be run
at. A job submission usually provides: a) the executable, b) the input data, c) the
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Table 2.3: Scalar Symbols and Definitions.
Symbol Definition
n total number of chassis
h inter event interval or event period
ctotk the number of servers (blades) job k requires
rac thermal capacity of air flowing out of the CRAC per unit time
rroom thermal capacity of air in the data center room
fii cold supply air fraction going from CRAC to chassis i
di j heat recirculation coefficient from chassis i to j
m mode of operation of CRAC, m ∈ {high, low}
tsw time taken by the CRAC to switch from one mode to the other
ω idle chassis power consumption
α power consumption of a chassis per unit of utilization
u chassis utilization
Nh total number of jobs in event period h
T sup(t) air temperature as supplied from the CRAC at time t
T sen(t) air temperature at the input of the CRAC at time t
T red manufacturer’s redline inlet temperature
T thhigh high thermostat setting for the CRAC
T thlow low thermostat setting for the CRAC
(T thhigh)
max upper bound on high thermostat setting for CRAC
(T thhigh)i CRAC high thermostat setting requirement for server i
∆T th temperature difference between the CRAC high and low thermostat settings
Pmex power extracted by the CRAC in mode m
P f ullj power dissipation of chassis j at 100 % percent utilization. For any variable z,
z f ull denotes the value of z at 100 % utilization and zempty denotes that at empty
data center.
Pcomph total computing power at inter-event period h
PAC(t) power consumption of CRAC at time t
Ey energy consumption for algorithm y
Emy energy consumption of CRAC in mode m for algorithm y
number of servers it requires and the estimated runtime, and d) other constraints
such as a priority, and specific computing node preferences. A computing node is
a chassis containing multiple blade servers. The job run-times are normally overes-
timated by the users [73]. We consider user estimated job turnaround times as the
jobs’ deadlines. The scheduler aborts the jobs that do not complete by the deadline.
Thus, a scheduling algorithm has to ensure meeting of the job deadlines to avoid job
abortion. There are two types of decision making for job scheduling: i) temporal (i.e.
when to start the execution of the jobs), which directly impacts the job throughput
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and turnaround times; and ii) spatial (i.e. where to execute the jobs), which can
also impact the job throughput and turnaround times if jobs are assigned to servers
with low computing capabilities (e.g., processor speed). To ensure no degradation
in throughput and turnaround time, this thesis focuses only on energy-aware spatial
scheduling decision making among the servers requested by the users.
Further, an event based decision making for job scheduling is considered. An
event comprises of arrival of new jobs (job arrival), beginning of job execution (job
start) and end of job execution (job completion). Inter event interval, also referred
to as event period (denoted by the symbol h), is the time between two consecutive
job start and completion events. Computing power in a data center changes when
a job starts or ends execution on a machine. Therefore, the computing power in
any inter-event interval is constant over time. The following sections will describe
the behavior of the CRAC unit in the data center and the inter-dependency of the
cooling behavior with the computing power consumption.
CRAC Behavior
The CRAC can have many different modes of operation. For simplicity, in this thesis,
we assume two operational modes viz. high and low modes. During its operation
the CRAC oscillates between the high and low modes. In each mode, the CRAC
extracts a constant amount of power Phighex and Plowex , respectively. Figure 2.7 shows
the variations in the CRAC input (i.e. ceiling temperature) and output (i.e. supply
temperature) over time from temperature sensor measurements in the ASU HPC
data centers. The difference between these two temperatures (that determines the
power extracted by the CRAC unit) clearly shows two distinct values indicating two
operational modes.
A mode epoch is the time duration for which the CRAC operates in a particu-
lar mode. In a CRAC mode, the input temperature linearly varies with time. The line
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gradient depends on: i) the difference of power generated in the data center, Pcomph ,
and power extracted by the CRAC [74]; and ii) the thermal capacity of air in the data
center room. Since the extracted power is different for different CRAC modes, the
temperature rise depends on which mode the CRAC is in. The temperature of the
supply air from the CRAC linearly varies with the input temperature based on the
power extracted by the CRAC.
CRAC Power Consumption
The CRAC power consumption depends on the CRAC power mode (i.e. the power
extracted by the CRAC) and Coefficient Of Performance (COP) of the CRAC. The
COP of the CRAC to supply air at temperature T sup(t) at an instance t is normally
given by COP(T sup(t)) = T
sup(t)
T sen(t)−T sup(t) , where T
sen(t) is the CRAC input temperature
(Figure 2.6) at the instance t [75]. The above assumption on the COP of the CRAC
unit enables the computation of the energy dissipated by a cooling unit in the op-
erating mode m. The COP is given by racT
sup(t)
Pmex
. The power consumption to run the









Any technique to reduce the CRAC power consumption has to operate in lower
modes, reducing the Pmex, and increase the T
sup(t) as far as possible.
Inter-dependency of Cooling and Job Management
As the data center utilization increases, power consumption at the chassis in-
creases; requiring lower supply temperature to meet the redline (Equation 2.7) [73].
The supply temperature is maximum for 0% utilization and minimum for 100% utiliza-
tion. Generally, however, if there is heat recirculation, the heat input to the chassis
increases; thus requiring lower T sup(t) to keep the temperature within the redline




























































CRAC supply and input temperature over time
CRAC input temperature (left axis)
CRAC supply temperature (left axis)
difference (right axis)
Figure 2.7: Variations in the CRAC input and output temperature based on actual
sensor measurements in the ASU HPC data center. The difference in these temper-
atures indicates the two operational modes of the CRAC.
perature from the CRAC. In a particular CRAC mode, the supply temperature also
changes linearly at the same rate as the CRAC input temperature. It should be noted
that the maximum temperature can be reached when the power extraction from the
CRAC is low, i.e. when it is operating in the low mode.
The CRAC switches mode when the CRAC input temperature reaches the
thermostat set temperatures. When the input temperature goes below a low ther-
mostat set temperature, T thlow, the CRAC mode is changed from the high to low.
Similarly, when T sen(t) reaches the high thermostat set temperature T thhigh, the CRAC
mode is changed from low to high. The CRAC does not change modes instanta-
neously. After the T sen(t) crosses a set temperature the CRAC takes tsw amount of
time to change mode. The maximum input temperature to the CRAC and hence the
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maximum supply temperature, T supmax, is therefore dependent on the high thermostat
set temperatures and any temperature increase during the switching time, tsw, as
follows:
max supply temp = max CRAC input temp − temp reduction due to CRAC cooling in low mode
=⇒ T supmax = max CRAC input temp − Plowex /rac
=⇒ T supmax =
(
high thermostat temp + input temp increase at low CRAC mode for tsw
)
− Plowex /rac








where rac is the thermal capacity of the air flowing out of the CRAC per unit time.
It can be concluded from Equation 2.9 that the maximum supply temperature from
the CRAC depends on the high thermostat settings and the computing power in the
data center. Hence, job management (i.e. scheduling and placement) and server
power management, both of which determine the computing power consumption, in
conjunction with the CRAC management (i.e. dynamically updating the thermostat
settings) need to be performed in such a way that for the maximum supply temper-
ature, the redline temperature is not violated (Equation 2.7).
A programmable thermostat is typically available in data centers where the
set temperatures can be dynamically changed. However, the CRAC maintains
a constant difference, ∆T th, between the high and low thermostat settings1 (i.e.
∆T th = T thhigh − T thlow). Depending on this difference, the minimum possible supply
temperature, T supmin , from the CRAC can be determined (in the same way as T
sup
min in
Equation 2.9) when the input temperature reaches the low thermostat set point and
the CRAC operates at a high mode (i.e. the power extraction by the CRAC is higher):
1In the rest of the thesis, changing the high thermostat set temperature refers to changing both
the set temperatures.
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Equation 2.10 shows how an increase in the high thermostat set temperature can
increase the supply temperature; thus potentially reducing the CRAC power con-
sumption (from Equation 2.8). The design of cooling-aware spatial job scheduling
algorithm, HTS, allows higher thermostat set temperatures.
HTS Algorithm Design
This is a cyber-physically oriented energy management algorithm developed in this
thesis. The principal intuition behind the algorithm is to: i) statically rank the servers
from best to worst (according to the potential load, i.e. the required thermostat
setting, incurred on the CRAC); ii) place (i.e. assign) temporally scheduled jobs
to the best ranked servers; and iii) dynamically set the thermostat to the required
value. Figure 2.8 presents the intuitive operational flow showing the aforementioned
four operations and their inter-dependencies. The following subsections describe
these three operations.
Server Ranking
The ranking of the servers is necessary for the job placement to assign jobs based
on the server ranks. To counter the energy inefficiencies because of the dependency
on the CRAC thermostat setting, the HTS algorithm ranks the servers based on their
requirement on CRAC thermostat to keep the inlet temperature within the redline
temperature. The servers are ranked from highest to lowest thermostat temperature
requirement. The jobs are then placed according to the server ranking; thus allowing
the CRAC thermostat setting to be increased.
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Figure 2.8: Architecture and work-flow of HTS. Each server is assigned a high CRAC
threshold temperature that it requires to avoid redlining. The workload manager
prefers servers with high CRAC thresholds and sets the CRAC threshold tempera-
ture to the lowest high threshold temperature among the chosen servers.
The power consumption of the servers impact the upper bound on the CRAC
thermostat settings (Equation 2.12). Finding the optimal placement is NP-complete
and may require hours of operation [73]. As such HTS performs a static ranking of
the servers based on full utilization of the data center, which yields the thermostat
setting requirement for a server i as follows:
(T thhigh)i =








f ull − Plowex
rroom
tsw, (2.11)
where P f ullj is the power consumption of chassis j at 100% utilization. The servers
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are then statically ranked in the decreasing order of (T thhigh)i. The server ranking, is
an one-time initialization process (performed in procedure Initialization in Algorithm
2.1). The ranks are represented by ranking vector R.
Job Placement
As shown in Figure 2.8, the Spatial Job Scheduler takes the jobs from the sched-
uled job queue2 and places them to the servers based on their ranks (procedure
HTS in Algorithm 2.1). Such rank-based job placement can be easily incorporated
in the current job management softwares. For example, the widely used Moab job
management software allows setting up server priorities in the software’s configu-
ration [76]. The server ranking presented in the previous section can be used to
prioritize the servers in Moab. The priority-based job assignment can then be en-
abled for job placement.
Dynamic Thermostat Setting
After placing the jobs, EDF-HTS sets the thermostat setting to the highest possible
value given by Equation 2.12. As shown in Figure 2.8, first the required thermo-
stat set temperature is determined followed by actually setting the thermostat to the
required value. Equation 2.12 is used to determine the required thermostat set-
ting after the job placement is performed. Unlike the server ranking in Section 2.4
(where the data center was assumed to be fully utilized), the thermostat requirement
is computed based on the actual server utilization after job placement.
With the CPS perspective in mind let us now focus on the paradigm of model
based engineering to better understand how such a technique can be useful for CPS
safety analysis and verification.
2Here the assumption is that the jobs are already temporally scheduled, i.e. the jobs’ start times
are decided by some temporal scheduling algorithm.
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Algorithm 2.1: HTS integrated in the spatio-temporal job scheduling
procedure INITIALIZATION( )
Group nodes with respect to power specifications.
Sort groups with respect to computing efficiency
(i.e. MIPS/watt).
Perform server rankings, R, according to the
requirement of thermostat set temperature to
meet the redline for 100% utilization (Equation 2.11).
end procedure
procedure HTS( )
Place job to available node(s) with the lowest rank in R.
Determine the power distribution vector,Ph.
Set the CRAC thermostat using SETTHERMOSTAT(Ph).
end procedure
procedure SETTHERMOSTAT(Ph)












Dispatch the next job in this group’s queue using HTS ().
Determine the power distribution vector,Ph.
Remove the job from the queue.
Set the CRAC thermostat using SETTHERMOSTAT(Ph).
end procedure
procedure UPONJOBARRIVAL( )
if job comes with node restrictions then
Insert the job in the queue of the specified node group based on a scheduling policy (e.g.
FCFS or EDF).
else
Insert the job in the most energy-efficient group queue based on a scheduling policy (e.g.
FCFS or EDF).
end if
for each node group, from the most to least efficient node do
if job’s finish estimation > deadline then
(1) Insert the job in an “opening” having enough free servers for enough time. Continue
with next job.
(2) If Step 1 fails, push-fit the job at an earlier “time” if shifting jobs still make the deadline.
Continue with next job.
(3) If Step 2 fails, add the job to next group’s queue.
end if
if required nodes in this group are idle then
Dispatch the job in this group’s queue using HTS ().






BACKGROUND ON MODEL BASED ENGINEERING
This chapter gives a brief background of model based engineering and the different
types of models and analysis that can be carried out on models with examples. An
overview of the model based engineering methodology is provided in Section 1.6 of
Chapter 1. MBE has three phases - a) modeling, b) analysis, and c) synthesis phase
and we will provide a background on each of the phases in the following sections.
3.1 Modeling Phase
The basic component of MBE is a model. However, before defining a model let us
first consider the definition of a system for which we are building the model.
Definition 2 System: A system is a collection of interacting components each hav-







Figure 3.1: System is a combination of interacting components with inputs and out-
puts. Any parameter affecting the operation of the system and is outside the system
boundary is an input. Any parameter observable from outside the system boundary
is an output.
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combination of the individual component behavior. A system has a system bound-
ary. Any variable with a source outside the boundary affecting the system behavior
is an input to the system. Any observable property of the system is the output of the
system.
Figure 3.1 shows a system with interacting components. A system boundary is used
to identify the components within the system and the inputs and outputs. Any vari-
ation with source outside the system boundary affecting components of the system
is denoted as input. Any observable system property outside the system boundary
is called output. Given this definition we consider the definition of a model.
Definition 3 Model: A model is a simplified representation of a real system.
This definition includes a large number of possibilities that model can mean. A model
thus can mean a mathematical representation using equations, or a physical model,
which can be a mock up of the real system using off-the-shelve components, or
a visual model, including drawings and plans, or textual models, such as English
text specification. However, any representation of a real system is not useful unless
certain properties or requirements are satisfied. These requirements are related
to how close the model is to the real system and whether the model satisfies con-
straints set by the designer. If a model is close to the real system to the satisfaction
of the designer then the model is called a validated model. If the model satisfies
constraints set by the designer then the model is called a verified model. A vali-
dated and verified model, i.e. a model built to the satisfaction of the requirements,
represents the real system and shows a conceptual implementation that can satisfy
constraints. The requirements on the model that validates it are called functional
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Figure 3.2: Visual model of Pulse Oximeter with components, subcomponents, and
connections indicating flow of data in between them.
Example 3 Model of a pulse oximeter: A pulse oximeter is a medical device that
is installed on the index finger or on the ear lobe of a person, and it measures the
blood oxygen level and pulse rate by passing light through the ear lobe or index
finger. A visual model of the pulse-oximeter is shown in the Figure 3.2. The heat
dissipation in the pulse-oximeter due to transfer of light through the human body
can be modeled using a mathematical equation, Penne’s bioheat equation [4]. If the
temperature rise predicted by the model matches that from the real system then the
model is validated. If the temperature rise predicted by the model is within limits
such that it wont burn the skin, a safety requirement, then it is verified for safety. ..
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Figure 3.3: Specification of the architectural model of Pulse Oximeter in Architectural
Analysis and Design Language (AADL).
Models can be classified into two basic types - architectural models and
behavioral models.
Architectural model
Architectural model is a representation of a system using components and subcom-
ponents and connections between them. The connections represent subcomponent
relationship and data flow between components. Unified modeling language (UML)
and system modeling language (SysML) are means for architectural modeling of
systems. An architectural modeling language extensively used in this thesis is the
Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) and Example 4 shows one such
case.
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Example 4 Pulse oximeter model: Figure 3.3 shows the AADL model of the pulse
oximeter. The AADL model shows that a pulse oximeter has a computing unit, which
is attached to the human body part (skin). Within the computing unit component
there is a radio, processor, and LED subcomponents. There is also a subcomponent
for the human skin which is connected to the computing component. The connection
represents heat transfer from the computing unit to the human skin. ..
Architectural models thus represent the what components the system is
made of. They do not explain how the system behaves.
Behavioral model
The system behavior is described by a behavioral model. A behavioral model is
a representation of the processes inside a system that causes observable outputs
for given inputs. Often it is a mapping of the input to an observable output through
mathematical equations, computational models, or transfer functions. There are
several types of behavioral models as discussed below -
Mathematical equations
Mathematical equations represent the output of a system as a function of its inputs.
Example 5 Bouncing ball: Consider the system with a ball and a floor. The system
consists of the ball and gravity, while the floor is outside the system boundary. The
ball is bouncing on the floor. The behavior of bouncing is represented by kinematic
equations -
h¨ = −g, if h˙ ≥ 0 (3.1)
h˙ = −γh˙, at h = 0,
where, h is the height of the ball from the ground and is an observable parameter
and hence is the output of the system, g is the acceleration due to gravity and is a
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system property, and γ is a damping factor and is a property of the floor and hence
is an input to the system. ..
Mathematical models thus express the system behavior with respect to an inde-
pendent variable for different inputs. Mathematical models of systems can become
abstract and may seem removed from the real system due to several assumptions.
Hence, it is of utmost importance to validate a mathematical model such that it cor-
responds to the real system.
Transfer function model
A transfer function model views the system as a black box and expressed the output
as a function of the input. The transfer function model abstracts the system behavior
in a single reversible function. Thus it is very easy to obtain the output for a given
input and also the input for an observed output by just inverting the transfer function.
Thus instead of representing the system behavior with respect to an independent
variable the transfer function expresses the nature of system behavior for different
inputs. Thus for a given input the transfer function has to solved or transformed to
obtain variation with respect to independent variables such as time or space.
Example 6 R-C circuit: Consider an R-C circuit as shown in Figure 3.4 where the
input is a voltage source and the output is the voltage across the resistor. The
transfer function is obtained by applying Kirchoff’s law in the Laplace domain as





Here s is the laplace transform parameter and an inverse transform is needed for











Figure 3.4: R-C Circuit system where the voltage Vin is the input and voltage across
the resistor Vout is the output.
Computational model
Computational models express the behavior of a system using a finite number of well
defined steps. Possible computational models are algorithms, or constructs having
a well defined execution method such as Turing machines. The usefulness of such
models is that the behavior of the system can be classified into types and theorems
on the properties of the model can be proven.
Algorithmic model: An algorithmic model is a representation of the behavior of a
system as an algorithm or a finite number of well defined steps.
Example 7 Consider a binary search engine that searches a given element from a
sorted array. The behavior of this search engine can be expressed in the form of an
algorithm as shown in Algorithm 3.1 Note that the algorithm finished in a finite num-
ber of steps when CurrentIndex becomes 0. None of the steps are non-deterministic
and do not have ambiguous implications. ..
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Algorithm 3.1: Index = BinSearch(Sorted Array A, Number N)
1: CurrentIndex = length of A/2;
2: CurrentArray = A;
3: if CurrentIndex == 0 then
4: Number N not found
5: end if
6: if (CurrentArray(CurrentIndex) = N) then
7: Index = N;
8: return(Index);
9: else if (CurrentArray(CurrentIndex) > N) then
10: Index = BinSearch(A(0 - CurrentIndex -1),N);
11: else
12: Index = BinSearch(A(CurrentIndex + 1, length of A),N);
13: end if
14: return(Index)
Algorithmic models can be used to simulate a system using software and can also
be used to prove theorems on the response time of the system.
Finite state automata: A finite state automata is a computational construct with a
definite execution process and can be used to represent discrete time behavior of a
system with random events causing changes in the behavior of the system.
Definition 4 A finite state automata can be defined as a tuple S =
{X, X0,U,Tr,Y,H} where,
1. X is a set of states or as we will call them in this thesis, modes,
2. X0 ⊆ X is a set of initial modes,
3. U is a set of inputs,
4. Tr ⊆ X × U × X is a transition relation such that if (x0, u, x1) ∈ Tr then given
a mode x0 ∈ X on input u ∈ U the FSM S goes to mode x1 ∈ X.
5. Y is a set of possible outputs
6. H : X → Y is an output mapping of a mode into a possible output y0 ∈ Y
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Example 8 Password validity checker: Consider a system that verifies whether
the password entered by an user is a valid one or not according to the rule that
there has to be atleast one integer in the password. The finite state automata
representation of this system can have two modes X = {x1, x2}. The initial mode
X0 = x1. The set of inputs can be U = {(a, b, c − − − − − z, A, B,C,− − − −
−Z, 0, 1, 2, 3,− − − − 9)}. The transition set can be Tr = {(x1, (a, b, c − − − − −
z, A, B,C,− − − − −Z), x1), (x1, (0, 1, 2 − − − −9), x2), (x2,U, x2)}. The set of out-
puts Y = {Valid, Invalid} and the mapping H is such that H(x1) = Invalid and
H(x2) = Valid. Thus this FSM describes the operation of the password validity
checker and it will only consider a password valid if it has atleast one integer in it. ..
There are several types of FSM. If the output map of the FSM has only yes and no
values then the FSM is called a Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA). If a DFA is
allowed to have a stack as a memory then it is called a Push Down Automata (PDA).
If the DFA now has an infinite tape as memory where it can write and can read at
any possible location without erasing any other location on the tape then it is called
a Turing machine. A Turing machine is the model of our current computing systems.
Hybrid Automata: A hybrid automata model is a mix of a finite state automata and
a mathematical equation model. Such models are useful for representing systems
which have an underlying dynamic behavior which causes changes in modes. Fur-
ther, with mode changes the nature of dynamic behavior also changes.
56
Definition 5 A hybrid automata is a tuple HA = {L,L0, Inv, F}, where
1. L is a set of modes of the HA. A state of an HA is an element of the state
space L × Rn, where n is the number of continuous variables in the system.
2. L0 is a set of initial modes.
3. Inv : L → Rn is a mapping from the set of locations L to a subset in real
space. The invariant set for a location has the following properties -
- Inv(li) for a given mode li is a compact set.
- for any two locations li and l j, Inv(li)o
⋂
Inv(l j)o = φ, where Inv(li)o
is the interior of the set Inv(li)o, which does not include the boundary





∀l∈L Invl = Rn
4. F : L→ Rn, is a mapping from L to a set of functions on the compact set Rn.
Thus for each mode there is a function governing the time variation of each of the n
continuous variables.
Example 9 Cooling control system: Consider a cooling control system (CRAC),
which receives hot air as input and provides cold air as output. The CRAC oper-
ates in two modes {m1,m2} and in each mode extracts a constant amount of power
Pac(mi) from the incoming air at temperature Tin. The outgoing cold air at tempera-
ture Tout of the CRAC gets heated by heat sources in a room generating power Pgen.
The CRAC changes mode based on a threshold on the inlet temperature Tthresh.
Whenever the inlet temperature becomes higher than a high threshold value, the





























Figure 3.5: Hybrid Automata model of a cooling control system with two states each
having different dynamics and state transitions governed by constraints on the inlet
temperature.
becomes lower than the high threshold value, it changes back to mode m1. The dy-
namic equations governing the inlet and outlet temperatures of the CRAC at a given
mode mi are given by Equation 3.3.








where, m˙ is the mass flow rate from the CRAC, mair is the mass of air inside the
room, and Cp is the specific heat of air. Given this CRAC system its hybrid model
is as shown in the Figure 3.5. The hybrid model of CRAC consists of two modes
L = {m1,m2} and the initial mode can be m1. The invariant set can consist of
Inv = {Inv(m1), Inv(m2)}, where Inv(m1) = [0,Tthresh] and Inv(m2) = [Tthresh,∞].
The F function can be the equations 3.3 where for each mode the power drawn by
the CRAC Pac(mi) changes. ..
There are several variants of hybrid automata two of which is most commonly used
- timed automata and a linear hybrid automata. A timed automata assumes that
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the dynamic equations can only be of the form t˙ = constant, and hence there is a
notion of clock. A linear hybrid automata assumes that the dynamic equations can
only be of the form of linear first order differential equations. Given this overview on
modeling techniques we now discuss how these models can be used for analyzing
a system in the next section.
3.2 Analysis Phase
Given any model analysis is performed for two objectives - a) validation, to prove
the closeness to the real system that the model represents, and b) verification, to
prove that the model satisfies constraints set forth for the system. Validation is the
first objective with which a model is analyzed and once closeness to the real sys-
tem is proven then verification for satisfaction of non-functional requirements are
performed.
Given the objectives, analysis of models can be broadly classified into two
types - a) simulation analysis, and b) reachability analysis.
Simulation Analysis
Simulation analysis considers a given set of configurations of a system and a time
bound. For each configuration the simulation analysis executes the system for time
t and outputs the values of the observable outputs.
Example 10 Consider the bouncing ball model in Example 5. The set of configura-
tions can include configurations with different values of the damping factor γ. The
equation 3.1 is solved for different values of γ for a time period of 100 seconds and
the results are shown in the Figure 3.6. ..
Thus a simulation analysis can be done on a limited number of case studies for
a limited amount of time. With simulation analysis no guarantees on the system
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Figure 3.6: Simulation of a bouncing ball showing the height of the ball with respect
to time for different values of the coefficient of restitution parameter, γ.
behavior can be established but for a given time and a given configuration actual
values of the system parameters can be estimated.
Reachability Analysis
A reachability analysis takes a neighborhood of a given configuration of the system
and outputs an over estimation of all possible values that the system parameters
can take. The set of all possible values that the system parameters can take is
called the reach set. The reach set computation is intensive and requires closed
form equations representing the system behavior. As an example we take the hybrid
automata model of the CRAC and perform reachability analysis on it using an open
source reachability analysis tool Phaver [77].
Example 11 Consider the hybrid automata in Example 9. We will perform the
reachability analysis of this model starting from a neighborhood of the initial state
335 ≤ Tin ≤ 350 and 305 ≤ Tout ≤ 320. Figure 3.7 shows the reach set starting
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Figure 3.7: Reachability analysis of the CRAC hybrid automata in Example 9, which
shows the values that Tin and Tout can possibly assume at any arbitrary time.
from the defined neighborhood. This figure shows that given any time the values
of Tin and Tout for the CRAC will always remain in the shaded region. The gen-
erated power in the room is taken to be 200 W. In the highest power setting the
CRAC extracts 75 W while in the lowest power state the CRAC extracts 50 W. The
results show that the Tin increases to high values even if the Tout is within acceptable
ranges. This is because the amount of power extracted by the CRAC is less than
the amount generated in the room and hence the room gets heated up. Thus, us-
ing such arguments some values of the system parameters can be deemed unsafe.
Using the reachability analysis, existence of such unsafe states can be determined.
Such results can be used to conclusively prove whether a system is safe or unsafe.
..
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Unlike a simulation, a reachability analysis can provide guarantees on the
system properties for arbitrary time, however, it over estimates the system param-
eters. Hence, one does not get an exact estimate of the system parameters at a
given time.
3.3 Synthesis Phase
Synthesis is the process of generating either the software implementation or the
hardware emulation of a system from its model in a generic programming language
or hardware platform, respectively. The software generated may often be used di-
rectly in the system. While the hardware emulation can be used for experimental
verification of the system. Software synthesis generally requires a code generator
that takes a model as input and converts into code in some generic programming
framework such as C,C++, embedded C and so on. Hardware emulation takes a
specification of a model using high level hardware design language (HDL) such as
VHDL, PSpice, Verilog and System C.
Synthesis cannot be assumed as an optimized implementation of the sys-
tem. But it is an implementation that can be used for experimentation in order to
check requirements satisfied by the envisioned system.
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Chapter 4
ARCHITECTURAL MODELING FOR FAST SIMULATIONS
Architectural models present an intuitive and fast way of representing CPSes. Such
models represent the CPS as a set of connected components and subcomponents.
Each component or subcomponent has properties associated with them. The con-
nections represent data communication between the components or a subcompo-
nent relationship. Architectural models are useful for fast simulation of a given test
case. Generally they can be used to test the worst case operation of the CPS. The
main contribution of this thesis in this front is the development of the CPS Design
Analysis and Simulation CPS-DAS tool that provides a systematic intuitive specifi-
cation format for CPSes and fast light weight analysis algorithm for various types of
safety evaluations.
4.1 Motivation and Related Works
Figure 4.1 depicts the modeling requirements of CPSes, maps the related work to
address the specific modeling requirements, and puts the contributions of CPS-DAS
into perspective. There are three basic modeling requirements for CPSes: i) cy-
ber entities, i.e. the application software (e.g., health monitoring software) and net-
worked computing units (e.g., embedded medical devices), ii) physical environment,
i.e. the human body, and iii) interactions between the physical environment and
the cyber entities (both intentional and un-intentional). Intentional interaction model-
ing would involve sensor and actuator behavior modeling. Un-intentional interaction
modeling require modeling the physical processes and the physical behavior of the
cyber entities.
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Figure 4.1: CPS modeling requirements and mapping of related works based on the
requirements that they address with highlighting of CPS-DAS contributions
A large number of tools are available that model and analyze hardware of
computing systems such as Pspice [78] and AADL ( http://www.aadl.info/ ), and ap-
plication software such as UML ( http://www.uml.org/ ) and Petrinets [79]. The model
based approach is also used to study the behavior of physical systems through tools
such as SysML ( http://www.sysml.org/ ), Simulink ( http://www.mathworks.com/ ),
and Flovent ( http://www.mentor.com/ ). However, none of these tools can model the
cyber-physical interactions. A generic framework to perform model based engineer-
ing of CPSes has been proposed in [80]. However, the framework only considers
the intentional interactions for the proper functioning of the CPSes. The proposed
CPS-DAS tool provides a uniform model specification and analysis platform that ad-
dresses all the three salient modeling requirements of CPSes.
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Figure 4.2: CPS-DAS tool architecture consisting of two parts: CPS-DAS modeling
framework, which is used to specify a CPS and CPS-DAS Analyzer, which analyzes
a CPS model.
4.2 CPS-DAS: Analysis and Design of CPSes
This section presents the CPS-DAS tool. Figure 4.2 shows the architecture of the
tool and depicts how it enables the execution of the different phases in MBE. As
shown in the figure, CPS-DAS consists of a model development framework, called
the CPS-DAS Modeling Framework (Section 4.2), and a model analysis engine,
called the CPS-DAS Model Analyzer (Section 4.2).
CPS-DAS Modeling Framework
The modeling framework helps in the model development phase of MBE. There are
three inputs to the framework:
1. CPS Requirements: These are usually a set of limits or thresholds on the
system parameters. For example, an upper limit on the maximum body tem-
perature (system parameter) ensures safety.
2. CPS System: This includes CPS deployment information such as the number,
types, spatial distribution, and communication topology of the nodes.
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3. Analysis Parameters: These are specific parameters for the model analysis.
Example of such parameters include time steps, spatial granularity of differ-
ential equation solvers (e.g., Finite Difference Time Domain (FDTD) [81]), and
functions determining the aggregate effects (e.g., summation function to com-
bine heat effects from multiple computing units).
Given these inputs, the following subsections describe modeling methodologies in
the CPS-DAS modeling framework.
Requirements Modeling
The thresholds on the system parameters, which characterize the CPS require-
ments, can be modeled in CPS-DAS by providing a set of constants. These con-
stants will be used in the requirements verification phase to check if the CPS behav-
ior is suitably constrained.
Abstract Modeling of CPSs
CPS-DAS envisions a CPS as a set of computing (i.e. cyber) components (medical
devices or servers or UAVs) and a physical environment (human body or recirculated
air or UAV terrain). Figure 4.3 shows a typical deployment of the BSN CPS with both
implanted and wearable (i.e. on the skin) sensor nodes. Both the intentional and
un-intentional interactions are further depicted in the figure. Figure 4.4 shows all the
modeling constructs in a hierarchical form. Following are the modeling constructs:
Global CPS (GCPS): A CPS is considered as a GCPS (Figure 4.3), i.e. a collection
of distributed and networked cyber-physical subsystems. Each of these subsystems
consists of a single worker node. The GCPS construct can also correspond to the
portion of the physical environment observed for analysis, e.g., the portion of human
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Figure 4.3: BSN as a Global Cyber-Physical System (CPS) with several Local
CPSes each having region of interest and a region of impact. Overlapping of ROIn
and ROIm indicate cyber-physical interactions.
Local CPS (LCPS): Each individual subsystem in a GCPS is referred to as an LCPS.
The LCPS construct models each computing unit in a CPS as a single CPS. This
enables modeling and analysis of the interactions between each individual node and
the physical environment in a modular fashion. Each LCPS consists of three types
of constructs:
• Computing unit : This construct corresponds to the computing units capable of
sensing, computation, and communication. The construct facilitates the mod-
eling of both computing and physical behavior of the computing units through
the following two properties:
– Computing property : This property characterizes the computing behav-
ior, e.g., the processor speed of a worker node or the amount of mem-
ory space available. The computing properties depend on the hardware
configuration of the computing unit and the design of the application soft-
ware. The hardware and the application software should be designed
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such that CPS operations are accurate and have low latency. These de-
sign requirements specific to BSNs have been addressed in [3]. Trade-
offs between these design requirements with safety are demonstrated in
the specific case studies on BSNs(Section 4.3).
– Physical property : This property characterizes the physical behavior,
e.g., the power dissipation, of the computing unit. These properties of-
ten depend on the computing behavior of the nodes and can cause un-
intentional interactions. For example, the processor speed determines
the power dissipation of the sensor nodes in a BSN. This in turn causes
un-intentional temperature rise of the human body.
• Physical unit : This construct is used to model the portion of the physical en-
vironment with which the computing unit interacts. These interactions usually
affect the system parameters, for which the thresholds are provided in CPS
requirements. For example, the heat dissipation (un-intentional interaction)
from the nodes affects the body temperature (system parameter). The model-
ing paradigm of CPS-DAS hypothesizes that any interaction of the comput-
ing unit with the physical world will take place within a bounded region.
Therefore, all interactions are limited within a region defined in the LCPS. To
this effect, two types of regions for intentional and un-intentional interactions
are specified in the physical unit. These regions are described below:
– Region-Of-Interest (ROIn): This construct facilitates the modeling of the
intentional interactions, e.g., the sensing and the wireless communica-
tion region. A ROIn has two attributes:
* Monitored parameter: This construct models the system parame-
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Figure 4.4: Hierarchical view of the generic constructs of a GCPS which is used to
specify a CPS high level architectural model.
the physiological signal sensed by a sensor node can be a moni-
tored parameter, which is affected by the nodes’ sensing capabilities
(electro-magnetic interaction [ http://www.quasarusa.com/ ]).
* Region Boundary: This attribute represents the limits of the
bounded region, within which the intentional interactions are con-
fined. The region boundary depends on the variation of the moni-
tored parameters. For example, when the sensed signal is the mon-
itored parameter, the sensing range of the sensor node becomes
the region boundary.
– Region of impact (ROIm): This construct is used to model the un-
intentional interactions. The ROIm consists of three attributes:
* Physical Property: This attribute characterizes the properties of
the physical system such as blood glucose level, tissue temperature
etc. These properties depend on the location of the node, physio-
logical conditions, and environmental factors such as temperature,
and pressure ( http://urwhatueat.org/carb5.html ).
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* Physical Dynamics: This construct enables modeling the physical
processes. These processes are normally expressed in terms of
partial differential equations. For example, the process of body tem-
perature variation is governed by the Penne’s bioheat equation [4].
* Region Boundary: This is similar to region boundary in ROIn.
However, the region boundary of ROIm depends on the physical
properties and dynamics. Since the physical dynamics are gov-
erned by differential equations, the region boundary can be speci-
fied by boundary conditions on the equations. These conditions are
generally limits on the physical properties outside the ROIm. For
example, in case of temperature rise in human body, we can as-
sume that the body temperature is 37 °C outside the ROIm. We can
then employ this boundary condition to the associated differential
equation [4] to obtain the region boundary.
• Local Interactions: The local interactions are cyber-physical interactions be-
tween the computing unit and the physical unit within an LCPS (denoted by
the dashed lines in Figure 4.4). The intentional and un-intentional interactions
are modeled using the following constructs, respectively:
– Intended interactions: These are modeled as transfer of information
between the computing unit and the ROIn. For example, the sensing of
physiological signals from the human body by a node can be modeled
by this construct.
– Unintended Interactions: These interactions as modeled as transfer of
energy between the computing units and the ROIm. For example, heat
transfer from the computing unit can be modeled by this construct.
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Figure 4.5: Global Interactions between two local CPSes. Intersection between the
ROIn of two LCPS indicate intended interactions while that between ROIms of two
LCPS indicate unintended interactions.
Note that an interaction is also defined between the ROIn and the ROIm of
an LCPS. These are used for representing certain special cases, where there
are inter-dependencies between the ROIn and ROIm.
Interactions among the LCPSs: In the GCPS model, interactions between differ-
ent LCPSs can also take place. For example, the wireless communication between
two sensor nodes in a BSN is a form of information transfer between two different
LCPSs. This phenomenon can be modeled by introducing the concept of intercon-
nections between the LCPSs. These interconnections are called global interactions
(as depicted by the two way dashed arrows in Figure 4.4). Global interactions be-
tween two LCPSs normally occur whenever there is an overlap in the ROIn or the
ROIm of the two (as shown in Figure 4.5). This notion of global interaction facilitates
the modeling of a network of nodes in a CPS (through overlapping ROIns) or the
cumulative thermal effect of the nodes on a particular area of the physical environ-
ment (overlapping ROIms). Global interactions can be intended or unintended due
to overlapping of ROIns or ROIms of the interacting LCPSs, respectively.
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Analysis Parameter Modeling
Analysis of a model generally involves specific methodology to solve equations that
govern the physical dynamics. The solution techniques often require a configuration,
i.e. assigning values to certain specific parameters determining the quality of the
solutions. For example, solving the Pennes’ equation will require the FDTD time
and space discretization approach. The granularity of such discretization can be
specified in the model as sets of constants. Further, the aggregate functions can be
specified as a set of equations combining the physical dynamics of different LCPSs.
CPS-DAS Analyzer
The CPS-DAS analyzer determines the CPS behavior from the GCPS model. The
behavior is then verified against the requirements given as input to the CPS-DAS
modeling framework. Figure 4.2 shows the work flow of the CPS-DAS analyzer.
The models from the CPS-DAS modeling framework are first parsed into a
suitable format by a Model Parser. There are three different components of the
parser: 1) requirements parser, 2) GCPS parser, and 3) analysis parameter parser.
Each of these components correspond to the three modeling aspects of the mod-
eling framework (Section 4.2). The output of the Requirements Parser is a set of
constants indicating the thresholds on different system parameters. Analysis Parser
provides parameters (a set of constants) related to the analysis methodology (e.g.,
configuration for equation solvers, time step and spatial granularity). The GCPS
Parser extracts the hierarchical organization of the GCPS model in a structure us-
ing which interactions and aggregate effects can be computed. The outputs of the
parsers are called the Model Variants.
The pseudocode of the analyzer is shown in Figure 4.6. The EvaluatePhys-
icalProperty and EvaluateMonitoredParameter routines evaluate the variations of
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Process:     CPSDAS  Analyzer (CPSModel) 
 
Model Parser    /* Parse model and extract the Model Variants */ 
GCPS = Model Parser(CPSModel.GCPSModel); 
[Performance Thresholds]  = Requirements parser(CPSModel.RequirementsModel); 
[Analysis Parameters] = Analysis Parameter parser(CPSModel.AnalysisParametersModel); 
 
Interactions between computing unit and physical system 
for each i from 1 … n 
     GCPS.LCPS(i).ROIm.Physical Property = EvaluatePhysicalProperty(GCPS.LCPS(i).ROIm, AnalysisParameters) 
for each i from 1 … n 
     GCPS.LCPS(i).ROIn.Monitored Parameter = EvaluateMonitoredParameter(GCPS.LCPS(i).ROIn, AnalysisParameters) 
 
Interaction between different computing units 
for each i from 1 … n 
for each j from 1 … n 
  if GCPS.LCPS(i).ROIm.RB overlap with GCPS.LCPS(j).ROIm.RB  
IntFm(i,j) = 1; 
else 
 IntFm(i,j) = 0; 
if GCPS.LCPS(i).ROIn.RB overlap with GCPS.LCPS(j).ROIn.RB 
IntFn(i,j) = 1  
else  
 IntFn(i,j) = 0; 
for each IntFm(i,j) == 1 
GCPS.LCPS(i).ROIm.Physical Property  = Compute the aggregate effect in the intersecting region; 
GCPS.LCPS(j).ROIm.Physical Property  = Compute the aggregate effect in the intersecting region; 
for each IntFn(i,j) == 1 
GCPS.LCPS(i).ROIn.Monitored Parameter  = Compute the aggregate effect in the intersecting region; 
GCPS.LCPS(j).ROIn.Monitored Parameter  = Compute the aggregate effect in the intersecting region; 
 
Requirements Verification 
for each Param.time step 
for each Param.space step 
Compare Monitored Parameter with performance thresholds 
Return Verification Results 
Figure 4.6: Pseudocode for CPS-DAS Analyzer, which first parses the GCPS model,
computes interactions within an LCPS, and then computes global interactions be-
tween LCPSes. Finally, the system properties obtained from the computation is
chacked with requirements for safety verification.
the physical properties and monitored parameters within the Region Boundaries (de-
noted by RB) of the ROIm and ROIn of each LCPS, respectively. These evaluations
essentially compute the local interactions within an LCPS. Note that the represen-
tation of the Region Boundary by the notation GCPS.LCPS(i).ROIm.RB reflects the
hierarchical nature of the constructs (Figure 4.4). Similar notations for the other
constructs are also used.
The next process is to identify and compute the interactions between differ-
ent computing units. This process involves the computation of the global interac-
tions. In the pseudocode, this is achieved by iterating through all n2 possible pairs
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of LCPSs (where n is the number of nodes in the BSN) and checking whether the
RBs of LCPS pairs overlap. These overlapping regions are tracked by the parame-
ters, IntFm and IntFn, for ROIm and ROIn, respectively. The aggregate variation of
the physical properties and the monitored parameters are then evaluated for these
regions of intersections. To this effect, the aggregation functions provided in the
analysis parameter model are used.
After computing the interactions and aggregate effects, the analyzer checks
the monitored parameters and the physical properties against the requirements.
This process is called the requirements verification process.
Implementation
Given the modeling framework and the analysis work flow in the previous subsec-
tions, this subsection presents the current implementation of CPS-DAS. CPS-DAS
is currently implemented for BSNs and is known as BAND-AiDe [2]. However, the
same implementation can be used to specify any CPS. The modeling framework
of CPS-DAS is developed using the Abstract Architecture Description Language
(AADL). AADL is an industry standard language to model real time embedded sys-
tems and is suitable for implementing CPS-DAS due to the following reasons:
• AADL specifications are hierarchical in nature, which helps in specifying the
GCPS model.
• AADL has dedicated construct to model hardware and software of embed-
ded computing devices. This will be helpful in modeling the behavior of the
computing units in the CPS.
• AADL has been used to model CPSes such as wireless sensor networks [82],
UAVs ( aadl.info ).
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• AADL provides facilities for language extension through development of an-
nexes. These facilities can be used to incorporate the generic constructs of
the GCPS model in AADL.
Model Specification
The GCPS in the GCPS model (Figure 4.4) can be represented using the system
construct in AADL (as shown in Figure 4.7) and is named Global CPS (GCPS). In
the GCPS, the monitored region of the human body is specified as a grid. The origin
and the units of the grid are specified using the properties construct. The constants
for the requirements specification and the analysis parameters can be provided in
the GCPS specification using separate property sets, which are AADL constructs
to specify system attributes. The GCPS consists of several subcomponents called
Local CPS (LCPS). These are also modeled using the system construct. Each
LCPS consists of three subcomponents: 1) Computing Unit, which models a sin-
gle worker node, 2) Region of Interest, which models the ROIn, and 3) Region
of Impact, which models the ROIm. The system construct is used to model these
subcomponents. The Computing Unit has two property sets, Computing Prop-
erty Set and Physical Property Set, to model its cyber and physical behavior, re-
spectively. The Computing unit can be modeled in a conventional way, containing
subcomponents such as processor, memory, radio, and bus [82].
The location of the computing unit is specified using the Location property
set. This property set gives the coordinates of the computing unit with respect to
the origin and grid units defined in the GCPS. Within an ROIm, the position of the
computing unit is considered to be the origin. The ROIm consists of properties from
the Physical Property Set. The dynamics of the physical system which involves
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Figure 4.7: AADL specification of the GCPS model (a more detailed model can be
found in the publication [2])
SAnnex. This annex is extends AADL with customized constructs for specification
of partial differential equations. The Region Boundary of the ROIm is represented
by boundary conditions on the properties of physical unit. Similar approach is taken
to implement the ROIn of the LCPS.
The global and local interactions in the GCPS model are specified with the
help of port group AADL construct. The port group construct is an assembly of dif-
ferent types of ports. These ports, along with their interconnection using the connec-
tions construct, models information transfer among the subcomponents. The Com-
puting Unit has two port groups: 1) CyberToROIn, which specifies the intended in-
teraction of the computing unit with the ROIn and 2) CyberToROIm, which specifies
the unintended interaction of the computing unit with the ROIm. The global interac-
tions are modeled using two types of port groups, LCPSROIn and LCPSROIm, in
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each LCPS. These port groups signify interactions between a computing unit of an
LCPS and the ROIn and ROIm of some other LCPS, respectively.
Analysis framework
The analysis framework is developed on the OSATE platform, which supports AADL
model specification and analysis through java plug-ins in eclipse. The analysis
framework uses the parsers provided by the OSATE platform to parse the AADL
constructs. A new parser was developed for the customized differential equation
constructs in the CPSAnnex. In GCPS Annex specific constructs were declared for
denoting differential equations. The construct DeltnXY represents the mathematical
operator δ
nX
δnY . The differential equations were then parsed using the following context
free grammar:
Operator =
Variable * DeltnXY * Operator + Variable * Operator |
Variable * DeltnXY * Operator - Variable * Operator
| null
DeltnXY = Delt1XY | Delt2XY .................
Variable = any string | null
The parsed differential equations are represented in the form of a parse tree.
In the Analysis plug-in, the parse tree representation of the equations was converted
into a mathematical form. Currently, the GCPS Annex converts the parsed equations
into FDTD form which can be solved using any FDTD solver. To this effect, the
analysis plug-in is integrated with domain specific tools such as Matlab. The analysis
results were provided in a graphical format through Matlab.
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4.3 Case Study for Design and Analysis with CPS-DAS
This section shows the usage of the CPS-DAS tool to model and analyze BSN CPS.
To this effect, the following case studies are considered: i) a BSN with wearable
and implanted sensor nodes, and ii) a secure health monitoring application, Ayush-
man [5]. The sensor nodes are assumed to be capable of:
• sensing temperature, humidity, sound, and physiological signals (e.g., Photo-
Plethysmogram (PPG));
• data communication through wireless radio; and
• communication security through Physiological value based Key Agreement
(PKA) [64].
Figure 2.1 shows the Ayushman workload highlighting the three operations. As
shown in Figure 2.1, the operations in the worker nodes have different CPU uti-
lization profile. These utilization profiles determine the nodes power consumption.
Hence, proper duty-cycling and communication scheduling can be employed to re-
duce the nodes’ power consumption. The nodes are assumed to be always expend-
ing the maximum power, Pc, if duty-cycling is not employed. On the other hand,
when duty-cycling is employed, then the nodes do not always consume maximum
power. In such a case, the power consumption of the sensor node when radio is
turned off is given by Pproc. During the communication operation, the processor
consumes Pproc amount of power. The radio transmitter will also be active during
this operation (Pradio being its power consumption). In a single day, there will be d
number of sense and transmit periods (sleep cycles) for each sensor node in the
BSN, with a duration of (ts + tT x) seconds each, where ts and tTX denote the time
required to perform the sensing and communication operations, respectively..
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The symbol tPKA denotes the duration to execute the PKA. The total number
of nodes is assumed to be n, and the nodes execute pairwise PKA (once everyday)
to ensure freshness of keys. In PKA, frequency domain features are derived from
the sensed physiological signals and are used to facilitate key agreement between
two sensors. The feature extraction process involves several complex computa-
tions such as Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and peak detection. The node power
consumption during the PKA operation is comprised of the power required for the
aforementioned computation, PPKA, and the power required to keep the radio on, i.e.
Pradio. In general, duty-cycling is not considered for safety verification to analyze the
thermal effects of worst-case node power characteristics.
To obtain the model parameters for CPS-DAS through experimental evalua-
tions, Ayushman was implemented in a BSN consisting of TelosB motes interfaced
with temperature, humidity, and physiological sensors. The implementations were
performed to meet the design requirements of accuracy and low latency. Figure 4.8
shows the implementation strategy of the peak detection stage of the PKA protocol1.
The usage of the CPS-DAS tool is demonstrated through safety verifications for: i) a
single medical device, and ii) a network of sensor nodes, as summarized in Figure
4.9 and described in the following subsections.
Safety Analysis of a Single Wearable Medical Device
This subsection presents the safety verification for a single high-power wearable
medical device. To this effect, the medical device considered is a TelosB mote in-
terfaced with a Smith fingertip pulse oximeter (PPG) device ( http://www.smithsoem.
com/ ) deployed on the index finger. The pulse oximeter probe which is in direct
contact with the human finger passes light at a particular intensity through the finger
1The threshold indicated in the figure is specific to the peak detection [3] process and is not the
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Figure 4.8: Implementation logic for Peak Detection (a more detailed discussion can
be found in the publication [3])
during its operation. The pulse rates are then derived from the modulations in the
sensed light intensity. Power is consumed by the device to execute the Ayushman
workload, i.e. sensing, transmission, and PKA execution, as shown in Figure 2.1.
CPS-DAS Inputs
The safety requirement input to CPS-DAS is the upper threshold on the skin temper-
ature, which is 39 °C as obtained from the Henriques Moritz equation [83]. Pennes’
bio-heat equation is used to characterize the thermo-dynamic processes. The
thermo-dynamics of the finger comprises of heat transfer mechanisms such as ther-
mal conduction, convection, radiation, and electro-magnetic absorption. The ther-
mal safety analysis parameters include the time steps and space granularity (e.g.,
grid size, where a grid is the smallest volume of the human body within which the
temperature is assumed to be constant) of the solvers for equations (e.g., Pennes’
equation) describing the thermo-dynamic processes.
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Figure 4.9: Summary of case studies showing CPS-DAS usage for safety evalua-
tions that are further discussed in detail in Section 4.3
CPS-DAS Model
The requirement and analysis parameter modeling involves representation of the
skin temperature threshold, and the time steps and grid sizes (to solve Pennes’
equation) as constants. The GCPS is represented as a system with a single LCPS.
The medical device is modeled as the computing unit, which has several subcom-
ponents such as LED array, radio, and processor. These subcomponents are the
generic components of the pulse oximeter device. Each subcomponent has a set of
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physical properties (such as power dissipation, operating temperature) that model
their thermal characteristics. The ROIm models the thermodynamics of the human




= K 52 T − b(T − Tb) + ρSAR + Pc, (4.1)
where ρ is the mass density, Cp is the specific heat, K is the thermal conductance, T
is the temperature of the skin, Pc is the power generated by any heat source (i.e. the
device), b is the blood perfusion constant, Tb is the blood temperature, and S AR is
the specific absorption rate of the skin (i.e. the amount of electromagnetic radiation
absorbed by unit volume of the skin).
The region boundary of the ROIn is preset to a 30mm × 30mm square
region on the fingertip skin, which is the size of the pulse-oximeter probe ( http:
//www.smithsoem.com/ ) that is in direct contact with the fingertip. The ROIn also
models the range, up to which a scavenging source can charge a sensor node. To
this effect, only body heat and sunlight are considered as the possible scavenging
sources at the fingertip. The operating temperature of the pulse-oximeter probe is
assumed to be constant [41]. This is because the Ayushman workload (Figure 2.1)
is highly repetitive, which causes the probe temperature to reach a steady state
quickly. Given the inputs and the CPS-DAS model, the CPS-DAS analyzer performs
the safety analysis (described in Sections 4.3) based on the work-flow in Figures 4.2
and 4.6.
Safety Verification
CPS-DAS analyzer computes the temperature at different points on the skin by solv-
ing the Pennes’ equation using the FDTD approach.
Table 4.1 shows the maximum skin temperature reached during the eight
hours of operation of the pulse oximeter at different device temperatures. A sample
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Table 4.1: Skin temperatures after eight hours of pulse oximeter operation at different
device temperatures (Burn threshold 39 °C)
Device Temperature Maximum Skin Temperature
43.0 °C 38.2 °C
43.5 °C 38.5 °C
44.0 °C 39.2 °C
44.5 °C 39.4 °C
45.0 °C 39.7 °C
thermal map of the skin for a pulse oximeter operating temperature of 44 °C is shown
in Figure 4.10. It can be verified that the maximum temperature reached after eight
hours of operation is 39.2 °C, which violates the thermal safety requirement. An ex-
perimental study performed on pulse oximeter thermal safety [41] shows that blisters
are observed in human skin when a pulse oximeter is operated continuously for eight
hours at a device temperature of 44 °C. Our results concur with these experimental
observations and are hence verified.
Safety Analysis of Network of Devices
This section presents the safety verification for a network of sensor nodes in a BSN.
To this effect, we consider low-power devices (as sensor nodes), e.g., EKG sensors,
interfaced with the TelosB motes. High power nodes are not considered since it
has already been verified (in Section 4.3) that even a single such node can cause
safety violations. Cluster based multi-hop communication protocol is used [84] for
the network. In this protocol, the sensor nodes in the BSN form a cluster. Nodes
in a cluster nominate a leader node, a.k.a. the cluster head. All the non-leader
nodes transmit their sensed data to the cluster head. The cluster head then forwards
these data to the base station, and hence has a considerably high communication
workload. The absorption of electromagnetic radiation (because of communication)
can cause heat dissipation, which in turn may lead to significant thermal effects in
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Figure 4.10: Thermal map of fingertip skin for 8 hrs of pulse oximeter operation at
44 °C temperature
CPS-DAS Inputs
Similar to the single device verification in Section 4.3, the safety requirement input
for verifying the network of nodes is the upper threshold on the skin temperature, i.e.
39 °C. The exact values use for the analysis are shown in the Table 4.2. Analysis
parameters corresponding to the Pennes’ equation are same as that in Section 4.3.
The control volume was divided into 30 × 30 cells where the cell size was set to
0.005m. The aggregation function for the heat effect from multiple contributing nodes
is provided as follows: i) summation of the SAR values from the contributing nodes;
ii) summation of the power generated from the contributing nodes; and iii) apply the
summed SAR and generated power values in the Pennes’ equation (i.e. Equation
4.1). In addition, the leadership sequence is input as an analysis parameter.
CPS-DAS Model
GCPS consists of multiple LCPSs. The LCPS modeling for each sensor node is
same as in Section 4.3. In addition, the ROIn of each LCPS models the communica-
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Table 4.2: Timing and power consumption values used for the Ayushman workload
and the experimental methodology
Parameter Value Methodology
ts 5 s Ayushman workload characteristics
tT x 0.39 s Time taken to transfer five seconds of 32 bit data values
sampled at a rate of 60 per second. Transfer rate is 24
Kbps which is standard for Chipcon radio [85]
tPKA 16.36 s Measured time in TelosB motes [85]
Pradio 56 mW Measurements from the Chipcon radio in TelosB
motes [85]
PPKA 3 mW Measured power of the TelosB mote while executing
PKA [85]
Pproc 0.01 mW Idle power of the TelosB mote [85]
tion range of the node. The intersections between the ROIns reflect the connectivity
among the corresponding worker nodes. The leadership sequence is represented
as a string of constant integers. Scavenging nodes are further modeled as LCPSs,
where the ROIn represents the inductive charging range. Intersection of the ROIn
of a worker node and a scavenging source means that the worker node can extract
power from that source.
Safety Analysis
To evaluate the tissue temperature distribution, Pennes’ bio-heat equation is solved
using the FDTD solvers (as in Section 4.3). This aggregate effect was calculated by
summing up the heat contribution of each node to a particular grid, as indicated in
Section 4.3. The power consumption of leader sensor node executing the Ayushman
application was 60mW [85] while that of a non leader sensor node was 12 mW. This
power consumption was experimentally measured for TelosB motes at 0 dB and -7
dB radio attenuation, respectively. For a sample BSN cluster of 10 sensor nodes,
the leaders were changed every second. Each leadership sequence was operated
once for a short period of 1000 seconds and then for a long duration of two days. Our
results for 1000 second of exposure matches with the observations in [81]. Table 4.3
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(5 2 8 6 1 7 3 4 10 9) 37.1145 °C 37.1632 °C
(5 7 4 1 6 10 8 2 9 3) 37.1130 °C 37.1614 °C
(1 6 9 10 2 7 5 4 3 8) 37.1124 °C 37.1757 °C
(5 7 1 9 10 8 4 2 6 3) 37.1130 °C 37.1585 °C
shows maximum tissue temperatures for different leadership sequences at different
exposure times. The maximum temperature is below the safety threshold of 39 °C
for all these cases. It can be seen from the table that for a short duration of exposure,
different leadership sequence does not have much effect on the tissue temperature
rise. However, for longer durations, the temperature rise is significant (around 0.02
°C). This shows that for long term operation of implanted network of medical devices
the leadership sequence plays an important role in thermal safety.
Apart from BSN CPS the CPS-DAS tool is also used on data center CPS as
shown in the following case study.
Thermal Safety of Servers in a Data center
In this section, the usage of CPS-DAS for analyzing safety of servers from redlining
is shown. The recirculation of heat has to be modeled using the GCPS constructs.
CPS-DAS modeling of data centers
Figure 4.11, represents the data center as a GCPS. Each server in the data center
is an LCPS. The GCPS system has 50 port groups that specify the recirculation of
air from the room to the input of each server (lines 3-4). Each LCPS has a port
group that specifies the transfer of heat from the computing units to the environment
(line 8). The heat recirculation matrix is implemented as a data component (lines 10
- 13) and each entry in the recirculation matrix is implemented as ports such that all
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 1. system GCPS 
 2.   features 
 3.     P2C01: port group RecirculationPG; 
 4.     P2C02: port group RecirculationPG; 
 5. end GCPS; 
 
 6. system LCPS 
 7.   features 
 8.     C2P: port group RecirculationPG; 
 9. end LCPS; 
 
10. data implementation RecirculationMatrix.imp 
11.   subcomponents 
12.     A: data behavior::integer; 
13. end RecirculationMatrix.imp; 
 
14. port group RecirculationPG 
15.   features 
16.     Matrix1: in out data port RecirculationMatrix.imp; 
17.     Matrix2: in out data port RecirculationMatrix.imp;  
18. end RecirculationPG; 
 
19. system Chassis 
20.   properties 
21.     PhysicalPropertySet::IdlePowerDissipation => 0.0 W; 
22.     PhysicalPropertySet::PowerDissipationPerUtilization => 
0.0 W; 






24. system BladeServer 
25.   properties 
26.     ComputingPropertySet::TypeOfComputingUnit => ""; 
27.     ComputingPropertySet::NumberOfServers => 0; 
28. end BladeServer; 
 
29. system implementation ImpactingParam.imp 
30.   subcomponents 
31.     Tin: data behavior::float; 
32. end ImpactingParam.imp; 
 
33. system implementation ImpactedParam.imp 
34.   subcomponents 
35.     Tout: data behavior::float; 
36. end ImpactedParam.imp; 
 
37. system implementation RegionOfImpact.imp 
38.   subcomponents 
39.     ImpIngParam: system ImpactingParam.imp; 
40.     ImpEdParam: system ImpactedParam.imp; 
41. end RegionOfImpact.imp; 
 
42. system implementation BladeServer.imp01 
43.   properties 
44.     ComputingPropertySet::TypeOfComputingUnit => 
"1955"; 
45.     ComputingPropertySet::NumberOfServers => 4; 
46. end BladeServer.imp01; 
 
47. system implementation LCPSManagement.imp 
48.   subcomponents 
49.     PlacementAlgorithm: process HTSALgo.impl; 
50. end LCPSManagement.imp; 
 
51. system implementation PhysicalUnit.Air 
52.   properties 
53.     PhysicalPropertySet::Cp => 1005.0 JpkgpK; 
54.     PhysicalPropertySet::Volume => 290.304 m3; 
55.     PhysicalPropertySet::Density => 1.19 kgpm3; 




57. system implementation Chassis.imp01 
58.   subcomponents 
59.     Blade01: system BladeServer.imp01; 
60.     Blade02: system BladeServer.imp01; 
61.     Utilization: data behavior::integer; 
62.     Power: data behavior::integer; 
63.     Idle: data behavior::integer; 
64.     Unit: data behavior::integer; 
65.   properties 
66.     PhysicalPropertySet::IdlePowerDissipation => 2420.0 W; 
67.     PhysicalPropertySet::PowerDissipationPerUtilization => 175.0 W; 
68.     PhysicalPropertySet::FlowRate => 0.2454147 m3ps; 
69.   annex CPSAnnex {** 
70.     states 
71.       s0 : initial complete state; 
72.     transitions 
73.       s0 -[  ]-> s0 {Power := Idle + Unit * Utilization; }; 
74. **}; 
75. end Chassis.imp01; 
76. system implementation LCPS.imp01 
77.   subcomponents 
78.     ComputingUnit: system Chassis.imp01; 
79.     ROIm: system RegionOfImpact.imp; 
80.   annex behavior_specification {** 
81.     states 
82.       s0 : initial complete state; 
83.     transitions 
84.      s0 -[  ]-> s0 { 
85.         C2P.Matrix1 := a1; 
86.         C2P.Matrix2 := a2; 
87. }; 
88. **}; 
89. end LCPS.imp01; 
 
90. system implementation ACUnit.imp 
91.  Model: "Linear Transient Model" 
92. end ACUnit.imp; 
 
93. system implementation GCPS.imp 
94.   subcomponents 
95.     LCPSManager: system LCPSManagement.imp; 
96.     LCPS01: system LCPS.imp01; 
97.     LCPS02: system LCPS.imp02; 
98.     PhysUnit: system PhysicalUnit.Air; 
99.     LCPSAC: system LCPS.ACUnit; 
100     Tout: data behavior::integer; 
101     Tin: data behavior::integer; 
102     Recir: data behavior::integer; 
103     Power: data behavior::integer; 
104   connections 
105     Recirc01: port group LCPS01.C2P -> P2C01; 
106     Recirc02: port group LCPS02.C2P -> P2C02; 
107   annex CPSAnnex {** 
108     states 
109       s0 : initial complete state; 
110     transitions 
111       s0 -[  ]-> s0 {Tout := Tin + Recir * Power; }; 
112 **}; 
113 end GCPS.imp; 
Figure 4.11: GCPS specification of Data center using the AADL language. The
specification is for a data center with 50 chassis however only a snippet of the entire
specification is shown in the thesis for ease of readability.
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the components can access them. An LCPS consists of a chassis which consists
of 10 blade servers. Each blade server has computing properties such as type of
servers or number of cores and physical properties such as heat dissipation (lines
19-28). The region of impact is discretized into points of interest, which are the inlets
of the servers. The LCPS has recirculated heat values for all other LCPSes. Such
matrices are specified using the behavior_annex (lines 80 - 88). The GCPS con-
sists of several LCPSes. The port group of each LCPS is connected to appropriate
port groups of all other LCPSes to feed in recirculated heat values. The dynamic
equations governing the temperature rise in the data center are specified using the
CPSAnnex (lines 69-74 and 107-112).
Safety analysis of data centers
Several management strategies for the data center were simulated using this GCPS
modeling. A comprehensive discussion of the algorithms and the results of the com-
parison are available in the publication by Mukherjee [86]. The algorithms simulated
using the GCPS modeling are: i) Cooling Management (CM) - which places a job
in the first available server with an arbitrary ordering and then sets the thermostat
such that no server crosses redline according to the conditions discussed in Chap-
ter 2; ii) Job and Power Management (JPM), which assumes an Earliest Deadline
First (EDF) temporal schedule with a Least Recirculated Heat (LRH) placement al-
gorithm; and iii) Job, Power and Cooling Management (JPCM), which assumes an
Earliest Deadline First (EDF) temporal schedule with a Highest Thermostat Setting
(HTS) placement algorithm. Figure 4.12 shows that for any of the policies the the
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Figure 4.12: Maximum chassis inlet temperature for 80 % utilization under linear
cooling model for different energy management policies. Only CM, JPM, and JPCM
as representative of non-coordinated cooling, no cooling management, coordinated
cooling management, respectively. JPCM allows highest maximum inlet tempera-
tures temperatures (without violating the redline) among all the policies.
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Chapter 5
SAFETY ANALYSIS UNDER DYNAMIC CONTEXTS
The operation of a CPS is characterized by dynamic changes in the environment
e.g., change in user location or the weather changes affecting energy scavenging
or sudden change in workload in a data center. Such changes in context affect the
operation of every subcomponent of a CPS. To illustrate this claim let us consider
the example of the Ayushman PHMS [5] discussed in Chapter 2 developed at the
IMPACT Lab at ASU.
In case of the network controlled infusion pump in the Ayushman PHMS,
the controller sends control inputs to infusion pump over the wireless channel to
maintain the analgesic drug concentration to a particular level. The controller gets
feedback from a pulse oximeter on the human body on the blood oxygen level. The
pump should stop infusing immediately when the blood oxygen level falls below a
certain level to prevent respiratory distress [55]. Since the wireless channel is prone
to errors, the packets containing control information can get corrupted or dropped at
random. If control informations do not reach the infusion pump the pump maintains
the previous control information for a preset time and then shuts down. Further,
if the controller does not obtain an accurate estimation of the blood oxygen level
it can cause unstable or oscillatory infusion rates, which is harmful for the user.
To this effect, the communication protocol is modified to consider dynamic power
control for avoiding packet drop. The design of the technique considered a home
environment and modulates radio power to increase the packet delivery rate (PDR)
of the medium from 0.6 to an acceptable level of 0.8. However, if the user now
moves from home to an outdoor open space such as the balcony, the PDR of the
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medium drops drastically [67], and the dynamic power control may not increase the
PDR to the acceptable level. If this happens too frequently, a property governed
by the user’s mobility model, a number of control packets may be dropped, which
can lead to overshoot, undershoot and oscillations in the analgesic concentration
in the blood as result causing pathological conditions such as respiratory distress.
Hence, in such a scenario the user mobility pattern may be unsafe for his health!
The operation of a PHMS involves such dynamic context driven interaction between
the embedded computing device and the environment including human physiology.
Thus dynamic context changes may affect the safety of a CPS. Hence it is
essential to consider the modeling of dynamic contexts for analyzing CPS safety.
This chapter focuses on extending the CPS-DAS tool with capabilities to model and
analyze dynamic contexts. The running example that is used in this chapter is the
Ayushman PHMS.
5.1 Dynamic Contexts
Formally a context is defined as a triple {G,M, I} such thatG is a set of objects, M is
a set of attributes, and I is a bipartite graph mapping between the sets of objects G
and attributes M. As an example, let us consider that the user of a PHMS is at home.
The set of objects can include the wireless channel, the devices in the PHMS such
as infusion pumps, glucose meter, thermometer, or blood pressure sensor, and the
human physiological parameters. The attribute set may consist of the packet drop
ratio and electromagnetic properties of the wireless channel, sampling frequency of
the sensors, and mathematical models of the physiological processes.
A context change can be represented by a change in the object set G, at-
tribute set M, and bipartite mapping I. This change can occur due to several reasons
and are mostly random in nature. In this work, three causes of context changes are
considered:
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a Mobility: An user of a PHMS is always in a state of motion in her day to day
life. This leads to change in environmental properties such as temperature and
humidity, or wireless channel properties such as the packet delivery ratio (PDR)
of indoor and outdoor environments. This change is exhibited by a change in
the mapping I where the same set of objects, humidity, temperature, PDR are
mapped to different values.
b Physiology: Random physiological events such as epileptic seizure can cause
changes in the PHMS or the operation of the PHMS. It can introduce new medical
devices such as an EEG sensor, or it can cause execution of a new algorithm for
analyzing epilepsy. This is exhibited through a change in the object set G due to
the introduction of the new sensor and subsequently a change in the set I.
c User activities: Random user activities such as exercise or food intake can cause
changes in the PHMS. For example, during exercise the energy scavenged from
the scavenging source may be sufficient for sustaining the operation of the med-
ical devices. This is exhibited in a change in the attribute set M of the PHMS, in
specific the scavenged energy attribute of the source.
The causes of the context changes are random in nature and hence are to be mod-
eled using random processes. For example, the mobility of human users are gener-
ally modeled using random processes such as Random way point model or the Levy
walk model.
Representation of context
Mathematically contexts can be represented as finite state machines, called the
ContextFSM. The object set G, the attribute set M, and a unique mapping I forms
a state in the ContextFSM. Any change in G, M, or I causes a state transition. The
state transitions are governed by the context changing events. The events can be
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represented by a random process that outputs a random sequence of 1s and 0s,
where 1s indicate a state transition. The parameters of the random process are
dependent on the user’s mobiliy, physiology and activity patterns. As discussed fur-
ther in the text these random models are not considered for analyzing the safety of
the PHMS in current literature. This thesis provides a methodology to consider the
random context changes in the analysis in a tractable manner.
5.2 Effects of Context changes
Mobility is a basic human nature. Due to this mobility of human beings, its envi-
ronment changes continuously. Associated with this are several other contextual
factors such as physiological condition, mood, and time of the day. Each context
affects the human body parameters in different ways. For example, during hot and
humid summers the body sweats leading to a lower average skin temperature, or
when a person is excited the skin conductance increases. These parameters af-
fect the way a medical device interacts with the human. As an example, consider
a wearable computer controlled infusion pump on a patient as shown in the Figure
5.1.
Infusion Pump Control System: The infusion pump is a medical electrical equip-
ment that obtains commands from a remote computer or a smart phone over the
wireless channel and accordingly injects a dose of drug such as insulin or anaes-
thetic into the human body. The controller obtains feedback from the human body
using sensors such as a glucosemeter and according to a control algorithm com-
putes the future infusion rate and sends it to the pump. In the literature, the feedback
has been modeled by pharmacokinetic diffusion equations, which take the infusion
rate as input and outputs the drug concentration in the blood. The controller then
follows a predetermined algorithm to calculate the infusion rate so that the drug con-
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Figure 5.1: A computer controlled wearable infusion pump system.
Algorithm 5.1: Discrete Time Infusion Control (Desired Drug Level (Cpd), Initial In-
fusion (x0), Increment Step (δx), Time Step (δt))
1: NoOfSteps = Total Time / δt
2: for i do = 1 to NoOfSteps
3: Infusion rate xi = xi−1
4: Predicted Present Plasma Drug Level Cpp = Simulation of PKA with infusion rate xi
5: Increment Infusion Rate xitemp = xi + δx
6: Predict Future Plasma Drug Level Cp f = Simulation of PKA with infusion rate xitemp
7: Assume linearity of the PKA model, slope = Cp f−Cppxitemp−xi
8: y - intercept Cp0 = Cpp - slope × xi
9: if thenCp0 ≥ Cpd




12: New Infusion Rate xi+1 = xitemp
13: end if
14: end for
5.1 [55] is one such algorithm that the infusion controller follows to derive the future
infusion rate from the past history of drug concentration in the blood. The controller
in this case increments the infusion rate by a small amount δx and estimates the
drug concentration using the pharmacokinetic model. If the estimated drug concen-
tration is greater than the desired level, the controller reduces infusion rate by linearly
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approximating the model such that the estimated drug concentration remains below
the desired level.
An important factor in this infusion pump device is the transfer of information
from the controller to the pump through the wireless channel. Wireless channels are
prone to errors leading to loss of control information. When the pump fails to receive
a control information the pump maintains the infusion rate obtained in the last suc-
cessfully received information. Mobility affects the wireless channel characteristics
leading to time varying packet delivery ratio (PDR), which may affect the drug con-
centration due to faulty infusion. These effects further, vary with different mobility
patterns. Hence to characterize these effects different models of mobility have to be
studied.
Models of Mobility: Over the years several models of mobility for human has been
studied including the random walk and Brownian motion models. The most popularly
used mobility model is the random walk model. However, recently, the Levy walk
mobility model was found to fit the average human mobility the best [87]. A mobility
model consists of three parameters: a) flight length, which is the distance traveled,
b) flight direction, direction of the movement, and c) pause time, time for which the
person stays at a particular position. The random walk mobility model assumes that
the probability that the flight length is greater than a certain value follows a gaussian
distribution. This says that it is less probable for a person to move further away
from a given spatial location. However, a recent research has shown that the flight
length follows a power law distribution in specific levy distribution. This comes from
the ever inquisitive nature of human being, which compels her to explore remote
regions. Instances of the two mobility models are shown in Figure 5.2, where in
random walk the shorter flight lengths are more frequent, while levy walk model has
more frequent longer flight lengths.
95
Indoor Outdoor 
Probability of staying indoors 






Probability of staying indoors 





Random way point Levy walk 
Figure 5.2: Random way point and Levy walk mobility models used as different mod-
els for the same context. Levi walk model captures the human nature of restricting
their movements to specific regions.
Effect of mobility patterns on infusion pump operation: The infusion pump con-
trol system was simulated under different mobility patterns of the user. Two different
channel properties were considered: a) indoor, with a PDR of 0.8 and b) outdoor,
with a PDR of 0.4 as suggested in [88]. A stretch of 20 feet was considered with
a door separating indoor and outdoor environment at the 10 feet mark and com-
puted the sequence of indoor and outdoor movements for random and Levy walk
models. Packet drops were simulated using the Ricean fading model and the aver-
age case drug concentration for 1000 runs for both the mobility models is shown in
Figure 5.3a). The figure shows that since the Levy walk mobility pattern has more
frequent outdoor visits, it causes more loss of control information and hence causes
drug overshoots due to faulty infusion. On the other hand random walk has shorter
excursions leading less frequent change of environment and hence less overshoot.
Further, apart from the frequency of outdoor visits, different sequences of indoor to
outdoor transitions also affect the drug concentration as shown in Figure 5.3b for
Levy walk model.
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Figure 5.3: a) Drug concentration have different overshoots for different mobility pat-
terns, b) drug concentration profile may depend on the sequence of context changes
This establishes the importance of considering dynamic context changes in
analyzing PHMSes. Before going into the details of our analysis methodology, let
us first look into the literature for similar research endeavors and distinguish our
approach from others.
5.3 Related Works
Model based engineering is a common development paradigm in the medical device
domain. But only recently there have been efforts to model and analyze the human
body along with the medical device as a closed loop system. This advancement is
mainly due to the classification of medical devices as mission critical cyber physical
systems (CPSes), where computing systems operate in close loop with their physical
environment to accomplish mission critical objectives, such as drug infusion control,
precise chemotherapy. Hence, in the literature there are several tools, frameworks,
and methodologies, that are available for medical device design or CPS design in
general. These works are classified into five categories as shown in the Table 5.1.
Hardware or Software Modeling: Several tools exists to model, analyze and sim-
ulate the hardware and software of medical devices. Some of them model the hard-
ware and electric circuitry of the medical device while others model the system soft-
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ware. The main drawbacks of these tools are that they totally ignore the modeling
of the human body and the cyber-physical interactions. Further, they do not support
context modeling and can only do simulations for a given fixed configuration.
Physical Modeling: Models of the human physiological processes and organs has
been considerably researched in the past with efficient solutions. However, exist-
ing tools do not support modeling the cooperation of the computing and physical
environment.
Interfacing tools: To model the interaction, researchers have proposed interfac-
ing tools from computing and physical domains. The interaction between these tools
are typically coarse grain where, simulation results from one tool is used by the other
to perform its own simulations. Such discretization of inter-communication between
tools lead to errors in estimation. Further, with random contexts it is difficult to predict
context changes, which can occur in the middle of a simulation. Hence, such deter-
ministic scheduling of communication may cause difficulties in modeling contexts.
Event based communication between tools on the other hand causes an increase in
simulation time during frequent context changes. Hence, for requirements analysis
of PHMSes a single tool is necessary for simulating computing functions, physical
processes, and random contexts.
Integrated modeling: To simulate the computing and physical processes of a
PHMS researchers have proposed integrated modeling tools, where both the as-
pects are modeled and analyzed in a single framework. However, such tools are
typically used on specific PHMS test cases, and generally involve extreme cases of
operation. To model effects of context changes using such tools, a large number of
test cases will have to be simulated in sequence. Further, since context changes
involve changes in PHMS configurations, automation of simulation may not be pos-
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Figure 5.4: Approach for analysis of SMCS under dynamic context changes.
inherently support context modeling and dynamic changes in PHMS models.
Formal modeling: Formal models are used extensively for mathematically charac-
terizing the computing and physical processes. Hybrid systems are used to specify
PHMSes in a single mathematical framework. However, most attempts have been
restricted to modeling stand alone medical devices. Further, there is no theory for
analyzing random contexts in a formal framework. This work proposes an approach
to formally specify contexts using a ContextFSM and describes a simulation method-
ology for random contet changes. The different stages of the model based analysis
as shown in the Figure 5.4 are explained next using the Ayushman PHMS discussed
in Chapter 2 as the example.
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5.4 Specification Phase
The specification of a PHMS is done using the industry standard AADL language (
www.aadl.info ). AADL is a hierarchical model specification tool that provides con-
structs dedicated to modeling embedded software and hardware. However, AADL
inherently does not support specification of context and context transitions and phys-
ical dynamics of the human body. The behavioral annex is used to specify context as
states and context changes as a finite state automata, ContextFSM. Further, AADL
is extended to incorporate specification of complex physical processes as a series
of differential equations through the development of annex (language extensions).
The AADL specifications shown in this thesis denotes the AADL specific constructs
in bold.
A PHMS specification has five subcomponents:
PHMS specification: It has three different contexts and their dynamic transition
logic, AADL Spec 1 (PervasiveHealthMonitoringS ystem). For each context, there
is a different hardware and software implementation indicated by the subcompo-
nents in the AADL Spec 1, and are specified using the system implementation
construct. Each context is specified using the mode construct, and the context tran-
sitions are specified as shown in the AADL Spec 1. The transitions take place on
occurrence of events, which are specified in the features section of the specification.
The events are generated from context sensors specified using the ContextS ensor
system component. In this component, mobility models can be specified, which can
be later used to generate random events that cause state transitions. In this partic-
ular example, there are f our states - home, roaming, hospital, and inactive, and six
events - RoamingActive, AtHome, Emergency, Mitigate, Activate and DeActivate. In
each context, the PHMS consists of context sensor nodes, energy source, the hu-
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AADL Spec 1: PHMS context specification
system PervasiveHealthMonitoringSystem
features
RoamingActive: in out event port;
AtHome: in out event port;
DeActivate: in out event port;
Activate: in out event port;
Emergency: in out event port;









P1: system PHMS.HomeContext in modes Home;
P2: system PHMS.OutdoorContext in modes Outdoor;








event port R1.SensorOutput → P0.RoamingActive;
event port H1.SensorOutput → P0.AtHome;
event port E1.SensorOutput → P0.Emergency;
event port M1.SensorOutput → P0.Mitigation;
event port UA.UserEvent → P0.Activate;






Home: -[ P0.RoamingActive ] → Roaming;
Roaming: -[ P0.AtHome ] → Home;
Home: -[ P0.DeActivate ] → Inactive;
Roaming: -[ P0.DeActivate ] → Inactive;
Inactive: -[ P0.Activate ] → Home;
Home: -[ P0.Emergency ] → Hospital;
Roaming: -[ P0.Emergency ] → Hospital;
Hospital: -[ P0.Mitigate ] → Home;
end PervasiveHealthMonitoringSystem.imp;
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man body specification, and specification of the coordination between the devices
and the human body.
Context sensor node: The context sensor node specification, AADL Spec 2
(PHMSnode.ContextS ensorNode1), has the processor, application algorithm, and
the radio. The processor (Processor.Atom) power for different sleep states and the
idle power consumption at various operating frequencies are obtained from the ex-
periments performed in the profiling phase. The busy power consumption of the pro-
cessor for different operating frequencies are dependent on the application threads,
modeled in the Application.Ayushman subcomponent. The model of the applica-
tion workload consists of three main threads: 1) Sensing, 2) Data Transmission and
3) PKA Execution, each of which models the power consumption and thread execu-
tion time for different frequency of operation of the processor. The Radio.CC2420
subcomponent models the power consumption of the radio for three different modes
of operation: 1) Radio transmission, 2) Reception and 3) Radio turned off. The
model based communication algorithm can be specified as a state machine using
the mode construct, where there will be three modes: 1) model match, when the
model matching thread will be executed, 2) feature update, when the thread will
compute features from the signal and send it back to the base station, and 3) raw
signal update, when the sensor will just blindly send sample by sample data. For
each mode the power consumption and data sent properties will capture the com-
pression obtained for each mode. The wireless channel properties for the radio can
be specified using the properties construct, which can change for different modes.
Energy scavenging source: The total scavenged energy can be modeled as a
property of the system implementation,
Human body specification: The modeling of the human body is complex and AADL
is not geared towards it. Property constructs can be used to specify the physical
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properties (thermal conductance, specific heat, blood perfusion as shown in AADL
Spec 3). However, the complex physical dynamics of human body that controls
its thermal behavior requires specification of differential equations in AADL which it
does not support. In this regard, an annex (CPS _annex) was developed which ex-
tends AADL to incorporate specification of differential (both partial and total) equa-
tions in the model itself. Specific constructs for denoting differentials were developed
in the annex. The annex implementation is described in detail in Section 5.7.
Specification of coordinated operation: The coordinated operation results in
changes in the complex physical processes with events occurring in the comput-
ing domain. In the infusion pump example, the diffusion of drug is governed by the
pharmacokinetic (PCK) process [55], which can be modeled as a set of differential
equations.
However, the equations change with the change in state of the controller.
The controller algorithm takes the drug concentration predicted by the PCK process
as input and varies the infusion rate to keep the drug concentration at a given level.
Such an algorithm can be represented using a state machine, which captures both
the computing and physical behavior of the infusion pump. A hybrid automata can
be used in this regard for to capture the continuous physical dynamics in each state.
However, the mode construct cannot be used since there is no provision to spec-
ify equations for a given state and transitions cannot depend on the variation of a
system variable. Instead a combination of the behavior_annex and the CPS _annex
is used in AADL to specify the control algorithm as a hybrid automata, AADL Spec
4 (NetworkControlledDevice.In f usionPump). As shown in the specification, the
partial differential equations can be specified using CPS _annex, PDE1 and PDE2
and associate them with states s1 and s2 in the behavior_annex. Further, events in
behavior_annex can occur when a variable crosses threshold (Overshoot event).
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IdlePower => 0.160 W in modes SleepState1;






















Power => 0.030 W in modes Frequency1;




AADL Spec 3: Human Body Specification
system implementation HumanBody.skin
properties
SpecificHeat => 1.6 J/(Kg.K);. . .
annex
Del1<Temperature><Time> = K(Pdel2<Temperature><x>+
Pdel2<Temperature><y> + Pdel2<Temperature><z>) + . . .
end HumanBody.skin;
AADL Spec 4: Infusion Control Algorithm Specification
system implementation NetworkControlledDevice.InfusionPump
properties




D(Pdel2<DrugConc><x>+Pdel2<DrugConc><y>) + InfusionRate + . . .
PDE2: Del1<DrugConc2><Time> = D(Pdel2<DrugConc2><x>





s1, s2, s3: state;
transitions
s0: -[ Bolus ?] → s1 {PDE1;};
s1: -[ OverShoot ? {PDE1;}] → s2 {PDE2;}; ∗∗}
end NetworkControlledDevice.InfusionPump;
5.5 Profiling Phase
The available energy profiles of the scavenging sources are already obtained
from [1] while the profiling of human body for its thermal properties are obtained
from previous literature. Thus, the power and thermal profiles of the PHMS node are
derived under the Ayushman workload.
Power Profiling
For power measurement of the Atom processor the Mobile Intel 945 GSE (GMCH)
chipset is used. The power measurement setup provides the board power con-
sumption, which includes the CPU power as well as power for driving the chipset
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and other associated components. In order to isolate the CPU power consumption
during Ayushman execution, the idle power of the board is first measured for each
throttling mode by allowing the CPU to run idle for three minutes (for stabilizing the
watt meter). Then the Ayushman workload is executed to measure the average
platform power. The difference between the two power values gives the power con-
sumed by the processor during the execution of the workload, which is shown in
Table 5.3 for different throttling modes.
The power consumption of the TelosB motes were experimentally obtained
by running the BSNBench benchmarking suite [107]. The benchmarking suite has
specific tasks for obtaining power consumption due to computation, sensing, and
communication. The sensing and computation power consumption is listed in Ta-
ble 5.2 for benchmark signal processing applications such as Fourier transform,
and peak detection. The power consumption of the Chipcon radio was measured
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perature °C after 24
Hr of operation
0, 13, 25 43 39.4365
37, 50 42 39.3325
62, 75 41 39.2295
87 39 39.0264
during transmitting packets at a bit rate of 250 kbps, standard for a sensor node (
www.xbow.com ). The current consumption of the CC2420 radio used in the PHMS
was measured to be 18.41 mA during transmission and 19.20 mA during reception.
Considering the operating voltage to be 3 V the maximum power consumption of the
radio is 58 mW.
Thermal Profiling
The thermal effects of the TelosB sensors are negligible and hence are not con-
sidered in the analysis. However, the Intel atom based smart phone dissipates a
greater amount of power and hence can cause thermal harm to the human skin.
The temperature of the Intel Atom processor is measured using the on board thermal
sensor of the Mobile Intel 945 GSE development platform (GMCH). The N270 pro-
cessor has dedicated MSR registers ( http://download.intel.com/design/processor/
datashts/320032.pdf ), which stores the digital thermometer reading. The Atom pro-
cessor was first kept at sleep state (C6) to allow for the core temperature to stabilize
to a low value. Then the processor was brought back to normal state and the Ayush-
man application was run at different throttling modes of the processor. Table 5.4
shows the peak operating temperature attained by the Atom processor during the
execution of the Ayushman application at the different processor throttling modes.
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5.6 Modeling Phase
From the AADL specification and using the profiling results, abstract models of the
different components of the PHMS can be built as discussed in this section.
Power model of PHMS
Power consumption of hardware components (processor, radio) for execution of dif-
ferent threads (Thread_power) and their timings (Thread_Time) are extracted from
the AADL meta-data. It is contended that during the period of sensing ts = 5 secs,
the micro controller is in idle state, where it consumes Pidle amount of power (≈
1 mW in TelosB motes). For a PHMS with n nodes the sensing process can be
performed in parallel by all sensors. After each sensing period the sensed data is
transferred to the base station. During this transmission period tT x the processor is
in idle state, consuming Pidle amount of power (approximately for 0.39 secs to trans-
mit five seconds of 32 bit data values 60 Hz sampling rate and a transfer rate of 24
Kbps [85]). The radio transmitter will also be active during this period (Pradio ≈ 58
mW being its power consumption). In a 24 hr period there will be x number of sense
and transmit periods (sleep cycles) for each sensor in the PHMS, with a duration of
(ts + tT x) secs each. Further, in a single day of operation of Ayushman the PHMS
nodes under go pairwise PKA execution to maintain the freshness of the encryption
key among two nodes. During this execution of PKA the processor should be in
active state consuming PPKA amount of power for the duration of execution of the
PKA algorithm tPKA. The value of PPKA is around 10 mW and tPKA is around 1 sec
as obtained from actual measurements averaged over all the commercially available
platforms. Further, during the transfer of the vault (tVault = 6.75 secs [85]), the radio
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Figure 5.5: PHMS analysis methodology is shown in the Figure. The context sensors
post events in the event queue, the events cause state transitions in the ContextFSM.
Each state has a different configuration of PHMS, which are analyzed using the
analysis engine.
Total PHMS Energy = Sensing Energy + Data Transmission Energy + PKA computation energy
+ vault transfer energy
⇒ EPHMS = nx(ts)Pidle + nxtT x(Pradio + Pidle) + tPKAPPKA(n(n − 1)2 )




x is the number of sleep cycle to be sustained in 24 hrs.
Thermal model of PHMS
The operating temperature (Operating_Temperature) of the PHMS node, power
consumption (Component_Power) of each component, human skin proper-
ties (S kin_Properties) and the distances of the components from the skin
(S kin_Distance) are obtained from the metadata information after parsing the AADL
specification. These parameters are used in the estimation of the temperature rise
in the human body parts, which is governed by the following physical phenomenon:
1) radiative heat transfer from the Atom processor which depends on the operat-
ing temperature of the processor (modeled using the Stefan’s Law), 2) conductive
heat transfer from the processor, 3) electro-magnetic radiation absorption by the
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body part (modeled by calculating the Specific Absorption Rate (SAR) [81]) and 4)
convective heat extraction by blood. These physical processes are combined in a
partial differential equation known as Penne’s equation which gives the temperature




= K 52 T − b(T − Tb) + ρSAR + Pc (5.2)
where ρ is the mass density, Cp is the specific heat, K is the thermal conductance
and T is the temperature of the body part, Pc is the power generated by the proces-
sor, b is the blood perfusion constant, Tb is the blood temperature, and SAR is the
specific absorption rate of the body part for electromagnetic radiation.
Model of Infusion Control
The control algorithm of the pump considers an initial infusion rate of x0. The control
algorithm discretizes time and queries the pharmacokinetic model after each dis-
cretized step δt for an estimation of the drug concentration. It then either increases
the infusion rate by δx or decreases it according to a linear approximation of the
diffusion process. The initial infusion rate, time discretization step and the infusion
increment step are the variables of the control system which can be tuned to obtain
different behaviors. Further, the infusion pump can get random Bolus requests (a
step rise in infusion rate). The magnitude of the bolus is also a variable of the sys-
tem. The pharmacokinetic model expresses the drug diffusion process as a set of
multi-variable linear differential equations in state space form (Equation 5.3).
y˙1 = A1y1 + B1z2 + E1u(t − Ti), z1 = C1y1(t − Tp) (5.3)
y˙2 = A2y2 + B2z1, z2 = C2y2(t − Tr)
Here y1 and y2 are the state space variables of the equation. A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2
and E1 are constants. z1 is the drug concentration in the blood while z2 is the drug
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concentration of the tissue. The initial infusion rate u = x0 is the input to the model
and the output is the drug concentration in the blood. The differential equations in
the model are time-variant. This is because they consider time delays related to the
infusion input (Ti), cardio-pulmonary transport delay Tp and the arterial, capillary
and venous transport delays Tr. The time-variant nature of the physical process
comes from the consideration of the transport delays.
5.7 PHMS Analysis
The AADL specification of the PHMS is first parsed to hierarchical XML based meta-
data. This XML metadata is now used to extract information for analysis. The
methodology for analyzing a PHMS for requirements verification under the dynam-
ically changing environment is shown in Figure 5.5. The first step in the analysis
procedure is to generate context transition test cases. In this step, a random se-
quence of events are generated according to context models such as mobility mod-
els, arrhythmia occurrence probability, and bolus request frequency. These events
are classified into event types (ETi) and are appended with an estimate of the time
before next event (TBNEi) and arranged into an event queue. The ContextFSM is
then simulated starting from the initial state in accordance with the events. In each
state, the context specific PHMS is parsed to obtain the requirements and analysis
parameters. Depending upon the requirements different analysis plug-ins are em-
ployed to perform the simulation of the PHMS model. Further, domain specific tools
such as Matlab can also be used to analyze the PHMS model. The execution of
the appropriate plug-in for the correct analysis parameters and checking the compli-
ance with the requirements is performed by the analysis execution unit (Figure 5.5).
The output of the analysis execution engine is the compliance results. This analy-
sis methodology is developed in the OSATE simulation environment, a JAVA based
AADL specific software development platform.
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To specify the human body dynamics an AADL annex called CPS _annex
was developed as discussed in Section 5.4. The CPS_annex parses AADL model
parameters according to a specified grammar, which can be used to specify complex
equations including partial differential equations in the AADL model itself. Specific
constructs were declared for denoting differential operators and the following gram-
mar is proposed which can be used to parse the specified equation in a suitable
format.
Expression := SubExpression {(+ | -)
SubExpression}*
SubExpression := Term {(* | /)Term}*







A differential equation is denoted by an Expression. Expressions consist of
one or more SubExpressions which are combined either by addition (+) or subtrac-
tion (-) ({SubExpression}∗ denotes zero or more SubExpressions). Each SubEx-
pression further can consist of one or more Terms which are combined by division
(/) or multiplication (*) operations. Each term can either be a derivative operator (de-
noted by the term DerivativeExpression) or a constant value obtained from a port
communication (PortIdentifier ) or an AADL property. Two types of derivatives are
considered in this grammar: 1) absolute derivatives with respect to a single inde-
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Probability of going outdoors = 0.9 
Probability of going outdoors = 0.5 
Probability of going outdoors = 0.1 
Outdoor PDR = 0.4 
Indoor PDR = 0.8 
Figure 5.6: Analysis of infusion pump safety under dynamic context changes. The
levy walk model predicts higher concentration of insulin than the random walk model,
the difference increases with higher probabilities of outdoor excursions.
pendent variable and 2) partial derivatives with respect to multiple variables. For
representing the absolute derivatives the Del operator is used which has three parts
to its specification: 1) derivative order, 2) dependent variable and 3) a single inde-
pendent variable. Partial derivatives are represented by the Pdel operator which has
the same structure as Del but can have multiple independent variables. This gram-
mar allows ordinary and partial differential equation specification in AADL model
itself.
The usage of the analysis framework to analyze the dynamic context driven
interactions between the PHMS devices and the human body is considered in the
next section.
Effect of context change on medical control systems
The usage of our analysis framework is shown considering the infusion pump ex-
ample. The PHMS is in a hospital context. However, the patient wants to move
around in the hospital and goes to the balcony to enjoy the view outside. This will
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trigger a context change in the PHMS and the system state will transit from hospi-
tal to outdoor. In such a scenario, specifically the wireless channel properties will
change resulting in a different packet delivery ratio (PDR) for the radio communi-
cation. Since the infusion pump is controlled through the wireless channel by the
controller, change in the PDR may cause a drop in communication quality between
the controller and the pump. Low PDR may lead to packet loss from the controller to
the infusion pump. This may cause delay or loss of control inputs to the pump. In the
analysis framework, two different mobility models, random and Levy walk [87], were
used to simulate the context change. The hospital region was divided into two parts:
indoor (PDR = 0.8) and outdoor (PDR = 0.4). The contexts were simulated for 10
cases with probability of outdoor visits varying from 0.1 to 0.9. For each sequence of
control inputs the control algorithm and the pharmacokinetic model were simulated
in coordination. The results of the simulation is shown in Figure 5.6. The results
show that a random mobility pattern is less harmful (causes lower overshoots in the
average case) than a Levy walk pattern. This is because in the Levy walk pattern
the patient is more inclined towards an outdoor visit. However, in random walk pat-
tern the outdoor visits are more uniformly distributed. Such complex simulation of
dynamic context changes and its effect on the medical device and human body coor-
dination cannot be performed in contemporary simulation tools and is only facilitated
by our methodology.
Context driven safety violation:
This example considers the thermal impact of the Intel Atom based smart phone
on the human body. Two contexts are considered: 1) the smart phone is idle, and
2) when it receives data from the ECG sensor and starts online processing of the
signal to detect onset of epilepsy [108]. The epilepsy detection algorithm involves the
computation of Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of the signal and peak detection. Once
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(a) Temperature distribution 
when smart phone is idle 






(b) Temperature distribution while 
executing epilepsy detection algorithm 
Tsafe 
Figure 5.7: Skin thermal map for two modes of smart phone operation. Typically
temperatures are higher when the smart phone is executing the epilepsy detection
algorithm.
the smart phone transits to the epilepsy detection context it stays in that context for
1000 seconds. The thermal map for the operation of the smart phone is shown in
Figure 5.7. The results show that when the smart phone was in the idle state, it was
thermally safe. However, continuous execution of the epilepsy detection algorithm is
not safe since after 1000 seconds of operation the skin temperature reaches safety
limits of 312 K.
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Chapter 6
FORMAL MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF CPSES
The previous chapters talked about architectural modeling of the CPS and handling
dynamic contexts. With architectural modeling, analysis is limited to only simula-
tions. Theoretical guarantees on the safety of CPS can only be obtained with a
more formal representation of CPS with semantics that represent the evolution of the
cyber-physical interaction between the computing unit and the physical system over
both space and time. This chapter, first reviews existing formal modeling techniques
for applicability to CPSes. It then discusses a novel formal model, Spatio-Temporal
Hybrid Automata (STHA) and develops its approximate reachability analysis tech-
nique. The reachability analysis outputs a comprehensive set of states, or possible
values of the system parameters, that can occur within a given time and space
bound.
Formal models for CPSes should thus capture four salient features: 1) dis-
crete time behavior of the computing nodes; 2) continuous dynamics of the physical
environment; 3) spatio-temporal variation of the continuous physical parameters;
and 4) aggregate effects because of concurrent operations of networked computing
nodes.
Traditionally, hybrid automata [42, 43] are used for capturing both discrete
and continuous behavior of a system. However, current tools to model a hybrid au-
tomata [77] only consider one dimensional variation of parameters, generally over
time, and are hence insufficient for modeling the spatio-temporal variation of physical
parameters in CPSes. Safety analysis of hybrid automata generally involve reacha-
bility study of the state trajectories to analyze whether the designated sets of unsafe
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states are reached with progression in time. However, for CPSes reachability study
should evaluate state trajectories in both time and space. To this effect, researchers
have considered spatial network of hybrid automata to capture the spatial propaga-
tion of physical parameters across the human body [44–47].
Spatial networks of hybrid automata discretize the space as a grid and stat-
ically allocate hybrid systems at specific points. Thus, they depend on fixed spatial
boundaries to setup the network. However, most of physical dynamics in human
body are Free Boundary Problems [109] where the boundary conditions in space
causes the spatial extent of interactions to expand. For example, the drug concen-
tration due to infusion at a given time is maximum at the site of infusion and gradually
decreases as we move away from the site. A point in space, which has a negligible
concentration at time t1, can have a considerable concentration at a later time t2.
Thus, a space point, which was not considered in the analysis since it was outside
the boundary, will be ignored by a spatial network of hybrid automata, even if at a
later time it has considerable concentration. Thus, they also fail to accurately model
the aggregate effects due to concurrent operations in networked computing units.
Modeling aggregate effects in CPSes, requires new dynamic equations in
the formal model. For example, the coefficients of the equation governing the tem-
perature rise in the human tissue changes when there are multiple heat sources (i.e.
the sensor nodes) [2, 81]. Thus, a single formal specification is necessary for the
entire network where aggregate effects can be expressed by incorporating new dy-
namic equations. Hilbertean transforms [110] have also been used to specify CPSes
formally. However, to the best of our knowledge, no formal verification of safety has
been performed.
Computationally tractable reachability analysis of a hybrid automata is only
possible to date for affine dynamics in one dimension [42, 43], since there exists
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closed form solutions of the differential equations. For the most commonly occurring
form of spatio-temporal dynamics, linear second order partial differential equations
(PDEs) as observed in Penne’s bioheat equation [4] or infusion pump diffusion dy-
namics [111], there exists no closed form solution even for a single spatial dimen-
sion. Hence, traditional method for reachability analysis with zonotopes [112] do
not apply. For temporal dynamics whose solution cannot be computed with infinite
precision, a time bounded reachability analysis is proposed in [113]. This thesis
takes an approach similar to [113] and proposes a novel bounded time and space
reachability analysis for spatio-temporal hybrid automata, where the interactions are
represented as linear second order PDEs with one space dimension. The thesis
makes the following fundamental contributions:
1. Defines a Linear 1-space dimension Spatio-Temporal Hybrid Automata
(L1STHA) capturing the aggregate spatio-temporal dynamics of cyber-
physical interactions in CPSes;
2. Develops a bounded time and space reachability analysis of L1STHA models
enabling safety verification of CPSes based on their spatio-temporal behavior.
3. Applies the reachability analysis technique to medical CPSes specifically in-
fusion pumps for safety analysis.
In the next section, we discuss some preliminary ideas, an overview of our approach
and the infusion pump example that is used in this thesis.
6.1 Motivation and Related Works
The principal source of complexity in modeling a CPS is the continuous interaction
of the computing system with the physical environment leading to spatio-temporal











































































(b) Thermal map of human skin after
18720 seconds of operation.
Figure 6.1: Thermal map of human skin for two sensors placed at locations 5 and 15.
The sensors were sensing at 60 Hz and were transmitting the sensed value to the
base station using ZigBee radio. This workload is typical of a pulse oximeter sensor.
The power consumption values are measured from a Smithsoem pulse oximter while
the temperature rise is governed by the Penne’s bioheat equation [4]
human skin governed by the Pennes bioheat equation due to heat dissipated from
two sensors places close to each other. It can be observed that the temperature
rise of the human skin varies over space, indicated by the different intensities of the
temperature rise at different spatial locations, and time, indicated by the change in
the thermal map between part a and b of the Figure 6.1.
Incapability of traditional hybrid automata: As discussed in the Chapter 1, a hy-
brid automata can effectively capture both continuous and discrete time behavior of
systems [42, 43]. In such a system, the discrete time behavior is modeled as dis-
crete states. Associated with each state is a differential equation that governs the
continuous dynamics based on which the state variables (usually the physical pa-
rameters) change over time. Transitions among the states occur with occurrences
of events normally caused by the continuous dynamics, e.g., state variable values
crossing thresholds. These systems can only express continuous dynamics in a sin-
gle (time) dimension. However, for a CPS the continuous dynamics varies over four
dimensions: three dimensions of space and one dimension of time. Hence, single
dimensional hybrid automata cannot directly model a CPS behavior.
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Drawbacks of spatial networks of hybrid automata: Recent efforts have attempted to
discretize the spatial dimensions in a CPS model and have used spatial network of
hybrid automata to capture the spatial propagation of physical parameters across the
environment [44–47]. However, such efforts have two important drawbacks. Firstly,
the discretization of the spatial dimension leads to errors in the modeling phase.
The solution of the differential equations for analyzing a hybrid automata involves
discretization of the time dimension. If the spatial dimensions are also discretized
then the errors due to quantizations are likely to be amplified during the analysis of
the hybrid automata.
Secondly, such spatial networks of hybrid automata may not capture the
aggregate effects of cyber physical interactions in a CPS. As seen in Figure 6.1 (a),
the temperature rise for both the sensors had died down significantly at the spatial
locations 9 to 10. However as time progressed the temperature at those locations
increased significantly and became comparable to the temperatures at locations 5
and 15 (the locations where sensors were placed). This happened due to aggregate
effects of the interaction between the two sensors, which caused a change in the
continuous dynamics at the spatial locations 9 and 10. Hence, it can be seen that
due to aggregate effects the continuous dynamics in certain spatial regions may
change. If a spatial network of hybrid automata were used in such a scenario, the
continuous dynamics would have been fixed over time at all spatial locations. Hence,
it may fail to capture such aggregate effects.
Model composition and aggregate effects: Hilbertean transforms [110] have also
been used to specify CPSs formally. However, no formal verification of safety has
been performed on them. Further, they do not consider the aggregate effects of
cyber-physical interactions due to network of computing units. Composition of multi-
ple hybrid automata has been studied to synthesize the global behavior of systems
121
from individual sub-components [114]. Such composition can be useful to capture
the effects of the concurrent operations in multiple computing nodes. However, the
aggregate effect of the multiple computing nodes may introduce new dynamic equa-
tions governing the variation of the system parameters. Therefore, composition of
the models has to allow changes in the equations for physical dynamics to capture
the aggregate effects which is not supported in these models.
This research proposed to overcome these challenges with a novel form of
hybrid automata called Spatio Temporal Hybrid Automata (STHA), which can cap-
ture spatio-temporal dynamics in a CPS. Further, a composition relation for STHA is
also defined that can capture the aggregate effects of cyber-physical interactions in
presence of a network of sensors.
Analysis of CPS models: Safety verification in hybrid automata normally involve
reachability study of the state trajectories to analyze if designated sets of unsafe
states are reached with progress in time. However, the continuous dynamics of the
physical parameters, caused by the cyber-physical interactions, is normally driven
by dynamic equations in four-dimensional spatio-temporal domain [4]. As expected,
most of the PDE models will not admit analytical solutions. Hence, it is often ana-
lytically not possible to bound the system parameters governed by these equations.
Therefore, this research focuses on trying to prove bounded time safety guarantees.
Towards that goal, existing reachability analysis techniques [115–125] have to be
adopted and modified and applied to STHA. The reachability analysis for the one
dimensional hybrid automata is also and open area of research given the complexity
of solutions of PDEs and only for very specific classes of equations such as lin-
ear differential equations, techniques to perform accurate reachability analysis exist.
This research also proposes the development of a simulation technique for STHA
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Figure 6.2: Assumed system model for Cyber-Physical Systems.
6.2 Preliminaries and Overview of Approach
Our system model of CPSes consists of a computing unit as a controller of the phys-
ical environment (Figure 6.2). The controller takes feedback from the physical envi-
ronment and makes a decision on the control information, which is sent back to the
physical environment. The control algorithm has m modes of operation, (l1,l2,. . .,lm),
each with a different control policy. The physical system can be represented using n
continuous variables or system properties, which vary according to a second order
PDE. In this thesis, we restrict these PDEs to one space dimension x.
There are three notions of state in our model: a) discrete state, b) continuous
state, and c) state. A discrete state represents the computing modes in a CPS and is
similar to the notion of state in a Finite State Automata. Each point in the continuous
state space (a subset V of Rn) is a value assumed by the continuous variables of
a system and is called a continuous state. A state is a tuple (l, v), consisting of a
discrete state or mode, l and a continuous state v.
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In this theory, we assume that the continuous state space is compact. That
is each subset J of the continuous state space has a continuous interior denoted
by J , an open set (e.g., 0 < x < 10), and a boundary denoted as J given by
boundary conditions (e.g. x = 0, x = 10). The set J = J∪ J  (e.g. 0 ≤ x ≤ 10). The
entire continuous state space V , is partitioned into a collection of polyhedral subsets
J = {J1, J2, . . .} such that: a) ⋃∀Ji∈J Ji = V , and b) J i ⋂ J j = φ for i , j. Each
polyhedron subset is called a cell and is a non-empty set of real numbers. Further,
two cells are called adjacent if Ji
⋂
Jj = n − 1. Two cells are connected if there is
a sequence of adjacent cells between the two.
Hausdorff distance, dH(P,Q), between two sets P and Q is the maximum
Euclidean distance of any point in P to its corresponding closest point in Q [126].
The main advantage of considering Hausdorff distance is that a δ neighbor-
hood of a point P in Rn, denoted by Bδ(P), computed using Hausdorff distance, is a
hypercube of side length 2δ. The set of vertices of a neighborhood Bδ(P) is denoted
by Vert(Bδ(P)). This is illustrated in Figure 6.3, where the δ Hausdorff neighbor-
hood of a point P in two dimension is a square of side length 2δ. This immensely
simplifies the computation of convex hull of a set of points required for reachability
analysis [127].
Unit vectors are used to denote direction. A unit vector nˆ from a set P to Q
is a vector of unit length along the Hausdorff distance from the set P to Q. The dot








nˆ, is the amount of variation in the direction from set P
to Q. This notion is useful for capturing the transition between L1STHA modes.
The image of any continuous state v, over time t and space x, denoted by
Dt,x(v) is the computation of the solution of the linear 1-space dimensional second
order PDE, for a time t and space x, with v as the initial condition.
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Figure 6.3: Computation of image from an initial state. A boundary of the initial
state is assumed and the dynamic equations are evaluated on the vertices of the
boundary. The reachable state at the next time or space step is the convex hull of
the images of the vertices.
Overview of Approach
The STHA expresses the variation of system parameters of a CPS according to a
control logic specified using the discrete states or modes. In our approach, we first
define the L1STHA, and then define its execution logic, which formalizes how the
L1STHA operates in space and time. The execution is governed by the linear 2nd
order PDE.
The reachability analysis of L1STHA is the method of approximating the con-
tinuous states that can occur during the execution of the L1STHA in space and time
from a given initial state (defined later), or in other words estimating the reach set.
This involves computing the image of an initial state using the solution of the PDE
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(Figure 6.3). To this effect, we first consider a L1STHA with only a single mode and
develop the algorithm to estimate its reach set (Section 6.9).
The reach set of a single mode L1STHA is computed using the following
steps (marked in Figure 6.3): a) we first find a suitable discretization of time and
space that guarantees that the error in computing the image of the PDE is within
the desired accuracy , b) we then consider a δ neighborhood of the initial state
v0, Bδ(v0), c) the image of the vertices of the neighborhood, Vert(Bδ(v0)), is then
computed using the PDE for a given time and space, d) the γ neighborhood of
each point in the image is considered, resulting in a new set of vertices, d) the
convex hull [127], of the new set of vertices gives the γ approximation of the reach
set. As shown later in the formulation the γ and δ are related linearly to . The
same algorithm is applicable for estimating the reach set of multi-mode L1STHA
(Section 6.10). The only difference is that in the process of computing the images
of vertices the reachability analysis algorithm keeps track of the transitions made by
the L1STHA into different modes. For safety analysis, a subset of continuous states
is designated as unsafe. If the computed reach set intersects the unsafe set, the
CPS is deemed unsafe.
Safety in CPSes
Safety of CPSes in the medical domain is defined as the avoidance of unwanted
hazards to the human body due to the cyber-physical interactions. Such a definition
is generic and is applicable to CPSes in general. Hazards can be of several types
as listed in ISO 60601 standard for medical electrical equipments. In this thesis, we
consider physiological hazards due to drug overdose in infusion pumps.
Example 12 Drug infusion: Infusion pumps operate in a close loop with a net-
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Figure 6.4: Conceptual illustration of L1STHA with two modes l1 and l2 and two
continuous variables v1 and v2
mended limits. The infusion pump has three modes: a) basal, where infusion rate is
I0, b) braking, where infusion rate is a fraction f of I0, and c) correction bolus, where
infusion rate is incremented by Ib. Diffusion dynamics of the drug is spatio-temporal
in nature and can be modeled using multi-dimensional PDE Equation 6.1 [111].
∂d
∂t
= 5(D 5 d) + Γ(dB(t) − d) − λd, (6.1)
where d(x, t) is the tissue drug concentration at time t and distance x from the in-
fusion site, D is the diffusion coefficient of the blood, Γ is the blood to tissue drug
transfer coefficient, and dB(t) is the prescribed infusion rate at time t, and λ is the
drug decay coefficient. A control algorithm in the infusion pump samples Equation
6.1 and adjusts the infusion levels so as to achieve the desired physiological effects
while avoiding hazards such as hyperglycemia.
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6.3 Linear 1-D Space Spatio-Temporal Hybrid Automata
The L1STHA expresses the variation of systems properties according to a discrete
control algorithm of the computing units in the CPS. A L1STHA is described as:
Definition 6 L1STHA: It is a tuple {L, Inv, A, B,C, u,Re},
• L is a set of m discrete states or modes {l1, l2, . . . lm}.
• Inv : L → 2J is the invariant set, which maps each discrete state to a set of
cells such that:
– for each l ∈ L the cells in Inv(l) are all connected,
– for any two different modes {li, l j} ∈ L, Inv (li) ⋂ Inv (l j) = φ,
–
⋃
∀i∈{1...m} Inv(li) = V ,
• A : L→ Rn × Rn, maps a mode to an n × n real valued matrix,
• B : L→ Rn × Rn, maps a mode to an n × n real valued matrix,
• C : L→ Rn × Rn, maps a mode to an n × n real valued matrix,
• u : L→ Rn, maps a mode to an n × 1 real valued vector,
• Re(.) : L×V → Rn is a reset function that sets initial conditions of the variables
in V at each mode li ∈ L.
Associated with the definition of L1STHA is the definition of its trajectory that relates
the variables A,B,C, and u.
Definition 7 Trajectory: The trajectory of an L1STHA with n continuous dimensions
for time t ∈ R and within a region s ⊂ R at a discrete mode li ∈ L is defined as the
1-D space spatio-temporal mapping η : [0,T ] × S → Rn such that:
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+Ciη(t, x) + ui, (6.2)
where Ai, Bi, Ci, and ui are for a mode li.
• and η(t, x) ∈ Invi ∀t ∈ [0,T ] and x ∈ S . 
The duration of the trajectory at a given spatial coordinate x is denoted by η|x.dur
and its spatial range at a given time t is denoted by η|t.range. A trajectory ends if
at any space or time point the continuous variables cross invariant set boundaries.
Figure 6.4 shows a conceptual view of a L1STHA. It has two modes l1 and l2. Each
mode is associated with an invariant set, a subset in the real space R2. The invari-
ants are used to determine transitions between modes (discussed later). Each mode
has a reset function (assigning of constant values (e1,e2)), which reflects the effect of
control operation on the system variables “whenever" or “wherever" the L1STHA first
enters a mode. In each mode the trajectory is a linear 1-space dimensional PDE,
with different values of A,B,C, and u. L1STHA is applied on Example 12 as follows:
Example 13 Infusion Pump: The L1STHA model for the infusion pump is shown
in Figure 6.5. The L1STHA model has three modes in the set L - a) correction bo-
lus mode, b) braking mode, and c) basal infusion mode. The L1STHA is initially
at the basal infusion mode l0. The continuous variable for the L1STHA model of
infusion pump is the blood glucose concentration in the blood, which varies over
space and time. The L1STHA is in: a) the basal infusion mode if the blood glu-
cose concentration is within 20 mg/dl and 120 mg/dl with infusion rate I0, b) the
correction bolus mode l1, if the blood glucose concentration is greater than 120
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Figure 6.5: The L1STHA model of single channel infusion pump.
concentration is below 20 mg/dl with infusion rate I0/ f . Thus, the Inv set con-
sists of the mappings {Inv(l0) = ([20/k, 120/k])}, {Inv(l1) = ([120/k,∞])}, and
{Inv(l2) = ([0, 20/k])}. Here k is a constant factor that converts blood glucose
concentration to insulin concentration. Such linear relationship is suggested by the
Bergman Minimal Model [99]. It can be seen that the invariant mapping Inv satisfies
the conditions in Definition 6. In each mode, the reset function Re represents the
decision of the control algorithm to increase or decrease the infusion rate whenever
the L1STHA enters the mode. The A,B,C, and u values can be derived from the
diffusion Equation 6.1 and the trajectory Definition 7 as A = 1, B = D, C = −Γ − λ,
and u = Γdb(t). 
With this definition of L1STHA we can also characterize aggregate effects as
shown in the following example.
Example 14 Multi-channel Infusion with aggregate effects: Infusion pumps
used in chemotherapy [111], often have multiple channels of infusion leading to
aggregate effects of drugs. If we consider a region of the body at a fairly large dis-
tance from the site of infusion of a drug, the concentration decreases to negligible
amounts (below a low threshold) at a given time according to Equation 6.1. How-
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ever, over time the concentration at that region may increase to such an extent that it
cannot be ignored. In case of a two channel infusion this phenomenon can happen
for both the drugs at a given region. In that case the effective concentration of drug
is a non-trivial combination of the dynamics of the individual drugs. Specifically, the
drug concentration also follows Equation 6.1 but with modified parameters and con-
ditions. To capture this aggregate effects, we first consider L1STHA models similar
to Example 13, for the individual drugs with concentration d1 and d2. The L1STHA of
the mutli-channel pump has a mode set which is the Cartesian product of the mode
sets of the individual L1STHA models. If we consider that the low threshold is 20/k
mg/dl, then aggregate effects can only occur when (d1, d2) ∈ ([20,∞], [20,∞]) i.e.,
when the individual L1STHA models are either in basal or correction bolus modes.
Hence of the nine possible modes that can occur due to the Cartesian product only
four are aggregate effect modes (Figure 6.6). The aggregate effect can be modeled
by introducing a new variable d3 to all the modes. In modes without aggregate ef-
fects d3 = 0, while in modes with aggregate effects d3 follows a new PDE with new
parameters D3, Γ3, λ3, and dB3 as suggested by [111]. The transition to the aggre-
gate effect modes can only occur if both d1 > 20/k and d2 > 20/k. The equation
expressing the aggregate effect has to be specified to the L1STHA, its execution will
determine when and where the aggregate effect occurs and with what intensity. Note
that this condition is spatio-temporal in nature and unlike spatial networks of hybrid
automata, impose no restriction on the space or time at which aggregate effects can
occur. 
The analysis of L1STHA models requires solution to the differential equations, which
depend on initial and boundary conditions and govern mode transitions.
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Figure 6.6: The normal and aggregate effect modes in the L1STHA model of multi-
channel infusion pumps.
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Figure 6.7: Example execution of the L1STHA model of a multi-channel infusion
pump, for 1000 seconds and over a 50 mm spatial region.
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6.4 L1STHA execution model
The definition of L1STHA is not complete and useful unless we define an execution
and a discrete transition. Figure 6.7 shows a simulation of the multi-channel infusion
pump L1STHA following the execution model to be discussed in this section. The
figure shows three modes of operation of the infusion pump: basal, correction and
braking. The plots show the trajectory, solution of Equation 6.1, with respect to
space at given times (0s, 100s, 500s, and 1000s). It is to be noted that we define
the L1STHA execution model with a time bound T and a space bound S .
Definition 8 Initial State: The initial state of a L1STHA at a given spatial coordinate
x ∈ S , is a continuous state v0,x ∈ Inv0 such that η(0, x) = v0 
As shown in the graph with time = 0s in Figure 6.7, initial state at the space point x
= 15mm is the value of the glucose concentration, which is 20 mg/dl.
Definition 9 Initial Configuration: The initial configuration of a L1STHA is the func-
tion η(0, .) : x→ Rn, & x ∈ S .
The initial configuration is the spatial variation of the glucose concentration at time t
= 0s as shown by the thick gray line in Figure 6.7 at time = 0s.
Definition 10 Mode Boundary: The mode boundary for any mode l ∈ L at a time t
is the boundary of a spatial region sl such that η(t, x) ∈ Invl∀x ∈ sl 
As time progresses the L1STHA is at different modes at different spatial regions.
If we consider the time t = 500s, then the spatial region from 0mm to 9 mm is in
braking mode, 9mm to 42mm is in basal infusion mode, and 42mm to 50mm is in
braking mode. Hence, each mode has a spatial boundary at a given time called
mode boundary while sl for a mode l is the spatial region in which the L1STHA is in
mode l. Note that the mode boundary shifts as time progresses.
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Definition 11 Boundary State: The boundary state of a mode l0 in L1STHA at a
given time t ∈ [0,T ], is a continuous state vt,x0 ∈ Inv0 such that η(t, x0) = vt,x0 ,
where x0 is in the mode boundary of l0.
The value of the glucose concentration at the mode boundary at a given time is the
boundary state at that time. For t = 500s the boundary state of the aggregate basal
mode is with glucose concentration 78.4 mg/dl.
Definition 12 Boundary Variation The boundary variation of an L1STHA is a set of
all functions η(t ∈ [0,T ], sl0). An element in this set is of the form η(t, x), where
t ∈ [0,T ] and x ∈ sl0 .
Definition 13 Temporal Execution: A temporal execution αt of a L1STHA at a given
spatial coordinate x ∈ S from an initial state (l0, v0,x) ∈ L ×Rn, is a concatenation of
trajectories at x, αt = η0|xη1|x . . . where:
• η0(0, x) = v0,x,




where ηk is the trajectory defined at a mode lk ∈ L, Re(.) is the reset function
(Definition 6), and αt.dur represents the duration of the temporal trajectory. ηk|x is
the trajectory at a given coordinate x for a mode lk. 
A temporal execution is the variation of a continuous variable at a given space coor-
dinate over time, as shown by the chain-dot lines in Figure 6.7. During the execution
there can be transitions to different modes with changes in the dynamic equations.
The first condition in the definition states that the execution starts from an initial
state, the second condition shows the concatenation, where ηk−1|x.dur denotes the
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time that the trajectory crossed the boundary of the invariant set for mode lk−1 at
space x.
Definition 14 Spatial Execution: A spatial execution αs of a L1STHA at a given
time t ∈ [0,T ] from a boundary state (l0, vt,x0) ⊂ L × Rn is a concatenation of
trajectories at time t, αs = η0|tη1|t . . . where:
• η0(t, x0) = vt,x0 ,




where ηk is the trajectory defined at a mode lk ∈ L, and αs.range represents the
range of the spatial execution. ηk|t is the trajectory at a given time t for a mode lk.
A spatial execution is the variation of the continuous variables over space at a given
time as shown by the thick gray lines in the four different graphs. At different times
the spatial execution changes (Figure 6.7).
Definition 15 Temporal Discrete Transition: A temporal discrete transition at a
given coordinate x from the mode li to l j occurs at a continuous state v(t′, x) at a time
t′, whenever v(t′, x) ∈ Invi
⋂
Invj , where v(t
′, x) = lim
t→t′ v(t, x) and v(t, x) ∈ Inv
 
i for
t ∈ [t′ − τ, t′] for some τ > 0.
Temporal transition at a given space coordinate x occurs at a time t′ if as the time
approaches t′, the continuous state approaches the boundary of the invariant set of
a mode li. The L1STHA transits to the state l j if the invariant sets are connected and
the continuous state approaches the intersection of the boundaries of the invariant
sets of li and l j. An example is shown in Figure 6.7, where the glucose concentra-
tion crosses invariant set boundaries from basal to correction bolus mode as time
progresses (chain and dot line).
135
Definition 16 Spatial Discrete Transition: A spatial discrete transition at a give time
t from the mode li to l j occurs at a continuous state v(t, x′) at a spatial coordinate
x′, wherever v(t, x′) ∈ Invi
⋂
Invj , where v(t, x
′) = lim
x→x′ v(t, x) and v(t, x) ∈ Inv
 
i for
x ∈ [x − s, x] for some s > 0. 
Spatial transition at a given time occurs similar to a temporal transition when the
spatial execution crosses invariant set boundaries as shown in the leftmost graphs
in Figure 6.7.
It is to be noted that in this theory we consider every transition to be deter-
ministic and transversal. A deterministic transition means that at any time or space
point the L1STHA from a given mode can only transit to a unique mode. This also
guarantees that at a fixed time and space point the L1STHA is at an unique mode.
Further, a transversal transition is assumed, which has the property that given the
L1STHA transits from a mode l1 to l2 it stays at l2 for a finite amount of time. This as-
sumption prevents zeno behavior [128], where in a very small amount of time there
are infinite transitions.
Definition 17 Deterministic Transversal Discrete Transitions: A discrete transition
is called deterministic if from a given location li the continuous state v(τs, xt) can
only transit to one unique location l j. A deterministic discrete transition is called






∧ δ−−−−−→v j(t, xt)
δt






∧ δ−−−−−−→v j(τs, x)
δx
.nˆi > , (6.4)











δx2 +C jv(τ, x) + u j, and nˆi is a outward normal unit vector to Inv

i at v(τs, xt).
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Definition 18 Deterministic Transversal Linear 1-D space Spatio-Temporal Hybrid
Automata (DTL1STHA): Given an L1STHA, a starting state (l0, v0), a time bound T,
a space region S, and a jump bound N, it is called a DTL1STHA if all the discrete
transitions starting from v0 for time T, within space region S, and for a maximum of
N jumps are deterministic and transversal.
6.5 Defining the  reach set of a DTL1STHA
Given these definitions of DTL1STHA and its execution and trajectory lets define 
reach set of a DTL1STHA. The determination of the  reach set is bounded by time
and space and an analysis technique similar to Kim [113] is proposed. However,
Kim did it for only temporal execution of a linear first order hybrid automata. This
thesis considers spatio-temporal execution of a DTL1STHA with linear second order
differential equations.
Definition 19 Reach State of a DTL1STHA: A continuous state V ∈ Rn is reach-
able if it is reached by a spatial or temporal execution at some time t and spatial
coordinate x.
Note that if a continuous state V is reached by a temporal execution given a
spatial point x at time t, then it is also reached by a spatial execution given a time t
at a spatial coordinate x.
Definition 20 Time and Space Bounded Reach Set of DTL1STHA: Given a time
bound T and a spatial region S, the time and space bounded reach set of
DTL1STHA, RTS (V0),from an initial configuration V0 ⊂ Inv0 is the set of continuous
states that can be reached by any spatial execution within the region S or temporal
execution of duration T.
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Definition 21  reach set of DTL1STHA: Given an  > 0 a set of continuous states
M of a DTL1STHA starting from an initial configuration {l0,V0} ⊂ L×Rn over a time
duration of T and within a spatial region S , is called and epsilon reach set, if:
• RTS (V0) ⊆ M, and
• dH(RTS (V0),M) ≤ , where dH(P,Q) is the hausdorff distance [126] between
two set P and Q.
Solving the PDE
In order to compute the reachable states of the DTL1STHA, we need to have the ca-
pability to solve the partial differential Equation 6.2. The initial conditions for solving
this PDE is given by -
η(0, x) = Ib∀x ∈ s (6.5)
where Ib is a constant value over time and space.
It is to be noted that this PDE has to be solved as a free boundary problem.
This assumption comes from the observations in various medical device examples.
Let us consider an infusion pump diffusing insulin into the human body. The insulin
concentration is governed by the PDE of the same form as in Equation 6.2. The
concentration spreads in space reaching different parts of the body through blood
circulation over time. Hence as time progresses the effect of insulin spreads further
away from the site of infusion. Further, at any given position the insulin concentration
increases with time. Hence, it is not intuitive to have a constant boundary condition.
Hence, we will consider this problem as a free boundary problem, where the bound-
ary at which the minimum insulin concentration is observed moves away from the
site of infusion with some velocity. However, one fixed boundary condition exists at
the site of infusion. This corresponds to the constant infusion rate from the infusion





where I0 is a constant that can be the bolus infusion rate in case of infusion pumps.
Given these initial and boundary conditions the free boundary PDE is solved in the
following subsection.






+C(η +C−1u) = 0 (6.7)






+C(θ) = 0 (6.8)




− (Aψ −C)θ(ψ) = 0 (6.9)
where ψ is the laplace parameter.
To solve the homogeneous second order linear differential equation let us





Since plus value indicates exponential increase in space, which is not ob-
served, only consider negative value of m is considered.




where k1 is a constant to be found out from the boundary condition.
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Applying laplace transform to the boundary condition Equation 6.6, and







θ(t), the temporal variation can be obtained by performing an inverse laplace










































Hence the value of η after solving the differential equation is given by Equa-
tion 6.15.
















η(t, x) can be computed from the Equation 6.15.
Notations
The table 6.1 lists the important notations and their definitions that will be used fur-
ther in the text. With these notations defined and the assumptions on exact compu-
tation, we move on to the time and space bounded epsilon reach set of a DTL1STHA
with a single location or discrete state.
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Table 6.1: Notations for reachable states and over approximations
Notation Definition
Dt,x(P) It is the set of reachable states at time t and coordinate x from a set P at time 0
and origin.
Dt,x(P, γ) It is an over approximation of the set Dt,x(P) such that i) Dt,x(P) ⊂ Dt,x(P, γ) and
ii) dH(Dt,x(P),Dt,x(P, γ)) ≤ γ for some γ > 0.
D0,0(P, γ) It is the γ over approximation of the set P.
Br(p) It is a hypercubic neighborhood of a point p in the state space i.e. Br(p) = {y ∈
Rn : ||y − p|| ≤ r}
6.6 Time and space bounded epsilon reach set of a DTL1STHA with a single
discrete location
Let us first consider the bounded epsilon reach set computation of a DTL1STHA
with a single discrete location l0 and the associated invariant set Inv0. We want to
find out the epsilon reach set by sampling the time and the space dimension with
time intervals hx at a spatial coordinate x and space grid ht at a given time. Now
sampling will lead to errors in state estimation. Hence, we need to find an epsilon
 such that from any sampled state η(t, x) the trajectory remains within B(η(t, x))
before the next sampled state is considered. We now derive the values of hx and ht.
To ensure that the trajectory stays within a hypercube of dimension length 
we have to obtain hx and ht such that,
max
τ∈[0,hx]
||η(t + τ, x) − ηt, x||∞ < , (6.16)
max
s∈[0,ht]
||η(t, x + ht) − η(t, x)||∞ <  (6.17)
We first consider the time differential of η -
max
t∈[t,t+hx]


















||η(t, x)||∞ + ||A−1u||∞
We need to express maxt∈[t,t+hx] || δ
2η(t,x)
δx2 ||∞ and the term maxt∈[t,t+hx] ||η(t, x)||∞
in terms of the location invariants so that they can be easily computed. The ab-
solute max of the term maxt∈[t,t+hx] ||η(t, x)||∞ is the maximum value that η can
take while staying in the location. This means that maxt∈[t,t+hx] ||η(t, x)||∞ = ηmax =
maxt∈Tandx∈S Inv0.
To find the maximum of the double differentiation we employ Finite Difference




2η(x) − η(x + ht) − η(x − ht)
h2t
(6.20)
The maximum value of this term is obviously 2(η
max−ηmin)
h2t
, where ηmin =
mint∈Tandx∈S Inv0. Hence we get,
max
t∈[t,t+hx]





Therefore we can derive maxτ∈[0,hx] ||η(t + τ, x) − η(t, x)||∞ as follows -
max
τ∈[0,hx]





|| ˙η(t, x)||∞ dt (6.22)
max
τ∈[0,hx]





Therefore to ensure that the trajectory stays within the hypercubic bound 




hx + ||A−1C||∞ηmaxhx + ||A−1u||∞hx ≤  (6.24)
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hx + ||A−1C||∞ηmaxhx + ||A−1u||∞hx = /2 (6.25)



































− ||B−1C||∞ηminh2t /2 − ||B−1u||∞h2t /2
Again to ensure that the trajectory remains within the hypercube of dimen-
sion  we should have -
||B−1A||∞(ηmax − ηmin)h2t
2hx
− ||B−1C||∞ηminh2t /2 − ||B−1u||∞h2t /2 ≤  (6.29)
Hence we can assume,
||B−1A||∞(ηmax − ηmin)h2t
2hx
− ||B−1C||∞ηminh2t /2 − ||B−1u||∞h2t /2 = /2 (6.30)
The value of ht and hx can be found out by simultaneously solving the equations
6.25 and 6.30.
The simultaneous solution to these equations may not always be feasible,
leading to inapplicability of the fdtd approximation. We see that if the elements of the
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C vector are positive then the spatial sampling interval is imaginary. Only when all
elements in C are negative there is a feasible value of the spatial sampling interval.
If the elements of C are all positive then the spatial and temporal sampling intervals










δt |max −CB−1ηmin − uB−1
(6.32)
Given these sampling intervals let us now define an epsilon reach set. The
following definition will give us the method to compute the epsilon reach set of a one
location DTL1STHA.
Lemma 6.6.1 Given  > 0 a bounded  reach set RTS (V0, ) of a one location
DTL1STHA from an initial configuration V0 ⊂ Inv0 from time [0,T ] and within space
S can be determined as -





B(η(khx, B jht(x0))), (6.33)
where m = T/hx, r = ||S boxdot||/ht, x0 is the origin of the coordinate system, and
hx and ht are derived from the equations 6.31 and 6.32. The set has the following
properties -
i Lim→0RTS (V0, ) = RTS (V0) and
ii It contains the /2 neighborhood of RTS (V0) i.e,⋃
z∈RTS (V0)
B/2(z) ⊆ RTS (V0, ) (6.34)
Proof: For the first property of the set RTS (V0, ), we observe that, as  → 0
we have ht → 0 and hx → 0. This establishes that in the limiting case there is no
discretization. Hence, Lim→0RTS (V0, ) = RTS (V0).
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Further, we have already selected hx and ht as half of the value required to
guarantee  reach set. Hence, η(khx, B jht(x0)) is in /2 neighborhood of RTS (V0).
Since, RTS (V0, ) considers the  neighborhood of η(khx, B jht(x0)) it already contains
the /2 neighborhood of any η(t, s). Hence proved.
6.7  reach set for a set of initial configurations
In this section, we consider a set of initial configurations which are within a δ ball of
the initial configuration V0, Bδ(V0). First it is shown that there exists a δ ∈ R+ such
that the reach set starting from the set of initial configurations Bδ(V0) is contained in
the  neighborhood of RTS (V0).
Lemma 6.7.1 Given an  > 0, an initial configuration V0 of a DTL1STHA, a time
interval [0,T] and a spatial region S, there exists a δ > 0 such that,
RTS (Bδ(V0)) ⊆ RTS (V0, ), (6.35)
where Bδ(V0) is a δ neighborhood of the initial configuration V0 and RTS (Bδ(V0)) is
the reachable set starting from the set of initial configurations Bδ(V0) upto a time
T and within spatial region S. In particular it will be shown that, δ = /2H for an
appropriate H.
Proof: Let us consider a point p within the location boundary of the initial lo-
cation l0. Let the initial state at the point p be v0. A continuous state can be reached
either by traversing in time or through space following the continuous dynamics of
the DTL1STHA:















If we consider two continuous states v1 and v2 in RTS (Bδ(V0)) then the max-
imum difference between the two is given by -
||v1 − v0||max = (6.37)













≤ ||Ib1 − Ib2||+ 2 ||I01 − I02||√
4bc
The initial configurations for v1 and v2 were within a δ bound of the initial configuration
V0, ∀x ∈ sl0 . Hence, ||Ib1 − Ib2|| ≤ δ, this is obtained by putting t = 0 in the Equation
6.15. I0 is the impulse bolus at time t = 0. Hence, we can assume that ||I01− I02|| ≤ δ.




) ≤ /2 (6.38)
Hence, we get for an H = (1+ 2√
4bc
), the reachable states from a δ = /2H boundary
of the initial configuration V0 is within an epsilon bound of the reachable states from
V0.
Let us now focus on proving that the γ approximation of the reachable states starting
from a δ ball around the initial configuration is also within  approximation of the
reachable states starting from V0.
Lemma 6.7.2 Given an  > 0, a one mode DTL1STHA, an initial configuration
V0, a time interval T , and a spatial region S , there exists a δ > 0 and a γ > 0
such that, RTS (Bδ(V0), γ) ⊆ RTS (V0, ). In particular we show that, RTS (V0) ⊆
RTS (B/4H(V0), /4) ⊆ RTS (V0, ), where H = (1 + 2√4bc ).
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Proof: Let us consider continuous states vm and vp in Bδ(V0) and V0 respec-
tively. The continuous state reached after time t and at spatial location x starting
from vm is η(t, x)|vm . Let vn be a continuous state in RTS (Bδ(V0), γ), then we get,
||vn − η(t, x)|vp || = ||vn − η(t, x)|vm + η(t, x)|vm − η(t, x)|vp || (6.39)
≤ ||vn − η(t, x)|vm || + ||η(t, x)|vm − η(t, x)|vp || (6.40)
≤ γ + Hδ (6.41)
Since the sampling rate accounts for half of the approximation error, we can say that
vn ∈ RTS (V0, 2(γ + Hδ)). Therefore if we choose γ = /4 and δ = /4H the lemma
is proved.
6.8 Determining exit condition from an invariant set
With a suitable over approximation we can determine the first time the DTL1STHA
crosses the boundary of an invariant set. Let us consider that the first time that the
set of reachable states crosses the continuous domain V at time τ1 < T . Then we
have the following lemma:
Lemma 6.8.1 Given a DTL1STHA, an initial state v0 at a given space point x0 ∈ S , if
the trajectory η(t, x) exits the domain V at time τ1 < T and space point x1 ∈ S , then
for all small enough δ > 0 there exists some hx and ht such that, Bδ(η(mhx, nht)) ⊂
VC for some m and n.
Proof: Let us consider a ball of radius r around η(τ1, x1). Now since the
trajectory is moving to VC at (τ1, x1) then < η(τ1, x1).nˆ1 >> 0, where nˆ is the unit
normal vector at η(τ1, x1) outward of V. Now since the dynamic equations of the
DTL1STHA are continuous then we can say that for an appropriately small r, ∀v ∈
Br(η(τ1, x1))∩V, < v.nˆ1 >> 0. If we consider a larger values of δηδt and δ
2η
δx2 then the
approximation error for the reachable states will be larger which will result in a larger
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boundary for the reachable states. Let us consider that, δη
δt |max = (b/a)(2 δ
2η
δx2 + r) +
(c/a)(2ηmax+r)+u/a and
δ2η
δx2 |max = (a/b)(2 δηδt +r)−(c/b)(ηmin/2−r)−u/b. Then if we
consider 2hx < r/
δη
δt |max and 2h2t < r/ δηδx |max then it is assured η(τ1 + 2hx, x1 + 2ht) ∈
VC. Since, the domain is compact we can always find a δ from Lemma 6.6.1, such
that Bδ(η(mhx, nht)) ⊂ VC.
6.9 Algorithm for bounded  reach set of a single location DTL1STHA
The algorithm computes the approximate image of an initial configuration V0 over
time and outputs the reachable states based on the approximation parameter . The
input to the algorithm are: i) a single location DTL1STHA, ii) an initial configuration
V0, iii) an invariant set Inv, iii) the parameter , iv) a parameter α, v) the time bound
T , and vi) the space bound S . The algorithm outputs the set of reachable states the
time and spatial location at which the DTL1STHA exits the invariant set Inv and the
γ and δ parameters.
The algorithm 6.1 first considers a δ boundary of the initial configuration V0
and tries to compute the reachable states that are either within V or are in VC. Note
that if a set of reachable state intersects with both V and VC then it means that
at the given space and time the DTL1STHA is in two different locations which is
not feasible. However, since the computed reachable states are an  approximation
such infeasible cases may occur during execution of the algorithm. Hence, if such
an infeasible case occurs the algorithm updates the values of γ and δ such that the
bounded epsilon reach set is within either V or VC.
The algorithm increments time in steps of hx. For time t = 0, the algorithm
starts with Bδ(V0) and computes its image for different space points starting from x
= 0, to x = S in steps of ht. After each computation of image the algorithm checks
whether the image is within V or not. If it is not within V there can be two cases:
a) it is within VC, in that case the algorithm terminates and the reachable set is
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the image of Bδ(P0) at the current time and space location, and b) it is not within
VC, in that case the algorithm returns an empty set as the reachable state, updates
the parameters γ and δ by multiplying the previous values with α and restarts the
computation at t = 0 and x = 0. If the image is within V for all x ∈ S , the algorithm
then increments t by hx. It then computes the image of Bδ(P0) at x = 0, and t = t +
hx. The computation of images with respect to spatial dimension is again repeated
until t < T .
We now discuss how the image can be computed in a simple manner with the
help of the theorems and lemmas established in the previous sections. We will first
discuss the methodology of image computation and then prove that the computation
methodology leads to an  approximation of the image.
Given an initial state the δ neighborhood can be computed by considering
points at a hausdroff distance of δ. This is essentially a box around the initial state
as shown in the Figure 6.3. The images are computed twice, once through time and
for each time interval through space. For every vertex of the box the spatial or tem-
poral image for the next interval is computed by simulating the Equation 6.15 with
approximate values of the error functions. The next step is to create a δ neighbor-
hood of the images of the vertices. This step results in a fresh set of vertices created
from the neighborhood of the images of the vertices of the neighborhood of the initial
state. The convex hull of the new set of vertices gives the  reachable states after
hx time and at space location x0 + nht for some n > 0.
If the convex hull is entirely within Inv0 then there is no transition between
locations. On the other hand if the convex hull is entirely within InvC0 , then there is a
transition to a different location. Note that the convex hull cannot intersect both Inv0
and InvC0 . Intersection means that the DTL1STHA is in two locations at the same
time and space, which indicates that the DTL1STHA is not deterministic.
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Algorithm 6.1: (Rset,t,x) = CalcReach(DΣ,Inv,V0,T,S,,α)
1: Rset = φ;
2: while Rset == φ do















δt |max− cb ηmin− ub
;
6: t = 0; Pc = Bδ(V0);
7: while t ≤ T do
8: x = 0;
9: Dt,x(Pc) = Pc;
10: while x ≤ S do
11: x = x + ht;
12: Dt,x(Pc) = Compute the image at x from Dt,x−ht (Pc);
13: if (Dt,x(Pc) 1 Inv) then
14: if (Dt,x(Pc) ⊂ InvC) then
15: Rset = Rset
⋃
Dt,x(Pc);
16: return (Rset,Dt,x(Pc), t, x, γ, δ);
17: else
18: Rset = φ;




23: t = t + hx;
24: Dt,x(Pc) = Compute the image at t from Dt−hx,x(Pc);
25: if (Dt,x(Pc) 1 Inv) then
26: if (Dt,x(Pc) ⊂ InvC) then
27: Rset = Rset
⋃
Dt,x(Pc);
28: return (Rset,Dt,x(Pc), t, x, γ, δ);
29: else
30: Rset = φ;






Formally, the algorithm first computes P0 the δ neighborhood of the initial
state vx0 = V0(x0) within the initial configuration V0. The set Dt+hx,x(P0) or Dt,x+ht(P0)
is computed from the set Dtx(P0) by exploiting the polyhedral structure of P0. The
algorithm first considers the set of vertices Vert(t, x) of the image Dtx(P0). Then for
each vert(t, x) ∈ Vert(t, x), vert(t + hx, x) or vert(t, x + ht) using the solution of the
dynamic Equation 6.15. Hence the set Vert(t + hx, x) or Vert(t, x + ht) can be com-
puted from Vert(t, x), which are essentially the images of the vertices in Vert(t, x).
The image Dt+hx,x(P0) or Dt,x+ht(P0) can then be computed from the convex hull of
the set of vertices in Vert(t + hx, x) or Vert(t, x + ht) respectively. To obtain a γ
approximation of the reachable states we can take γ boundaries of the new vertex
set Bγ(Vert(t + hx, x)) or Bγ(Vert(t, x + ht)) are obtained. Since the ht and hx were
determined such that the computation of the dynamic equations wont result in an er-
ror greater than γ we can conclude that the γ approximation of the reachable states






Lemma 6.9.1 If H is the convex hull of the set
⋃
v∈V Vert(Bγv) then it is the closed
γ neighborhood of the convex hull of the set V .
Proof: Consider a point w in H. Then there exists two points y1 and y2 in⋃
v∈V Vert(Bγv) such that, w = λy1 + (1 − λ)y2 for some λ > 0. There should
exist some v1 and v2 in V such that ||y1 − v1|| ≤ γ and ||y2 − v2|| ≤ γ. Further,
w′ = λv1 + (1 − λ)v2 must be in the convex hull of the set V .
Note that,
||w − w′|| = ||λy1 + (1 − λ)y2 − λv1 − (1 − λ)v2|| (6.42)
≤ λ||y1 − v1|| + (1 − λ)||y2 − v2|| (6.43)
≤ γ (6.44)
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Hence, w is in the γ neighborhood of V .
Let us consider wv in the γ neighborhood of the convex hull of the set V .
Then there exists an element vc in the convex hull of V such that, ||wv − vc|| ≤ γ.
Further, there exists v1 and v2 in V such that ||vc = λv1 + (1 − λ)v2||. Let ||wc|| =
||vc + αγ||, where α ∈ [0, 1]. Now we can write,
||vc + αγ|| = ||λv1 + αλγ + (1 − λ)v2 + α(1 − λ)γ|| (6.45)
= ||λ(v1 + αγ) + (1 − λ)(v2 + αγ)|| (6.46)
Hence, wc is expressed as a convex sum of two elements in the set⋃
v∈V Vert(Bγv). Thus, wc ∈ H.
We will now show that the algorithm 6.1 terminates in a finite number of steps
and gives the RTS (Bδ(x0), γ) as output.
Theorem 6.9.2 Given the input (DΣ,V,V0,T, S , , α) to the Algorithm 6.1, the algo-
rithm terminates in a finite number of steps and outputs the set RTS (Bδ(x0), γ).
Proof: The algorithm terminates whenever the current time is greater than
T and the current space point is outside S . Since the time and space points incre-
ment in fixed steps the algorithm terminates in a finite number of steps for these
conditions. However, if the  reach set intersects both V and VC then the algorithm
restarts computation with reduced δ and γ. This has the potential of running into
infinite loops with δ and γ reducing to arbitrarily small value.
If there exists a time τ1 < T or a space point x1 ∈ S such that, the tra-
jectory moves to VC then from Lemma 6.8.1 there exists a δ1 > 0 such that
Bδ1(η(nhx,mht)) ⊂ VC for some n and m. Let ta = nhx and xa = mht. Now for
this ta and xa, from Lemma 6.7.2 there exists a γ1 such that Rtaxa(Bδ1(V0), γ1) ⊆
Br(η(ta, xa)).
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Now if t f = min(τ1,T ) and x f = min(xa, S ), then from Lemma 6.7.2 there
exists δ2 > 0 and γ2 > 0 such that Rt f x f (Bδ2(V0), γ2) ⊆ Rt f x f (V0, ). If we assume
that δ = min(δ1, δ2) and γ = min(γ1, γ2), then there is a δ > 0 and a γ > 0 such that
the algorithm does terminate and outputs the  reach set.
6.10 Algorithm for computing  reach set for multiple location DTL1STHA
The lemma 6.8.1 states that if the trajectory exits a given domain V then there exists
a suitable δ > 0 such that the reachable states from the δ neighborhood of the initial
states, computed using the convex hull methodology, exits the domain V . This fact
along with the assumption that the transitions are all deterministic and transversal
can be used to determine transitions between different locations. If a single location
DTL1STHA exits a domain V at a time τ1 < T or space x1 < S then the Algorithm
6.1 gives us an approximate time and spatial location at which the exit occurred and
the  reach set. This fact can be utilized to find transitions for the more general case
of the DTL1STHA.
The underlying idea is to use the algorithm 6.1 to find exit condition from an
invariant set Inv0. In the process the δ and γ parameters are changed. On transition
an updated reachable set is obtained, which can intersect multiple invariant sets
of different locations. For a deterministic transition the DTL1STHA can only transit
to one location. We prove subsequently, that by proper adjustment of the δ and γ
parameters it is possible to obtain an  reach set such that the reach set intersects
only a single invariant set.
The algorithm is similar to the algorithm 6.1, where it starts with the com-
putation of images from the δ neighborhood of the initial configuration. The image
computation procedure follows the same convex hull methodology. The only differ-
ence is that now when the reach set is not in the invariant set of the current location
then the algorithm has to decide on the new location and the new initial configu-
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ration. The algorithm adjusts the values of δ and γ, to compute the reach set on
transition, the new location after transition, and the time and spatial location of tran-
sition. The new reach set is then considered as the initial state of the new location
and the computation continues.
Hence for the algorithm to function properly we need to find out the time
τ and the spatial location x at which a transition takes place and the value of the
trajectory η(τ, x) at the transition point. In the next lemma we will show that, it is
possible to approximate the time of transition and the value of the trajectory with a
given error bound.
Lemma 6.10.1 Given that at τ1 < T and x < S the trajectory η(τ1, x) ∈ Inv0
satisfies deterministic transversal transition conditions, there exists a δ > 0 such
that B2δ(η(τ1, x)) ⊂ Inv0 ∪ Inv1 and also there exists ∆t and ∆x such that -
1. η(t, x) ∈ Inv 1 for t ∈ [τ1, τ1 + ∆t] and x ∈ [x, x + ∆x]
2.
⋃
η∈Tr0→1 R[τ1,τ1+∆t],[x,x+∆x](η) ⊂ Inv 1 , where, Tr0→1 = Bδ(η(τ1, x))∩ Inv0 ∩ Inv1
Proof: Let us consider that Inv0 ∩ Inv1 ∩ Inv2 , φ. Since the transition is determin-
istic, if η(τ1, x) ∈ Inv0 ∩ Inv1 then η(τ1, x) < Inv0 ∩ Inv2. Hence, η(τ1, x) < Inv2.
Now since Inv2 is assumed to be compact then there exists a δ′ > 0 such that
Bδ′(η(τ1, x)) < Inv2. Hence, Bδ′(η(τ1, x)) ∈ Inv0 ∪ Inv1.
Since, η(τ1, x) satisfies the deterministic transversal transition condition at
Inv0 , then there exists a unit normal vector nˆ1 out of Inv

0 such that < ˙η(τ1, x).nˆ1 >>
0. If we consider δη
δt = max((b0/a0)(
δ2η







δt )−(c0/b0)(ηmin)−u0/b0, (a1/b1)( δηδt )−
(c1/b1)(ηmin) − u1/b1), then there exists a δ′′ > 0 such that, for all η(t, x) ∈
Bδ′′(η(τ1, x)) ∩ Inv0 ∩ Inv1 < ˙η(τ1, x).nˆ1 >> 0. Now for these values of δηδt and
δ2η
δx2 if we select δ = min(δ
′, δ′′) and ∆t = δ/2, ∆x = δ/2 then both the claims satisfy.
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The above lemma 6.10.1 gives a methodology to over-approximate η(t, x),
where a δ neighborhood of η(t, x) is intersected with the Inv0 and Inv1. Given such
an appropriate δ > 0, an appropriate δ0 neighborhood of v0 = η(0, 0) can also be
found such the reach set at time t and space location x is within a δ neighborhood
of η(t, x).
DTL1STHA bounded time and space reachability analysis algorithm
The Lemma 6.8.1, the resulting Algorithm 6.1, along with the assumption that the
transitions are all deterministic and transversal can be used to augment Algorithm
6.1 to use it for multi-mode DTL1STHA. Using Algorithm 6.1 an updated reachable
set can be obtained on transition, which can intersect multiple invariant sets of dif-
ferent modes. However, a DTL1STHA can only transit to one mode. We prove
subsequently, that by proper adjustment of the δ and γ parameters it is possible to
obtain an  reach set using Algorithm 6.1 such that the reach set intersects only a
single invariant set on transition.
In this regard, we need to find out the time τ and the spatial location x at
which a transition takes place and the value of the trajectory η(τ, x) at the transition
point. In the next lemma we show that, it is possible to approximate the time of
transition and the value of the trajectory.
The lemma 6.10.1 gives a methodology to over-approximate η(t, x) if it satis-
fies the deterministic transversal transition condition. It takes a similar approach as
Lemma 6.8.1 to estimate the state at the time τ and space x of transition. It approxi-
mates the state η(τ, x) by intersecting the δ neighborhood of η(t, x) with the Inv0 and
Inv1. The lemma further states that if the reach set from Bδ(η(τ, x)) ∩ Inv0 ∩ Inv1
is computed for an appropriate ∆t time interval and ∆x space interval then the reach
set lies within Inv1.
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Given an appropriate δ > 0 from Lemma 6.10.1, an appropriate δ0 neighbor-
hood of V0 can also be found as guaranteed by lemma 6.8.1, which ensures that the
 reach set computed following the lemma 6.6.1 lies within Inv1.
Lemma 6.10.2 If the reachable states during a deterministic transverse transition at
time τ1 and space location x1 is within a δ neighborhood of η(τ1, x1), there exists a
δ0 such that Dτ1,x1(Bδ0(v0)) ⊂ Bδ(η(τ1, x1)) and Dτ1,x1(Bδ0(V0)) ∩ Inv0 ∩ Inv1 is an
over-approximation of η(τ1, x1), where Dτ1,x1(Bδ0(v0)) is the reach set computed by
Algorithm 6.1.
The Lemma 6.10.2 states that if for δ > 0 a transition is detected by computing the
reach set using Lemma 6.6.1, as in Algorithm 6.1, a corresponding δ0 boundary of
the initial configuration can be found. The lemma 6.10.2 can then be used in arith-
metic induction to prove that if the reach set for any transition k is computed following
lemma 6.10.1 then a δ0 can always be found such that Algorithm 6.1 can capture
it. This allows us to use the Algorithm 6.1 with some changes for computing reach
set of multi-mode DTL1STHA. The changes include a Transition function that can
output the new mode, and the new initial configuration to be used for each transi-
tion. Further, if the Transition algorithm fails to find the new mode, then Lemma
6.10.2 allows it to reduce the value of δ0 and restart the overall computation with an
increased assurance of finding the new mode in the next iteration.
The reachability analysis algorithm for multi-mode DTL1STHA as shown in
Algorithm 6.2, takes as input: a)the DTL1STHA DΣ, b) initial mode l0, c) the initial
configuration V0, d) the time bound T , e) the space bound S , f) the approximation
parameter , and g) the parameter α used to adjust δ and γ. It outputs the reach set
Rset. The algorithm has the following simple steps:
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a) From an initial state it starts computing the reach set following Algorithm 6.1. On
computation of reach set the algorithm checks whether it is within the invariant set
of the current mode (line 13 to 15).
b) Whenever a reach set computed is not within the invariant set, the Transition
algorithm is called. Transition Algorithm 6.3 checks whether the reach set is within
a unique Invi. If it is within an unique Invi the algorithm returns the reach set, the
new mode, and the new initial configuration for the mode. If not then the algorithm
recalculates δ and γ and returns an empty reach set.
c) If Transition returns a valid transition then the algorithm resumes its computation
from the new initial configuration, new mode, current time and space point.
d) Else it restarts the computation at time t = 0 and space x = 0 with the new values
of δ and γ.
The reachability algorithm for multi-mode L1STHA is given in the Algorithm
6.2. Now from lemma 6.10.2, we know that there always exists a δ0 for which every
transition is captured by the algorithm Transition, hence at some point of time or
space the Transition function will return a non-empty reach set and the algorithm




logα(δ)) since the there are two loops for time and space and each can be
reiterated at the max logα(δ) times.
6.11 Formal Analysis Case-Studies
Given the STHA model and it reachability analysis algorithm, presented in the previ-
ous chapter, this chapter describes the application of the formal method in two case
studies—BSN safety (Section 6.11), and infusion pump (Section 6.11)—as men-
tioned in Chapter 2. For each of the case studies we first discuss the CPS design
requirements, the STHA formal models and then their reachability analysis.
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Algorithm 6.2: AlgoReachSet(DΣ,l0,V0,T,S,N,,α)
1: Rset = φ; γ = α; δ = α;
2: vx = maxi( aibi
δη
δt |max − cibi ηmin − uibi );
3: vt = maxi( biai
δ2η
δx2 |max + ciai ηmax + uiai );
4: while (Rset == φ) do
5: hx = γ/(2vx); ht =
√
γ/vt;
6: t = 0; Pc = Bδ(V0); lc = l0; jump = 0; Vc = V0; ValidTran = True;
7: while ( jump < N) do
8: while (t < T ) do
9: x = 0; Dtx(Pc) = Pc;
10: while (x < S ) do
11: x = x + ht;
12: Dt,x(Pc) = Compute image at x from Dt,x−ht (Pc);
13: if (Dt,x−ht (Pt) ⊂ Inv(lc)) then
14: Rset = Rset ∪ Dt,x(Pt);
15: else
16: (lc,Vc,ValidTran, γ, δ,Rset) = Transition(DΣ, lc,Vc, l0,V0,ValidTran, , α, γ,
17: δ,Dt,x(Pc),Rset);
18: if (!ValidTran) then
19: break;
20: else
21: Pc = Vc; Dt,x(Pc) = Bδ(Vc);
22: jump = jump + 1;






29: t = t + hx;
30: Dt,x(Pc) = Compute image at t from Dt−hx,x(Pc);
31: if (Dt,x(Pc) ⊂ Inv(lc)) then
32: Rset = Rset ∪ Dt,x(Pc);
33: else
34: (lc,Vc,ValidTran, γ, δ,Rset) = Transition(DΣ, lc,Vc, l0,V0,ValidTran, , α, γ,
35: δ,Dt,x(Pc),Rset);
36: if (!ValidTran) then
37: break;
38: else
39: Pc = Vc; Dt,x(Pc) = Bδ(Vc);
40: jump = jump + 1;









Algorithm 6.3: (lc,Vc,ValidTran, γ, δ,Rset) = Transition(DΣ,lc,Vc,l0,V0,ValidTran,,α,
γ,δ,Dt,x(Pc),Rset)
1: for (i = 1 to n) do
2: Φ(i) = Intersection of Dt,x(Pc) and Inv(li);
3: end for
4: IntersectStates = find the number of nonzero entries in Φ;
5: if (IntersectS tates > 1) then
6: lc = l0; Vc = V0; γ = α; δ = α; Rset = φ;
7: ValidTran = False;
8: else
9: lc = li such that Φ(i) > 0;
10: Vc = Inv(li);
11: ValidTran = True;
12: Rset = Rset ∪ Dt,x(Pc);
13: end if
14: return (lc,Vc,ValidTran, γ, δ,Rset)
BSN Safety Verification
As described in Section 6.11 of Chapter 2, thermal safety of BSN operations is
generally characterized by a threshold temperature, which when exceeded causes
thermal damage to human skin. The temperature rise on human skin due to heat
dissipation in a single BSN node is given by the Penne’s bioheat equation [4]. From
Equation 5.2 it can be observed that the temperature rise varies over both time and
three dimensional space; the time differential of the temperature depends on its
spatial gradient. Further, the temperature rise depends on the SAR due to elec-
tromagnetic radiation from the BSN node radio. In case of network of sensors, a
specific region of human skin may be affected by electromagnetic absorption from
multiple sensors. The aggregate effects of electromagnetic radiation on a specific
region for multiple sensors can be obtained by adding the individual SAR values.
Given such spatio-temporal modeling and analysis requirements we next discuss
the STHA modeling.
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Table 6.2: Safety Verification Results (HA = Hybrid Automata)
Gap between
sensors (m)






STHA HA STHA HA
0.005 2.41 2.39 Un-Safe Un-Safe 86400
0.005 2.2 2.19 Un-Safe Safe 1240
0.005 1.56 1.48 Safe Safe 520
0.015 2.3 2.24 Un-Safe Un-Safe 86400
0.015 2.1 1.98 Safe Safe 1240
0.015 1.4 1.37 Safe Safe 520
STHA model for BSN Safety verification
The dynamic equation Eq1 which governs the temperature rise in state I1 is same
as Equation 5.2. In state N1, the sensor power is considered to be zero and Eq2
represents the special case of Equation 5.2 with Pc = 0. Eq3 for the aggregate
effect takes the same form of Equation 5.2, but Pc and S AR values are the addition
of the power and SAR values from both the sensors. Further, the radiation term also
gets added up. Given the STHA model, the formal safety verification is performed in
Section 6.11 using the reachability analysis algorithm.
Formal BSN Safety Verification
For the formal verification of STHA models we use the reachability analysis al-
gorithm. We discretize three of the four spatio-temporal dimensions and use the
PHaver tool for reachability analysis on the remaining dimension. The tool accepts
a hybrid model, a list of forbidden (unsafe) states and an initial set of states and out-
puts whether the execution of the model will transition to unsafe states. To reduce
complexity of the analysis we considered only one dimensional space for this case
study. Thus, in our verification we had only two dimensions: 1) time and 2) one di-
mensional space. We discretized time as discussed in the algorithm and evaluated
the continuous dynamics of the hybrid automata in the one dimensional space.
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We consider two sensors placed at different distances from each other on
human arm and evaluate the thermal effects on human skin along the line connect-
ing their centers. The Penne’s equation was simplified to consider only one spatial
dimension over which reachability analysis is performed. This reachability analysis
is then repeated over several discrete time steps to determine safety of the BSN
operation. In any time step if the STHA model reaches unsafe states the analysis
is halted and the BSN design is deemed unsafe. The parameters of the Penne’s
equation are obtained from [81].
In order to show the effectiveness of the STHA modeling with respect to a
one dimensional hybrid automata, we develop a one dimensional hybrid automata
model of the BSN. It is to be noted that one advantage of STHA is its capability to
handle multiple space dimensions. But since we have simplified the case study to
have only one spatial dimension, we can use the one dimensional hybrid automata
to model BSN safety over space at a fixed time. The hybrid automata in this case will
look similar to the STHA model but Eq3 will be the same as Eq11. This is because
the one dimensional hybrid automata model cannot capture the aggregate effects
due to network of sensors in the BSN.
The safety threshold temperature is computed to be 39.2 °C from the Hen-
rique Moritz thermal damage parameter [129]. Table 6.2 shows the skin temperature
rise predicted by both the STHA and the hybrid model for different distances between
the sensors and at different time instants. It further shows the results of the reacha-
bility analysis in one dimensional space by the STHA and hybrid automata models.
It can be observed from the results that when the distance between the two sensors
is 0.005 m both the STHA and hybrid automata model predicts reachability to unsafe
states after 86400 seconds of operation. However, STHA model predicts that unsafe
states are reached much before at the time instant of 1240 seconds. Whereas the
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hybrid model predicts safe operation. Further, it can be observed that for every case
the hybrid automata model underestimates the temperature rise as it ignores the
aggregate effects. However, STHA predicts a higher temperature rise due to aggre-
gate effects. Thus, the STHA model is successful in capturing the aggregate effects
of networked operation in sensors, which a one dimensional hybrid automata fails to
do.
Drug infusion using infusion pumps
In this section we show the usage of CPS-DAS for safety analysis of single and
multi-channel infusion pumps.
Analgesic Infusion Pump
The analgesic infusion pump control algorithm obtains feedback from the human
body and attempts to keep the drug concentration in the blood at a desired value
Cd. The drug diffusion model takes the infusion rate as input and estimates the drug
concentration in blood (Cp) using a spatio-temporal partial differential Equation 6.47.
∂d
∂t
+ 5(ud) = 5(D(r) 5 d) + Γ(r)(dB(t) − d) − λd (6.47)
where d(r, t) is the tissue drug concentration at time t and distance r from the in-
fusion site, u(t) is the infusion rate, D(r) is the spatially varying diffusion coefficient
of the blood, Γ(r) is the spatially varying blood to tissue drug transfer coefficient,
and dB(t) is the desired drug concentration level after time t. However, in case of
analgesic infusion only the drug concentration at the infusion site is considered im-
portant [55]. Hence, the spatial region in the human body is discretized into two
compartments: 1) the tissue and 2) the capillary blood. The Equation 6.47 is then
simplified to the pharmacokinetic Equation 5.3 (PKA model) proposed in [55], also
called the two compartment model. In Equation 5.3, the first two lines represent
the diffusion process in the tissue, while the next two lines represent the diffusion
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Figure 6.8: Figure shows STHA model of the infusion pump. PKA model denotes
Eqn 6.47. The state transitions are spatio-temporal in nature.
process in the blood. Also the equations governing diffusion in these to spatial lo-
cations are interrelated and cannot be solved separately. This shows the strong
spatial nature of variation of the drug concentration. u(t) is the infusion rate of the
infusion pump. The differential equations in the model are time-delayed. This is be-
cause they consider time delays related to the infusion input (Ti), cardio-pulmonary
transport delay Tp and the arterial, capillary and venous transport delays Tr. The
controller first considers an initial infusion rate, which is the default infusion rate pro-
vided by the care giver, and estimates the drug concentrationCp using Equation 5.3.
If Cp > Cd then the controller increases the infusion rate by an increment δx, else
it decreases by the same amount. The controller queries the PKA Model every δt
time interval.
Infusion Pump Formal Model
The formal model for the infusion pump control system (Figure 6.8) has six states.
Each state is represented jointly by a discrete state in the infusion pump and a vari-
ant of the PKA model, which governs the state variables - infusion rate and drug
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concentration. Initially the pump is in Pump Off state with zero infusion rate and
waits for Infusion Start event from the care giver. In this state, the varia-
tion of the drug concentration follows PKA Model 2, which is Equation 6.47 with
dB(t) = 0. On the Infusion Start event the infusion pump model goes to the
Start Infusion state, where the infusion rate is set to a default value x0. In this state,
the PKA Model 1 is used to estimate the drug concentration Cp, where dB(t) is a
non zero constant. If Cp < Cd then the pump transits to the Increase Infusion state
where the infusion rate is increased by an amount δx, else ifCp < Cd, then the pump
transits to the Decrease Infusion state, where the infusion rate is decreased by δx
amount. These two states also use the PKA Model 1 to evaluate drug concentration
in the blood. In the Increased Infusion state if the drug concentration exceeds al-
lowable maximum CM then the model goes to Stop Infusion state where the infusion
rate is zero and drug concentration follows PKA Model 2. However, if Cd < Cp < CM
then the model transits to the Decrease Infusion state and stays there until Cp < Cd
again when it comes back to the Increase Infusion state. When in Increase Infusion
or Decrease Infusion states, if a bolus request event occurs, then the model
transits to the Start Bolus state. In this state, the drug concentration is governed by
PKA Model 3, where the infusion rate in Equation 6.47 is a step input for a short
duration Tb. When the bolus duration elapses or when Cp > CM in the Start Bolus
state the model transits to the Stop Bolus state (infusion rate = 0). The model comes
back to the Increase Infusion state whenever Cp < Cd.
Formal Infusion Pump Safety Verification
Five control parameters of the infusion pump are considered in this case study: 1)
control input delay, the time taken to transmit the control input from the controller to
the infusion pump, 2) set point, the drug concentration that is required to be main-
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Direction of increasing parameter value Safe region of operation for diffusion coefficient 0.26 cm2/s  
Figure 6.9: Safe and unsafe initial configurations of the infusion pump. The shaded
region includes the initial configurations of the infusion pump that result in drug con-
centration above prescribed safe values at any point in time and space.
tained, 3) bolus value, the infusion rate when bolus is requested by the patient, 4)
sampling interval, the time interval at which the controller samples the pharmacoki-
netic model, and 5) infusion increment, the maximum amount by which the controller
can increment the infusion rate. A configuration of the infusion pump is a tuple with
numeric values assigned to the above five parameters. In addition to these five con-
trol parameters we model the wireless channel PDR using the log normal shadow
fading model. On the loss of a control information, the infusion pump maintains
the infusion rate at the previous time slot. The reachability analysis as discussed in
Section 6.10 was performed on this model and the safe configurations of the infusion
pump were obtained as shown in Figure 6.9. In the figure, the five parameters were
considered in groups of three with the other two assuming constant values (a total of
100000 simulation runs). The control input delay was varied from 10 to 100 seconds,
the infusion increment step from 100 to 1000 ug/min, the set point from 100 to 1000
ug/l, the bolus from 600 to 1000 ug/min, and sampling interval from 5 to 25 s as rec-
ommended in the Graseby 3300 technical manual [130]. In each of the figure, the
unshaded regions are the unsafe states for the individual with diffusion coefficient
0.26 cm2/sec, where the drug concentration exceeded 1300 ug/min. The shaded
regions bounded by the bold lines are safe for the assumed values of the control
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parameters. The infusion pump failure example described in Chapter 1, can occur
due to two reasons: a) choice of infusion pump parameters in the unsafe region,
and b) the channel PDR falling in an unsafe region. Both suggest that during the
testing phase of the infusion pump, the environmental context driven cyber-physical
interaction between the pump and the human body were not considered. Further,
the region bounded by the dashed lines show the unsafe configurations for a dif-
ferent individual with a different diffusion coefficient. The overlapping of these two
regions indicates that the safe configurations of the pump for one individual is un-
safe for the other. These results verify our hypotheses set forth in Chapter 1: a)
the consideration of cyber-physical interactions between the human and the BSN




TACKLING NON-LINEARITIES IN CPS SAFETY ANALYSIS
Nonlinearities are inherent in a CPS since it involves a close interaction of the
computing system with the physical environment. Non-linearities impose hurdles
in reachability analysis of CPS models. Over the years researchers have concen-
trated in building the theory of reachability analysis of linear time invariant systems.
However, it is typically hard to tackle non-linearities. The principal hurdle is that non-
linearities can arise in many different forms in the model. It can be of the form of
a multiplicative term of two system parameters if there is internal feedback in the
physical system. It can be a power term for example in case of StefanŠs law [131]
of radiation. Given a type of non-linearity there may not exist a closed form solution
to the input-output relation of the system. Thus there may not be a single reacha-
bility analysis algorithm that can handle all non-linearities. This chapter considers
one type of nonlinearity found in artificial pancreas and shows how it can be tackles
using appropriate linearization and consequent error analysis.
7.1 Non-linear dynamics in Artificial Pancreas
Several models of glucose-insulin interaction have been proposed [132, 133], how-
ever, most frequently used is the Bergman’s Minimal Model (BMM) [99]. The BMM
represents the insulin action process as a set of three differential equations. The
BMM provides a relation between the interstitial insulin concentration X(t), blood
glucose concentration G(t), and the plasma insulin concentration Ip(t) as given in
Equation 7.1 - 7.3.
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dX(t)
dt = −k2.X(t) + k3.(I(t) − Ib), (7.1)
dG(t)
dt = −X(t).G(t) + k1.(Gb −G(t)) (7.2)
dI(t)
dt = −k4.I(t) + k5.(G(t) − k6)+.t, (7.3)
where k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, and k6 are constants to be determined for a specific patient.
Ib is the basal plasma insulin concentration and Gb is the basal glucose concentra-
tion in the blood. Further, G(0) = G0, X(0) = 0, and I(0) = I0.
The BMM is non-linear in two of the differential equations. The non-linear ef-
fect in Equation 7.2 is due to the interaction of the interstitial insulin with the glucose
in the blood. The non-linearity in the Equation 7.3 is more complex in the sense that
it has a sharp change in slope at time t when G(t) = h. These non-linearities make it
hard to model using currently available formal analysis tools, which can only perform
analysis on linear systems.
7.2 Modeling Artificial Pancreas with Hybrid Automata
Hybrid automata are most suited to model the discrete control algorithms and the
continuous human physiological processes in a single formal definition. The hy-
brid systems have finite number of states to represent operational modes of the
discrete control algorithms. Further, each state has an associated set of differen-
tial equations, which governs the variation of the system properties in the state.
The automata transits from one state to another when the system properties cross
thresholds. This model fits the artificial pancreas system perfectly, since the con-
trol algorithm also switches states depending upon when the glucose concentration
crosses pre-specified thresholds. A Linear Hybrid Automata (LHA), however, as-
sumes that the differential equations are all linear in nature. Theoretical analysis
of hybrid automata is complex and often infeasible with the exception of LHAs. A
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number of software tools such as PHaver [77], Ptolemy [134], are readily available
for performing the reachability analysis of an LHA. Hence, in this thesis we discuss
the modeling of artificial pancreas using LHAs. But before going into the details of
modeling and analysis, we first formally define an LHA.
Linear Hybrid Automata
An LHA assumes that any system variable ηi is governed by a differential equation
of the form of Equation 7.4.
dηi(t)
dt
= Aηi(t) + u, (7.4)
where, A and u are constants over time. Formally, an LHA is defined as -
Definition 22 Linear Hybrid Automata An n-dimensional Linear Hybrid Automata is
a tuple {L, Inv,A,u} where -
- L is a set of locations or discrete states of the LHA. A state of an LHA is an
element of the set space L × Rn.
- Inv : L → 2C is a mapping from the set of locations L to a set of cells C
and is called the invariant set for a given location. The set C consists of cells
Ci ⊂ Rn, such that for any two cells Coi
⋂
Coj = φ and
⋃
∀iCi = Rn. The
invariant set for a location has the following properties -
- all the cells within Inv(li) for a given location li are connected. Two cells
are connected when there is a path of adjacent cells in between them.
Two cells are adjacent if δCm
⋂
δCn , φ.
- for any two locations li and l j, Inv(li)o
⋂
Inv(l j)o = φ, where Inv(li)o
is the interior of the set Inv(li)o, which does not include the boundary





∀l∈L Invl = Rn
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- A : L → Rn×n is a function that maps each location to an n × n real valued
matrix.
- u : L → Rn is a function that maps each location to an n-dimensional real
valued vector.
The definition 22 only defines the components of an LHA. But for an LHA
to be executed we need to define three entities: a) trajectory at a given location, b)
execution over a given time, and c) discrete state transition.
Definition 23 Trajectory: The trajectory of an LHA for a location li, for a duration
t > 0 ∈ R is the map η : [0, t]→ Rn such that -
1. η(τ) satisfies Equation 7.4 ∀τ ∈ [0, t] and
2. η(τ) ∈ Inv(li) ∀τ ∈ [0, t]
We denote the duration of a trajectory as η.dur.
Definition 24 Execution: The execution α of an LHA from an initial state (l0, v0) ∈
L × Rn for a duration t is a concatenation of finite or infinite number of trajectories
η0η1η2 . . . such that -
• η0(0) = v0,




where α.dur is the duration of the execution. Re(.) is a reset function, which allows





















Figure 7.1: Hybrid automata modeling of artificial pancreas with non-linear
Bergmann minimal model governing the continuous dynamics.
Definition 25 Discrete state transition: For two locations or discrete states (li, l j) ∈
L a discrete transition takes place from li to l j at a state (li, v(τ)) ∈ L × Rn and at
time τ if v(τ) ∈ Inv(li) ⋂ Inv(l j) and v(τ) = Limτ′→τv(τ′) where v(τ′) ∈ Inv(li)o for
some δ > 0 such that τ′ ∈ [τ − δ, τ].
We next show how this definition of LHA is directly applicable to artificial
pancreas modeling in the following section.
Hybrid Modeling of Artificial Pancreas
To apply the LHA theory to the Artificial Pancreas system, the first step is to linearize
the Bergman Minimal Model (BMM).
Linearization of Bergman Minimal Model
To linearize the BMM we consider a small time interval h > 0 such that the changes
in the interstitial insulin concentration ∆x, blood glucose concentration ∆g, and the
plasma insulin concentration ∆i are small enough to neglect the multiplicative terms
∆x∆g and h∆g. We then consider an initial time t0 where we have the measured
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values of X(t0), G(t0), and I(t0). We can then replace X(t) = X(t0) + ∆x in the BMM
equations 7.1 and neglect the multiplicative terms to obtain the linearized equations
7.5.
d∆X
dh = −k2∆x + k3∆i (7.5)
d∆g
dh = −∆xG(t0) − ∆gX(t0) − k1∆g
d∆i
dh = −k4∆i + k5[G(t0) − k6]h + k5∆gt0, if ∆g > k6 −G(t0)
d∆i
dh = −k4∆i, if ∆g ≤ k6 −G(t0).
Artificial Pancreas Hybrid Automata Model
The artificial pancreas hybrid automata (APHA) can consist of 12 states in a hier-
archical design. At the top level, we can view the APHA as a three state hybrid
automata as shown in Figure 7.1. Each of the three states exactly corresponds to
the three discrete states of the control algorithm. The transition between these three
states are governed by threshold crossing by the glucose concentration. Each of the
three top level states can be divided into two states corresponding to the two differ-
ential equations for the plasma insulin concentration. The transition between these
two states are governed by thresholds on the glucose concentration given in Equa-
tion 7.5. Further, to reduce the approximation errors for the linearization, the time
h has to be small enough. Hence, given a small enough h, to apply the linearized
equations for estimating states over a long time, the glucose and insulin concen-
tration has to be reset to the current value. Reseting can only be done in an LHA
when there is a state transition. Hence, each of the six states in the APHA has to be
further divided into two states. The transition between these states is governed by
thresholds on the time intervals. The time for which the APHA stays in a particular
state is restricted to a small time h.
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Figure 7.2: Reachable states for the linearized artificial pancreas hybrid automata
model.
7.3 Patient Safety Analysis
To analyze patient safety we consider reachability analysis of the linearized hybrid
model of the artificial pancreas. Linearization introduces errors in estimation. In this
section, we first discuss the reachability analysis and then find an upper bound on
the error of the analysis.
Reachability Analysis
Reachability analysis of an LHA from an initial set of states {l0,V0} ∈ L × Rn, where
V0 ⊂ Rn, involves finding the set V f inal ⊂ Rn such that ∀v0 ∈ V0 and some time
t > 0 there exists an execution αv0 of duration t such that αv0(t) = v f inal for some
v f inal ∈ V f inal.
In other words, reachability analysis on an LHA results in all the continuous
states that can be reached by the LHA at any time starting from a given set of initial
states. Hence, when applied to artificial pancreas model it gives all possible values
of the interstitial insulin, plasma insulin, and blood glucose concentration that can
occur during its operation. Generally, computation of the exact reachable set is
infeasible. Hence, an over-approximation of the set is obtained through theoretical
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analysis. A number of LHA reachability analysis tools exist in the literature including
PHaver [77], Ptolemy [134], but we show here the usage of the PHaver tool.
In the reachability analysis we considered initial states with blood glu-
cose, plasma insulin, and interstitial insulin concentration within a range of
{G(t), I(t), X(t)} = {[60, 180], [0, 100], [0, 1]}. The reachable states or the possi-
ble values that the parameters can take at any arbitrary time are shown in lighter
shade in the Figure 7.2. If the glucose concentration crosses 180 mg/dl then it is
considered unsafe which is shown with dark shades in the Figure 7.2. The analysis
shows that for some configurations of the AP the glucose concentration reaches un-
safe levels to cause hyper-glycemia. The specific set of initial states did not cause
any hypo-glycemic cases. Given that we can perform the linearization and subse-
quent formal analysis we are now interested in the accuracy of the formal analysis
in the following section.
Error Bounds on the Linear Approximation
The linearization of the differential equations will lead to error in analysis. It is es-
sential to quantify this error in order to characterize the appropriateness of the lin-
earization. In this section we first derive an upper bound on the approximation error
and then argue that the error can be arbitrarily minimized with proper choice of the
time interval h.
As required for the linearization, we choose an initial time t0 and a time in-
terval h. Assuming that ∆x, ∆i, and ∆g are constant in the small h time interval, we
integrate the equations 7.5 over the interval time. We denote X′(t0 + h), G′(t0 + h),
and I′(t0 + h) as the estimations of X(t0 + h), G(t0 + h), and I(t0 + h), obtained
on linear approximation of the differential equations. Then we get Equations 7.6 on
integration,
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X′(t0 + h) − X(t0) = −k2[X′(t0 + h) − X(t0)]h (7.6)
+ k3[I′(t0 + h) − I(t0)]h
G′(t0 + h) −G(t0) = −[X′(t0 + h) − X(t0)]G(t0)h
− [G′(t0 + h) −G(t0)]X(t0)h
− k1[G′(t0 + h) −G(t0)]h
I′(t0 + h) − I(t0) = −k4[I′(t0 + h) − I(t0)]h
+ k5[G(t0) − k6]h2/2
+ k5[G′(t0 + h) −G(t0)]t0h
The estimations X′(t0 + h), G′(t0 + h), and I′(t0 + h) can be found by simultaneously
solving the set of three equations 7.6.
Over-approximations Xo(t0 + h), Go(t0 + h), and Io(t0 + h) of the parameters
X(t0+h),G(t0+h), and I(t0+h) can be determined by over-estimating the derivatives
of Equation 7.1. The over estimation is done by neglecting all the negative terms in
the derivative as shown in Equation 7.7.
dXo(t)
dt = k3(I
o(t) − Ib) (7.7)
dGo(t)




Solving the ordinary nonlinear differential equations 7.7 we can obtain an upper
bound on the approximation error for estimating the plasma insulin concentration as
given in Equation 7.8.
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Io (t0 + h) − I′(t0 + h) (7.8)
= (k5Gb − k5k6)(2t0 + h)h2







− k5(G(t0) − k6)h
2/2(1 + k2h)[1 + X(t0)h + k1h]
(1 + k4h)(1 + k2h)[1 + X(t0)h + k1h] + k3k5t0h3G(t0)
Similar equations can be found for the variables Xo(t) and Go(t) can be found fol-
lowing the similar process. For a chosen h the error in the values of X(t), G(t), and
I(t) can be computed from the Equation 7.8. Further, given an error bound the value
of h can be chosen from the Equation 7.8 so that the parameter estimation error is
within the desired bounds.
Figure 7.3 shows the linearization error with respect to the time discretization
interval. The initial blood glucose concentration was varied from 120 mg/dl to 180
mg/dl, the interstitial insulin concentration was varied from 0 U/dl to 1 U/dl in steps of
0.1 U/dl while the insulin concentration was varied from 0 mg/dl to 100 mg/dl in steps
of 1 mg/dl. The error curve can be used to obtain the linearization error for a given
discretization interval or to determine a discretization interval for a given error. The
different lines in the graph indicate error curves for different initial configurations of
the AP. The boundary lines limit the maximum linearization error within a band and
is a measure of confidence on the results of the formal safety analysis. As shown
in this example a suitable h = 6.82secs can be selected from this curve so that the
error is within 5%.
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SYNTHESIS OF CPS MODELS
This chapter discusses the contributions and ongoing work on automated synthesis
of CPS models.
8.1 Motivation and Related Works
Software synthesis: Automated synthesis of sensor programs has been a major fo-
cus of research. However, most of the work have concentrated in either developing
APIs or TinyOS specific sensor code generation. There exists several work on API
development for TinyOS to support signal processing, intelligent storage, and en-
ergy efficient communication [135–137]. However, to use these APIs the user has
to write TinyOS code for the sensors, requiring domain specific knowledge. Fur-
ther, the authors [136,137] do not consider the interfacing of the sensors with smart
phone, which is an important component of a BSN used in a PHMS. The mobile
middleware [135] provides basic API for the smart phone to control the sensors.
However, this again requires user effort to write the code.
Researchers have also focused on code generation for sensors from a high
level specification such as Simulink [137], or graphical specifications [138–140]. The
framework proposed in [137] comes closest to Health-Dev since they generate code
for TinyOS based sensors and can also execute sensor algorithms. However, the
supported algorithms are not related to physiological signal processing (required for
a PHMS). They are execution sequences of sensor operations such as sensing,
communicating, and radio duty cycling. The other works such as RaPTEX [138],
Viptos [139], and TOSDev [140] consider the sensor nodes as only a sensing and
communication device and does not allow physiological signal processing. Hence,
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a framework that can support intuitive high level specification for both sensors and
smart phones with OS and hardware independent code generation, and physiologi-
cal signal processing is missing in the literature. Health-Dev fills this gap.
Hardware Synthesis of Hybrid Models: Several efforts have been undertaken for
the hardware synthesis of physical processes involving continuous dynamics. Two
very common approaches to synthesis are to either develop an Application Spe-
cific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) [141, 142] or to use Field Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGAs) [143–145]. In both the approaches there is a common theme of discretiza-
tion of the continuous dynamics and approximation of the actual physical behavior.
However, such discretization leads to errors in the synthesis, which are hard to char-
acterize given the complexity of the continuous dynamics. This research proposes
to use the latest reconfigurable analog signal processors (RASPs) to implement the
continuous dynamics in STHA. Such a system uses analog signal processor mod-
ules to implement continuous signal characteristics and can form the building blocks
of any continuous variable, which is governed by a complex differential equation.
8.2 Health-Dev: Model Based Synthesis of BSNs
Health-Dev consists of three modules: 1) specification, 2) parsing, and 3) code
generation (Figure 8.1).
Specification Module
At the front end it provides the user with an interface to provide a high level spec-
ification of the BSN. In the specification module, the user provides three types of
information:
Sensor specification: In Health-Dev , the user specifies the computation, and com-
munication requirements for each type of sensed signal. Multiple sensors can be
























 PeakDetect  









Mean  Comm 
Platform: TelosB 
Comm: ZigBee 













Node N, Node M 















Sensor Platform N 
Type: Temperature, Humidity 
Platform: TelosB 
Algorithm Input Map: 
Temperature  Mean  Comm, 
Humidity Comm 
Comm Send To: Node K 
Comm Receive From: None 
Radio Schedule: duty cycle 
Sensor Platform M 
Type: ECG 
Platform: Shimmer 
Algorithm Input Map: ECG  
PeakDetect  HRcal  STDcal 
 Comm  
Comm Send To: Broadcast 
Comm Receive From: Broadcast 
Radio Schedule: Always On 
Smart Phone 
Button OnClicks: Start graphing, stop 
application, call mean function 
Text View Inputs: Heart rate value 
Graph Vars: Raw sensed value 
Comm: Bluetooth parameters 
Comm Receiver: Node N, M 
Algorithm Input Map: NodeN data  
















































Figure 8.1: Architecture of the Health-Dev which has three modules: specification,
parser, and code generator.
of the platform. For each sensed signal a separate specification module is main-
tained, which has two ports: i) input data, denoting the raw sensed data and 2)
output data, denoting the data that is to be reported via the wireless network. In
this module, three types of information are maintained: 1) Sensor properties: This
class of information includes the type of sensor, e.g., temperature or humidity or
electrocardiogram (ECG) signals, the sampling frequency of the signals, sensitiv-
ity, and the platform type. Health-Dev supports most commercially available sensor
platforms such as TelosB ( xbow.com ), Shimmer ( shimmer-research.info ), BSN v3
( http://vip.doc.ic.ac.uk/bsn/a1892.html ), and iMote2 ( bullseye.xbow.com ).
2) Sensor subcomponents: Each sensor has two classes of subcomponents re-
lated to the computation performed on the sensed value and communication of data
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(Figure 8.2). For computation in a sensor, the Health-Dev provides algorithm sub-
components. An algorithm subcomponent has an input port and an output port.
This subcomponent also has a property to specify the name of the algorithm. A
database of algorithms are maintained in the code generator module. If the algo-
rithm name matches any one of the available algorithms then the database code
is used in the synthesis. Otherwise, the user has to implement the algorithm in the
form of a function in the platform specific programming language and include it in the
database. The communication subcomponent has properties to specify the commu-
nication protocol, which can be either Bluetooth or ZigBee, multi-hop or single hop
communication, and the frequency of packet transmission. This subcomponent also
has four ports pertaining to the source id from which a packet is received, received
data, destination id to which data has to be sent, and send data. Further, there are
two additional data subcomponents in the sensor to specify its node id, and its one
hop neighbor node ids. Sensors with the same node id are implemented in the same
platform.
3) Sensor connections: To facilitate specification of algorithm execution sequence
and type of information transfered to the network, Health-Dev provides two types of
connections (Figure 8.2). Using the algorithm connections the user can specify the
inputs of each algorithm, which can be either the raw signal or the output of another
algorithm. For example, the raw ECG samples from the sensor can be passed
through a peak detector, heart rate calculator (HRCal), and heart standard deviation
calculator in sequence (Figure 8.1). The output can be transmitted to the smart
phone using the communication subcomponent. The communication connections
can then be used to specify the transmission and reception parameters.
Network specification: The routing information and communication energy manage-
ment schemes are specified in this subcomponent. Routing information can be in-
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Table 8.1: Specifiable properties in Health-Dev
Sensing Computation Communication Phone






2. Platform (BSNBench, heart rate 2. destination &
source address
2. text view inputs





4. Sampling frequency 2. Execution sequence 4. radio duty cycle 4. execution sequences
cluded in a routing table, a separate file, and the filename can be specified in the
routing info field. If a routing table file is provided then the user does not need to
specify the destination and source id. The parser will extract those information from
the routing table. If none is specified then a default scheme of flooding is employed.
For communication energy management, three modes of radio operation are sup-
ported - radio is always on, or is only on during transmissions, or duty cycled.
Smart phone specification: Health-Dev allows the user to specify the UI of the smart
phone base station, the sensor nodes in the BSN that can communicate with the
base station, and the algorithms to be run in the base station on the received data.
The user can specify buttons, text views, graphs in the smart phone subcomponent.
In the button OnClick functions Health-Dev currently allows only starting and stop-
ping graphs and running basic algorithms such as computation of mean, standard
deviation of received data. Text view and graph view inputs are specified using con-
nections in the smart phone subcomponents. Currently in Health-Dev only Android
based smart phones are considered, which communicate with the sensors using the
Bluetooth communication protocol (Table 8.1).
Parser Module
The parser module takes the specification of the BSN as input and generates meta
models, which are used in the code generation module for actual code synthesis.
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AADL Sensor Specification TinyOS Code 
 system implementation Sensor.Temp_1 
    subcomponents 
 
      Algorithm_Mean: process Algorithm.Mean_1; 
 
      Algorithm_FFT: process Algorithm.FFT_1; 
 
      Comm: system Communication.Sensor_1_SS; 
 
    connections 
 
      AlgInput: data port InputData -> 
 Algorithm_Mean.Input; 
 
      AlgOutput: data port Algorithm_Mean.Output -> 
 Algorithm_FFT.Input; 
 
      AlgOutput2: data port Algorithm_FFT.Output -> 
 OutputData; 
 
      Com: data port OutputData -> 
 Comm.Send_Data; 
 
      Destin: data access SendAddress.neighbor -> 
 Comm.Destination_ID; 
 
    properties 
 
      SensorParameter::SamplingFrequency => 123 Hz; 
 
      SensorParameter::Sensitivity => 1 g; 
 
      SensorParameter::Platform => telosb; 
 
      SensorParameter::SensorType => "Temperature"; 
 
      NetworkParameter::RadioDutyCycle => On; 



















module{  uses{ 
#ifdef TEMPERATURE 
    interface Timer<TMilli> as TimerTemperature; 
    interface Read<uint16_t> as ReadTemperature;  }} 
       #ifdef DUTYCYCLE     call RadioControl.start();   #endif 
        if (call AMSend.send(AM_BROADCAST_ADDR, &sendBuf, 
sizeof(localTemperature)) == SUCCESS)      sendBusy = TRUE;      
      #ifdef DUTYCYCLE      call RadioControl.stop();     #endif  }    }  } 
implementation { 
#ifdef TEMPERATURE 
  int32_t mean(int32_t *p, int32_t size){ ……..} 
  int32_t * FFT256(int32_t *p, int32_t size){………} 
   event void TimerTemperature.fired() { 
    if (reading == NREADINGS_TEMP){    
               meanOutput = mean(localTemperature,reading); 
               (int32_t *)fft256Output   = malloc(512*sizeof(int32_t)); 
               fft256Output = FFT256(meanOutput,256); ………………… 
       configuration{ 
       components new SensirionSht11C() as Sensirion;  } 
       implementation{ 
       #ifdef TEMPERATURE 
       OscilloscopeC.TimerTemperature -> TimerMilliC; 
       OscilloscopeC.ReadTemperature -> Sensirion.Temperature; …… 
 enum {   
DEFAULT_INTERVAL_TEMP = 123, 




// Line 16  
// Lines 3 and 4 
// Lines 
7,8, and 9 




15 and 16 
// Lines 13 and 14 
system implementation UI.imp 
 
    subcomponents 
 
      ECGDisplayGraph: system Graph.imp1; 
 
      HeartRateTextView: system TextView.imp1; 
 
      ButtonStartGraph: system Button.impStart; 
 
      ButtonStopGraph: system Button.impStop; 
 
      AlgoHeartRate: process  Algorithm.PeakDetection_1; 
 
      AlgoFFT: process Algorithm.FFT_1; 
 
      PatientInfo: system TextView.patientInfo; 
 
    connections 
 
      GraphDisplay: data port InputGraph1 -> 
 ECGDisplayGraph.GraphInput; 
 
      HeartRateCompute1: data port InputDataFromSensor ->  
 AlgoHeartRate.Input; 
 
      HeartRateCompute2: data port AlgoHeartRate.Output -> 
 AlgoFFT.Input; 
 
      HeartRateDisplay: data port AlgoFFT.Output -> 
 InputTextView1; 
 
      HeartRateInput: data port InputTextView1 -> 
 HeartRateTextView.TvInput; 
 
  end UI.imp; 
……………………………………. 
system implementation TextView.patientInfo 
 
    properties 
 
      UiParameters::PatientName => “Alice"; 
 
      UiParameters::Gender => “F"; 
 































EditText age;   ………………. 
graphView = new GraphView(this, values, 
"GraphView",horlabels, verlabels, 
GraphView.LINE);  ………………  
Android Java Code 







public void onClick(View v) { 
int cmdId = v.getId(); 
if (cmdId == idButton0){ 
flag=false ; 
StartReadThread(start); }}});  
  ……….. 
public final BroadcastReceiver  
mReceiver = new BroadcastReceiver() { 
@Override 
public void onReceive 
(Context context, Intent intent) { 




AADL Smart Phone Specification Smart Phone Code 
// Line 3 
- 9  
// Line 
17 - 22  
// 
Bluetooth 
Figure 8.2: AADL specification of a sensor and smart phone and their TinyOS and
Java codes
Sensor parser: The main function of this parser is to convert the platform indepen-
dent specification of the sensors to a platform specific one. The parser extracts
the node id and sensor platform information from each sensor specification and
groups the sensors with same node id to the same sensor platform and creates a
meta model for that platform or “mote". The parser then parses the sensor types
and gives platform specific names to the sensors for example for TelosB platform
a temperature sensor is named as Sensirion Sht11. For each algorithm the parser
extracts the appropriate filename from the platform specific database and includes it
in the meta model. It then parses the connections in the specification and for each
algorithm extracts the input map. For example, the input to the mean function in
sensor platform N in Figure 8.1, are the temperature readings and the number of
readings. For each communication specification the parser extracts the destination
node id, data to be sent, source node id, data received, and routing information, and
includes them in the meta model.
Smart phone parser: The smart phone parser in Health-Dev is made specific for
Android development and is primarily concerned with setting up the UI. The UI in
Android is an XML specification with specific keywords defined in the Android Java
183
widget. The smart phone parser reads the UI specification and converts it to the
corresponding XML specification.
Code Generation Module
The code generation module takes the parser output and uses code databases to
generate code for sensor platforms and smart phone. There are three types of code
databases:
Sensor platform specific database: The sensor platform program generally follows
an event driven paradigm, where there are event handler functions for sensing and
communication. In these event handlers, computation tasks can be posted for exe-
cution after the processing of the events. This is especially true for TinyOS, which is
the most popular OS used in sensor platforms. Further, the OS has several platform
independent hardware abstraction modules that can be used to handle sensing and
communication hardware. These abstractions are then wired to appropriate hard-
ware units to generate executable code. In the database, for each platform, a basic
module file for handling all available type of sensing and communication hardware
and their event handlers are stored. The different types of sensing and communi-
cation protocols are differentiated using preprocessing directives. Similarly a wiring
file is generated with all possible hardware modules differentiated by pre-processing
directives.
OS specific database: A collection of algorithms related to physiological signal pro-
cessing and health data statistics analysis are kept in this data base. The algorithms
include the BSNBench suite [146], a benchmark specifically designed for BSNs con-
sisting of FFT, peak detection, and statistics operation. Further, it includes physio-
logical signal specific algorithms such as heart rate calculator from ECG signal or
photo-plethysmogram pulse width calculator, signal normalization, correlation com-
putation.
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Smart phone database: This database consists of parameterized declaration and
call back codes written in Java for Buttons, Text View, and Graph Views. The Java
widgets provided by Android are also kept in the smart phone database.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
9.1 Conclusions
CPSes are increasingly becoming pervasive and are enabling critical operations in
systems providing improved health care, smart-spaces, green and cost effective
amenities. To enable wide acceptance of CPSes, their safe, secure and sustainable
operation has to be ensured. The tight coupling between computing units and physi-
cal environment in CPS when used intelligently can assure safe, secure and sustain-
able systems. However, the complex nature of the interactions impose several hard
challenges in CPS design. This thesis focuses on the problem of assuring safety
of the physical environment under the operation of CPSes. The thesis considers
the interaction of the CPS software with of dynamically changing physical environ-
ment and proposes analytical and simulation based techniques to estimate harmful
effects of the interaction. The main contributions of the thesis are: a) CPS-DAS tool
for simulation analysis of interaction safety, b) Spatio-Temporal Hybrid Automata for
formal verification of interaction safety, c) a tractable algorithm for analyzing interac-
tion safety under dynamic contexts, and d) Health-Dev tool for automatic synthesis
of healthcare CPS software from models.
9.2 Immediate extensions
Research in the area of MBE of CPSes has recently received considerable attention
and offers several unsolved problems. This thesis attempts to solve some of the
important ones related to safety assurance of CPSes and in the process opens up
new venues of research. Some of these problems are part of ongoing research
which will be discussed first. This section discusses the extensions that are being
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currently worked on. The extensions include the development of a tool for modeling,
analysis or verification, and development of CPSes and a technique for synthesizing
the STHA models of CPSes in hardware.
Integrated Tool for CPS Safety Analysis, Verification, and Design
An immediate future extension of this thesis, is the development of a tool that takes
intuitive architectural specification of CPSes using the constructs discussed in Chap-
ter 4, and enables both simulation and reachability analysis for safety verification.
However, this will require an automated conversion of architectural models into for-
mal models. Such model conversions are non-trivial and needs to carefully consider
boundary conditions.
Each LCPS in the GCPS model can be represented with a STHA model. The
state parameters for the GCPS model can be derived from the specification of the
computing unit (discrete variables) and ROIm and ROIn (dynamic equations). State
transitions will be affected by events in the computing domain or due to intersection
of the ROIn or ROIm. Separate states will be used to specify cumulative effects
of interactions. Transitions to those states will be governed by events generated in
the spatial domain (intersection of ROIn or ROIm). However, the following problems
arise with such specification:
1. Determination of region boundaries: The region boundaries can be de-
rived from the physical dynamics of the human body specified in the ROIm.
However, in most applications of CPSes the variation of the monitored param-
eter (determined by the physical dynamics) varies asymptotically in space. In
that case the region boundaries are infinite. The region boundaries can be
limited in extent by setting thresholds on the variation of the monitored param-
eter. For example, in case of thermal side-effect evaluation a low threshold
187
on the human tissue temperature rise can be imposed such that temperature
variations below this threshold is neglected. These thresholds can be used
as boundary conditions for the physical dynamics equation to compute the
region boundary. An alternative to this approach is the specification of the
region boundary equation in the model itself. For example, the user considers
the thermal effects within a circular region centered at the medical device lo-
cation. However, this may lead to in accuracies in the estimation of the effects
of the interactions.
2. Computation of aggregate effect: Aggregate effects of interactions can be
evaluated by considering the overlap in the ROIms and ROIns and combin-
ing the physical dynamic equations for the two regions. For special types of
region boundaries (square, circle) closed form equations for determination of
overlap regions is readily available. But in real life scenarios, region bound-
aries can have complex shapes and the determination of overlapping regions
can become mathematically rigorous.
Synthesizing STHA Models in Hardware
Hardware synthesis of STHA models is beneficial due to two important reasons:
1. Simulation of the differential equations governing the physical processes in
hardware is usually orders of magnitude faster than software.
2. CPSs generally consist of several computing systems interfaced together to
form a complex system. A hardware synthesis of the physical system will en-
able experimental testing of individual components of the CPS by interfacing
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Figure 9.1: Resistor grid and diffusor network synthesis of second order differential.
Research in this area is ongoing where diffusor networks are used for the
synthesis of differential equations representing the physical system. A diffusor net-
work can be conceptually viewed as a grid of resistors, as shown in the Figure 9.1.
A given 2nd order derivative δ
2V
δx2 can be discretized using the finite difference time
domain method [147] and represented as -
Vm+1(i, j) = K × [Vm(i + 1, j) + Vm(i, j + 1) + Vm(i − 1, j) + Vm(i, j − 1)], (9.1)
where the time is discretized into slots indexed by m, the x and y dimensions are
discretized with slots indexed by i and j, respectively and K is a constant. This
differential can be easily represented in the resistor grid if we consider the parameter
Vm+1(i, j) as voltages v0, v1, v2 . . . vn at appropriate nodes in the resistor grid (Figure
9.1(a)). Applying Kirchoff’s law to the resistor grid we get,
v1 =
1













which is similar to the equation 9.1. The value of the resistors can be properly
calibrated based on the constant K.
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The diffuser network uses CMOS circuits operated in collector mode and can
efficiently emulate the resistor grid circuit. Further, due to the floating gate nature
of the CMOS devices variable capacitors can also be simulated hence enabling a
more accurate representation of differentials. As shown in the Figure 9.1(b) the input




− Ik−1e−κ/VT (Vak−1−Vbk−1) − Ik+1e−κ/VT (Vak−Vbk+1) + Ik (9.3)
+ Ike−κ/VT (Vak−Vbk) + Ike−κ/VT (Vak−1−Vbk)
Here Ik s are the source currents of the CMOSs and Iink is the drain current at
node Vk. κ is a constant depending on the semiconductor device and VT is the
threshold voltage, and Va and Vb are the gate voltages of the corresponding nodes.
Interestingly, the z transform of equation 9.3 has the same form as that of a second
order derivative.
With this theory as background, connections of diffuser networks and resistor
grids are being used to implement the differential equations representing physical
dynamics in hardware.
9.3 Future research directions
This section discusses the future research directions in each of the three stages of
MBSV that are considered in this thesis.
Modeling Stage
This thesis considers modeling the cyber-physical interactions using hybrid models.
However, it makes important assumptions that the computing unit is the principal
active system in the CPS and it responds to context changes in the physical en-
vironment. When such assumptions are lifted interesting research problems may
arise.
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1. Modeling Interaction with Non-Passive Physical Systems
Most of the case studies considered in the thesis, represent the physical system as a
passive entity expressed by differential equations. This assumption is often not true.
Consider the example where a sensor in a BSN that measures physiological values
from the human body and transfers it to a the base station is implanted in the tissue.
Let the ROIn be defined as the communication range of the sensor node and the
ROIm be defined as the area of the surrounding tissue that receives thermal energy
from the sensor due to its heat dissipation. Implantation often leads to growth of tis-
sue around the computing unit resulting in a change in the ROIm of the system [149].
However, this phenomenon leads to a change in the electromagnetic environment
of the worker node thus altering, maybe reducing, its communication capabilities or
affecting the ROIn. The radio power control algorithm will then increase the transmis-
sion power to increase the communication range. Thus the radio will now heat the
surrounding tissue even more effectively leading to thermal runaway. Thus growth in
the physical system, in this case human body, makes it an active component. There
is no known differential equation model for such effects. Hidden markov model or
neural networks may be used to model such active behavior, but such models are
not specifiable in CPS-DAS. Thus, modeling the interaction with computing units and
an active physical system in a CPS is an open research problem.
2. Hierarchical Formal Models for Dynamic Contexts
Dynamic contexts are probabilistic in nature. A formal approach to modeling dy-
namic contest may thus necessitate a probabilistic timed automata (PTA) [150] as
shown in the Figure 9.2. For example, mobility of an user can be modeled using
PTAs. Each state in the PTA represents the location context of the user. The time
spent in a particular state is determined by different random distributions. Depending
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Figure 9.2: Probabilistic timed automata composed with mobility models, STHA
models, and scavenging source models.
the user has to leave home at 8 am to get to his office or during lunch the user might
go to his favorite place often. For states such as meet friends the location of the
user may follow the Levy walk probability distribution as suggested in [87]. Hence
context models are discrete while the models of physiology are continuous. A hybrid
automata approach would intuitively sound feasible for modeling the cooperation.
However, the state transition relations for a hybrid automata do not depend on dis-
crete events. Instead they are governed by system parameter variation according
to the continuous dynamics. In order to model the effect of dynamic contexts and
cyber-physical interactions, composition relations of the context models and physical
models have to be defined. In this regard, hierarchical formal models as shown in
the Figure 9.2, can be investigated. In such a model, a probabilistic timed automata
representation of the context will be considered. In each state, the human physiol-
ogy can be represented using hybrid automata. Given the spatio-temporal nature
of human physiology, a spatio-temporal hybrid automata can be used. Hence, each
state in the finite state automata will have a corresponding STHA to represent the
effect of dynamic contexts on the cyber-physical interaction. Such models are com-
192
plex and theoretical analysis is not guaranteed to be feasible. Nevertheless this is
an important area of research.
Analysis Stage
3. Extending STHA Reachability Analysis to Multidimensional Space
The STHA reachability analysis presented in the thesis is only for a single dimen-
sional space. An important extension is to convert this algorithm for multidimensional
space. However, such extensions may not be a direct corollary of the one dimen-
sional case. If the partial differential equation expressing the physical dynamics is
such that the variation in each spatial dimension is independent of the other, then
replicating the spatial image computation technique in Algorithm 6.2 for the other
two dimensions will suffice. Otherwise, a closed form approximation similar to the
Equation 6.15 for the one dimensional case will have to be derived. The discretiza-
tion parameters for each dimension will have to be chosen separately such that the
 approximation still holds. Non-linear spatio-temporal dynamics further aggravates
the problem since non-linearities may arise in several forms necessitating solutions
targeting special forms of differential equations.
Synthesis Stage
4. Online verification
The analysis and verification technique proposed in this thesis are all offline and
performed before implementation of the CPS. Moreover, the verification is done as-
suming a range of input parameters that can occur a real setting. The analysis or
verification results are not valid if the input parameters are out of the assumed range.
However, the physical environment is random and may have unexpected variations
which may not be taken into account in the verification stage. In such a scenario, a
static design of the system may not have the same safety properties as promised in
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the verification stage. Hence, different inputs to the CPS has to be reverified for the
new set of physical properties. Thus an online verification approach is necessary,
which takes the current physical parameters of the CPS and verifies each control
input before applying it to the system on-the-fly.
Online verification has received recent focus in the domain of transportation
and medical CPS [38, 151]. Researchers have demonstrated online verification us-
ing linear hybrid automata in theory and simulation but not in practice. However,
several fundamental research issues need to be solved before online verification
can be realized in practice.
1. Is online verification of more complex models of CPS such as STHA feasible?
Online verification requires fast execution of the synthesized formal models.
The complexity of the execution of STHA model depends on the desired accu-
racy or over estimation and can be time consuming for very accurate results.
2. What type of synthesis of formal model will make online verification feasible?
There can be two types of synthesis: a) in software, and b) in hardware. Syn-
thesis in software can be added as a module to the existing software of the
CPS, however its execution will be much slower. Synthesis in hardware has a
faster execution but it can make the CPS bulky, which can be a major concern
for applications such as UAV or medical devices.
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